There are many new philosophical queries about the moral status and rights of artificial intelligences; questions such as whether such entities can be considered as morally responsible entities and as having special rights. Recently, the contemporary philosophy of mind philosopher, Eric Schwitzgebel, has tried to defend the possibility of equal rights of AIs and human beings (in an imaginary future), by designing a new argument (2015). In this paper, after an introduction, the author reviews and analyzes the main argument and (...) then deals with four criticisms witch Schwitzgebel himself has presented and rejected and ultimately, the author presents and explains two new critiques against the argument. According to the writer, though the argument regarding his new criticisms and some other probable critiques is not convincing, or at least needs to be corrected, however, it holds appeal and raises questions and may open a new horizon for future questions and research. (shrink)

It has been observed, by D. Z. Phillips among others, that philosophy suffers from a “lack of imagination”. That is, philosophers often fail to see possibilities of sense in forms of life and discourse due to narrow habits of thinking. This is especially problematic in the philosophy of religion, not least when cross-cultural modes of inquiry are called for. This article examines the problem in relation to the philosophical investigation of reincarnation beliefs in particular. As a remedial strategy, I argue (...) for increased attention both to ethnographic sources and to the articulation of distinctively religious moral visions that reincarnation-talk facilitates. (shrink)

In the last 70 years there has been an explosion of philosophical and theological work on the nature of virtue and the process of virtue formation. Yet philosophers and theologians have paid little attention to the phenomenon of temptation and its role in developing virtue. Indeed, little analytic work has been done on the nature of temptation. This study aims to fill this gap in moral philosophy and theology by offering an analytic moral conception of temptation and explicating its connection (...) to the development of virtue. This project deploys a new iteration of an older methodology of integrating philosophy and theology that may now appropriately be called “analytic moral theology.” In discerning the nature of temptation and its role in virtue formation, theological sources provide foundational guidance. Analytic moral philosophy provides illumination, coherence, and conceptual robustness to the theological foundation. The argument developed follows in the footsteps of John Hick’s soul-making theodicy by contending that the development of virtue requires a world that permits of experiences of temptation. This conclusion is substantiated by a close moral analysis of the nature of temptation that builds on key works done in philosophical moral psychology, philosophy of action, and philosophical theology. The emerging conceptualization of temptation is then compared and contrasted with the closely related moral phenomenon of akrasia and weakness of will, and finally interfaced with a neo- Aristotelian conception of virtue development. In the end, Thomas Aquinas’s understanding of infused virtue is employed as a theological test of the thesis and conditions the scope of the thesis. In light of this constructive analysis of the nature of temptation and its argument for temptation’s role in acquiring moral virtue, this project makes a contribution to philosophical Christian ethics. (shrink)

In this study, it will be my concern to examine the argument for a discontinuity between Nietzsche’s early and ‘middle’ period writings. Specifically, I will address the notion that these earlier works represent something that had, by 1878, become intolerable for Nietzsche: life-denial. The typical reading of The Birth of Tragedy presents it as a work of Schopenhauerian pessimism, which offers the art of beautifying illusion as the only possible means to escape the relentless horror of existence. Scholarship in the (...) last 20 years has worked against this interpretation, and yet no scholar – perhaps with the exception of Michele Haar5 - has been able to fully endorse the claim made by Nietzsche in his 1886 preface to the work, “An Attempt at Self Criticism”: that Birth offered aesthetics as a remedy to life-denial. It was in the name of opposing this ethos – which Nietzsche most famously aligned with Christian and Buddhist asceticism – that the Free Spirit works were to wage their war against metaphysics and to denounce the ‘afterworldsmen’ who turn their back on life and seek for meaning in the Beyond. Through a reading of Birth, as well as its draft texts – “The Dionysian Worldview” and “The Greek Music Drama”-, the works’ proposed follow up Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, and the lectures series this latter was based on I will argue for an alternative interpretation. From a Naturalist reading of these early texts and their ‘Aesthetic interpretation of Life’, I seek to trace a line of continuity that extends into the Free Spirit works. (shrink)

The goal of this article to critically examine the essence and scope of philosophy of religion, its place and relation to philosophy and religious studies. Philosophy of religion is not only interrelated to both philosophy and religious studies but it is an inter-disciplinary field of knowledge. Philosophy of religion, being an inter-disciplinary field on the boundary of philosophy and religious studies and as a phenomenon of western rationalistic tradition, is engaged in conceptual and theoretical examination and analysis of the content (...) of religion. Philosophical reflections on religious matters, concepts, claims and practices, the origin of religion, relation between religion and other fields of knowledge and culture, and so on, are the scope of philosophy of religion. Philosophy of religion is based on rational approach. One of the functions of philosophy of religion is to verify whether the religious or theological claims and statements are trustworthy and rational, true or false, from the standpoint of logic. Viewed from this position philosophy of religion ought to be, to some extent, a normative discipline, a feature that has been overlooked by many scholars and philosophers of religion. Philosophy of religion is philosophical examination and comprehension of the phenomenon and essence of religion. (shrink)

