With the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971, John Rawls not only rejuvenated contemporary political philosophy but also defended a Kantian form of Enlightenment liberalism called “justice as fairness.” Enlightenment liberalism stresses the development and exercise of our capacity for autonomy, while Reformation liberalism emphasizes diversity and the toleration that encourages it. These two strands of liberalism are often mutually supporting, but they conflict in a surprising number of cases, whether over the accommodation of group difference, the design (...) of civic education, or the promotion of liberal values internationally. During the 1980’s, however, Rawls began to jettison key Kantian characteristics of his theory, a process culminating in the 1993 release of Political Liberalism and completing the transformation of justice as fairness into a Reformation liberalism. -/- Reconstructing Rawls argues that this transformation was a tragic mistake because it jeopardized the most important features of his theory, viz. the lexical priorities of right, liberty, and fair equality of opportunity as well as the difference principle. Controversially, this book contends that Rawls’s so-called “political turn,” motivated by a newfound interest in diversity and the accommodation of difference, has been unhealthy for autonomy-based liberalism and has pushed liberalism more broadly towards cultural relativism, be it in the guise of liberal multiculturalism or critiques of cosmopolitan distributive-justice theories. The book then demonstrates that the central elements of justice as fairness can only be defended within the context of a Kantian Enlightenment liberalism and that Rawls’s hope for a more pluralistic grounding for his theory, endorsed by a wide variety of belief systems present in modern democratic societies, is illusory. -/- Reconstructing Rawls is the first book to systematically compare Rawls’s and Kant’s theories and the first to offer an internal critique and reconstruction of justice as fairness, reconceiving it as a comprehensive, universalistic Kantian liberalism. By doing so, it gives us both the vision of a liberal world order—“a republicanism of all states, together and separately,” as Kant put it—and a mode of justification addressed to all men and women, not as members of particular nations, races, and faiths, but as human beings, as citizens of the world. In short, it reclaims Rawls for the Enlightenment. (shrink)

Rawls’s account of international toleration in The Law of Peoples has been the subject of vigorous critiques by critics who believe that he unacceptably dilutes the principles of his Law of Peoples in order to accommodate non-liberal societies. One important component in these critiques takes issue specifically with Rawls’s inclusion of certain non-liberal societies (‘decent peoples’) in the constituency of justification for the Law of Peoples. In Rawls’s defence, I argue that the explanation for the inclusion of decent peoples in (...) the constituency of justification is not, as is standardly assumed, that they are the kind of societies that ought to be tolerated in that way on some prior conception of which kinds of societies ought to be tolerated in that way. The real explanation appeals to a methodological principle underlying Rawls’s approach to political justification, according to which liberals owe justification, as a matter of liberal principle, to those who comply with liberal principles for political institutions that apply to them. If such liberal principles can be complied with by agents who nevertheless cannot accept fully liberal justifications for those principles, then liberalism itself requires liberals to seek justifications which they can accept. This approach gives us a new way to view decent peoples: as just such agents, who are therefore owed a justification for the Law of Peoples that they can accept. Decency is thus a concept that is internal to liberal political justification at the international level. Reading Rawls in this way permits a coherent and attractive defence of his strategy of toleration and of his international theory as a whole. (shrink)

Cosmopolitanism and statism represent the two dominant liberal theoretical standpoints in the current debate on global distributive justice. In this paper, I will develop a feminist argument that recommends that statist approaches be rejected. This argument has its roots in the feminist critique of liberal theories of social justice. In Justice, Gender, and the Family Susan Moller Okin argues that many liberal egalitarian theories of justice are inadequate because they assume a strict division between public and private spheres. I will (...) argue that this inadequacy is replicated in statist approaches to global justice. To demonstrate this, I will show how an analogue of Okin's critique of Rawls's A Theory of Justice can be extended to his The Law of Peoples. I will conclude that statist theories inevitably assume a strong divide between public and private spheres and that by doing so they allow for situations marked by gross injustice which anyone concerned with the welfare of the world's most vulnerable should find unacceptable. (shrink)

