Various authors debate the question of whether neuroscience is relevant to criminal responsibility. However, a plethora of different techniques and technologies, each with their own abilities and drawbacks, lurks beneath the label “neuroscience”; and in criminal law responsibility is not a single, unitary and generic concept, but it is rather a syndrome of at least six different concepts. Consequently, there are at least six different responsibility questions that the criminal law asks—at least one for each responsibility concept—and, I will suggest, (...) a multitude of ways in which the techniques and technologies that comprise neuroscience might help us to address those diverse questions. In a way, on my account neuroscience is relevant to criminal responsibility in many ways, but I hesitate to state my position like this because doing so obscures two points which I would rather highlight: one, neither neuroscience nor criminal responsibility are as unified as that; and two, the criminal law asks many different responsibility questions and not just one generic question. (shrink)

One thousand four-hundred thirty Portuguese psychologists answered a questionnaire that had been designed in order to ascertain the level of acceptability of a set of proposed ethical principles, which subsequently served as a basis for the Portuguese Psychologists’ Ethics Code. On the one hand, the results show that, as expected, the ethical principles rated high on the evaluation scale. On the other hand, the results also highlighted the need for a formal regulation of the practice of psychology in Portugal, especially (...) in view of participants’ noticeable failure to recognize the importance of the principle of professional integrity. The responsibility of psychologists in modern societies is huge. As such, the large number of different training programs in Portugal, and the implied lack of a strong professional identity, is a cause of concern. The creation of a professional association allows an external identification of the profession in terms of aims and methods. The main goal of such an association is to promote public trust and enhance public demand. The results also indicate that training and experience lead to a higher valorization of ethical principles, and this is an insight that will be of great importance to the professional practice of psychology. (shrink)

Over the past few years, a number of authors in the new field of neuroethics have claimed that there is an ethical challenge presented by the likelihood that the findings of neuroscience will undermine many common assumptions about human agency and selfhood. These authors claim that neuroscience shows that human agents have no free will, and that our sense of being a “self” is an illusory construction of our brains. Furthermore, some commentators predict that our ethical practices of assigning moral (...) blame, or of recognizing others as persons rather than as objects, will change as a result of neuroscientific discoveries that debunk free will and the concept of the self. I contest suggestions that neuroscience’s conclusions about the illusory nature of free will and the self will cause significant change in our practices. I argue that we have self-interested reasons to resist allowing neuroscience to determine core beliefs about ourselves. (shrink)

National minority women’s defense of nonliberal minority cultures that encompass sexist customs and rules has greatly perplexed liberal theorists. Many attempted to resolve this puzzle by attributing constrained agency to such women and dismissing their defense as unreasonable. This article argues that this liberal assessment of minority women’s position is philosophically indefensible and that the failure of mainstream liberalism to make sense of these women’s response indicates not that these women’s agency is compromised but rather that the liberal conception of (...) agency as autonomy at the heart of the liberal framework has limits in its crosscultural applicability. A conception of agency, valuational agency, that illuminates minority women’s agency is proposed as a more plausible alternative for radically pluralistic societies. -/- . (shrink)

“Hardwired” is a term commonly used to describe the properties of certain behaviors or brain regions. As its usage has increased exponentially in the past 50 years, both in popular media and the scholarly literature, the concept appears to have gained a cloak of respectability in scientific discourse. However, its specific meaning is difficult to pinpoint. In this paper, I examine how “hardwired” has been used in the psychological and neuroscientific literature. The analysis reveals two major themes: one centers on (...) certain purported characteristics of behaviors or brain regions, such as fixedness; the other places these and other characteristics within an evolutionary framework. Overall, the analysis reveals a degree of overlap between “hardwiring” and the folk biology concept of innateness. Various complications arise from such overlap, casting doubts on the usefulness and legitimacy of “hardwired” in scientific discourse. (shrink)

Public conversation about biological contributors to mental disorder often centers on whether the problem is “biological or not.” In this paper, we propose moving beyond this bifurcation to a very different question:how exactlyare these problems understood to be biological? Specifically, we consider four issues around which different interpretations of the body’s relationship to mental disorder exist:1. The body’s relationship to day-to-day action; 2. The extent to which the body is changeable; 3. The body’s relationship to context; 4. The degree to (...) which states of the body directly cause mental disorder.Drawing on the work of Merleau-Ponty and other phenomenologists, we examine different responses to these questions and associated implications for how mental health treatment and recovery come to be experienced. Finally, we consider broader questions these patterns raise, including why certain portrayals of the brain dominate public attention and how to foster more deliberation in this regard. (shrink)

According to deontic justice theory, individuals often feel principled moral obligations to uphold norms of justice. That is, standards of justice can be valued for their own sake, even apart from serving self-interested goals. While a growing body of evidence in business ethics supports the notion of deontic justice, skepticism remains. This hesitation results, at least in part, from the absence of a coherent framework for explaining how individuals produce and experience deontic justice. To address this need, we argue that (...) a compelling, yet still missing, step is to gain further understanding into the underlying neural and psychological mechanisms of deontic justice. Here, we advance a theoretical model that disentangles three key processes of deontic justice: The use of justice rules to assess events, cognitive empathy, and affective empathy. Together with reviewing neural systems supporting these processes, broader implications of our model for business ethics scholarship are discussed. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to highlight the importance and impact of terminology used to describe corporate social responsibility (CSR). Through a review of key literature and concepts, we uncover how the economic business case has become the dominant driver behind CSR action. With reference to the literature on semiotics, connotative meaning and social marketing we explore how the terminology itself may have facilitated this co-opting of an ethical concept by economic interests. The broader issue of moral muteness and (...) its relation to ethical behaviour is considered. We conclude by proposing a number of important attributes for any proposed terminology relating to ethical/socially responsible/sustainable business. (shrink)