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On sense and reference. A critical reception

In Michael Potter, Joan Weiner, Warren Goldfarb, Peter Sullivan, Alex Oliver & Thomas Ricketts (eds.), The Cambridge companion to Frege. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 293-341 (2010)

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  1. Predicativity, the Russell-Myhill Paradox, and Church’s Intensional Logic.Sean Walsh - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (3):277-326.
    This paper sets out a predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox of propositions within the framework of Church’s intensional logic. A predicative response places restrictions on the full comprehension schema, which asserts that every formula determines a higher-order entity. In addition to motivating the restriction on the comprehension schema from intuitions about the stability of reference, this paper contains a consistency proof for the predicative response to the Russell-Myhill paradox. The models used to establish this consistency also model other axioms (...)
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  • Frege’s puzzle and arithmetical formalism. Putting things in context.Sorin Costreie - 2013 - History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (3):207-224.
    The paper discusses the emergence of Frege's puzzle and the introduction of the celebrated distinction between sense and reference in the context of Frege's logicist project. The main aim of the paper is to show that not logicism per se is mainly responsible for this introduction, but Frege's constant struggle against formalism. Thus, the paper enlarges the historical context, and provides a reconstruction of Frege's philosophical development from this broader perspective.
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  • Patterns, Noise, and Beliefs.Lajos Ludovic Brons - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (1):19-51.
    In “Real Patterns” Daniel Dennett developed an argument about the reality of beliefs on the basis of an analogy with patterns and noise. Here I develop Dennett’s analogy into an argument for descriptivism, the view that belief reports do no specify belief contents but merely describe what someone believes, and show that this view is also supported by empirical evidence. No description can do justice to the richness and specificity or “noisiness” of what someone believes, and the same belief can (...)
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