In my reply to Pogge's critique of Rawls's international relations theory, I will try to show two things: (1) that Pogge's account of the public criterion of domestic social justice endorsed by Rawls is a partial one and (2) that this leads him to wrongly postulate a significant asymmetry between Rawls's domestic and international theories of justice. In the end, I hope to show that the domestic and international accounts are characterized by a significant degree of symmetry ? that both (...) accounts are motivated by Rawls's fundamental concern with self-respect. In other words, a more expansive, complete account of the domestic public criterion of social justice necessarily leads us (contra Pogge) to affirm a significant degree of continuity between the domestic and international accounts. (shrink)

Quando foi publicado, em 1999, O Direito dos Povos sofreu várias críticas, estando entre as mais influentes aquelas feitas por pensadores cosmopolitas. Muitas destas críticas se devem ao fato de que antes da publicação de O Direito dos Povos alguns pensadores apresentaram teorias de justiça internacional com bases na Justiça como Equidade de Rawls. Com base no que fora desenvolvido nestas teorias muitos esperavam que O Direito dos Povos apresentasse amplas garantias democráticas e, especialmente, um princípio distributivo de ampla aplicação. (...) Entretanto, O Direito dos Povos trouxe uma lista não tão abrangente de direitos humanos e apenas um modesto princípio de auxílio aos povos necessitados. Por essas razões certas críticas dizem que o Direito dos Povos não é coerente com a Justiça como Equidade. Pensamos, entretanto, que não só o Direito dos Povos é coerente com a Justiça como equidade, como também apresenta vantagens em relação à sua aplicabilidade em relação ao cosmopolitismo justificado na Justiça como Equidade. (shrink)

O modelo do realismo político nas relações internacionais concebe as relações entre os Estados como dadas em um espaço em que reina a anarquia. Dada a estrutura anárquica internacional, os Estados apresentam uma especial preocupação com sua segurança e a verdadeira confiança entre eles é improvável. A teoria da paz democrática é uma das mais conhecidas oposições à necessidade anárquica do sistema internacional. Os teóricos da paz democrática argumentam que as democracias não fazem guerras umas com as outras. Entretanto, elas (...) ainda se portam agressivamente com relação às não-democracias, deixando de observar normas e tratados internacionais sem critérios específicos para seu descumprimento e, consequentemente, gerando instabilidade internacional e ressentimento. Com sua teoria de paz democrática, apresentada em O Direito dos Povos, Rawls pretende dar uma resposta ao realismo político nas relações internacionais. A paz de Rawls é uma paz de povos, que se diferenciam de Estados por apresentarem características morais e limites nos seus poderes de soberania. Povos podem conceder a outros povos condições razoáveis para cooperação. Com o tempo, povos que vivem sob a égide de tal paz passam a vê-la como um valor e também desenvolvem confiança recíproca. Tal paz é ainda estendida aos povos não-liberais mas decentes, incluindo portanto certos povos que dificilmente seriam considerados democráticos, mas que possuem instituições que merecem ser respeitadas. Argumentamos que tal inclusão torna a paz democrática de Rawls especialmente eficiente, pois uma quantidade maior de povos pode fazer parte dela, diminuindo a instabilidade gerada pelo ressentimento. (shrink)

In this article I will argue that one of the strongest arguments for the charge of inconsistency in the international application of the rawlsian theory is defective because it establishes the false analogy between the decent hierarchical people and the reasonable comprehensive doctrines as the starting point of Rawlsian theory. Instead, I will argue that the analogy must not be thought as if it would establish comparisons between those two entities but among ways of justifying the tolerance of non-liberal conceptions. (...) At the same time, I will claim that the main cause for the defection of the disanalogy argument is the non-recognition of the objects of justice in the domestic and international cases. (shrink)