What kind of a toolkit should be used and how in order to have impact on the viewer’s reflective processes as well as guide such processes through a film? The author of this article explicates the idea that editing arrangement of shots series is essential in this aspect. He believes that the full effect and precision of what you want to say is conditioned by the meaningful structure of the series of shots. The latter is achieved as a result of (...) well-thought-out editing. The analysis, hypotheses, and statements presented in the article are subject to further detailed study, particularly from the perspective of general psychology and epistemology. However, it is beyond any doubt that specific succession of shots is forming a contextual and implicative information environment enabling to guide the audience’s perception process, thus affecting person’s contemplation processes and emotional state. (shrink)

In philosophy of religion, when, if ever, is it better to philosophically engage one another as advocates of competing religions as opposed to conducting a more detached philosophical investigation of each other’s actual religious convictions? We offer a narrative overview of a philosophy of religion seminar we participated in, highlighting questions about the possibility of even understanding persons of different religions and considering when, if ever, one’s own religious convictions should be put on exhibit in teaching philosophy of religion. We (...) defend a “middle path,” advocating the permissibility of some disclosure of religious convictions, but with an openness to role play and a passionate commitment to impartiality in class discussion and grading. This middle path lies in between advocacy models and more strict neutrality models. (shrink)

Leibniz’s claim that this is the best of all possible worlds has been subject to numerous criticisms, both from his contemporaries and ours. In this paper I investigate a cluster of such criticisms based on the existence, abundance or character of worldly evil. As several Leibniz-inspired versions of optimism have been advanced in recent years, the aim of my investigation is to assess not just how Leibniz’s brand of optimism fares against these criticisms, but also whether optimism as a philosophy (...) has the resources to meet these challenges. I show that none of the criticisms considered has sufficient force to pose a threat to Leibniz’s version of optimism or to one modelled on it. (shrink)

This thesis investigates how children ought to be influenced with respect to religion. To answer this question, I develop a theory of cognitive curriculum content and apply it to the teaching of religious beliefs and beliefs about religions. By ‘a theory of cognitive curriculum content,’ I mean a theory that determines which truth-claims belong on the curriculum, and whether or not teachers ought to promote students’ belief of those claims. I extend this theory to help educators to decide which attitudes (...) address on the curriculum and whether or not to promote them. I then apply this to the case of religious attitudes and attitudes about religions. I argue that where having or failing to have a certain attitude makes a significant difference to students’ lives, it ought to be addressed by curricula. Where failing to have the attitude is irrational, this failure ought to be remedied; where having the attitude is irrational, that attitude ought to be discouraged; and where neither having nor failing to have the attitude is irrational, that attitude ought to be introduced and discussed without encouragement or discouragement. In so far as is practicable, educators should aim to acquaint students with arguments for and against having these attitudes and initiate them into the practice of assessing their soundness. The implications of this theory for extra-curricular influence, such as upbringing in the home, are also explored. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Philosophy of religion has recently made a turn to lived religion, an approach which seeks to understand lived religion as it is experienced concretely by individual practitioners. However, this turn to lived religion has seen limited engagement with the notion of belonging. Belonging here refers to the felt sense of being part of a group – of insidership – along with the development of positive social ties and mutual affective concern. It is my contention in this paper that reflection (...) on this experience of belonging can improve our understanding of lived religion. In particular, I argue that human beings have an affective need to belong – a fundamental and affective need for belonging and positive social relationship which is felt in the body and rooted in human biology and evolutionary history. This paper makes the case for the affective need to belong, before examining its implications for understanding religion. It finds that the affectivity of belonging is capable of raising the affective salience of certain in-group beliefs, as well as creating affective hurdles to dissent, and in so doing can help to explain processes of religion conversion, sustained religious adherence, and religious disaffiliation. (shrink)

Leibniz’s claim that this is the best of all possible worlds has been subject to numerous criticisms, both from his contemporaries and ours. In this paper I investigate a cluster of such criticisms based on the existence, abundance or character of worldly evil. As several Leibniz-inspired versions of optimism have been advanced in recent years, the aim of my investigation is to assess not just how Leibniz’s brand of optimism fares against these criticisms, but also whether optimism as a philosophy (...) has the resources to meet these challenges. I show that none of the criticisms considered has sufficient force to pose a threat to Leibniz’s version of optimism or to one modelled on it. (shrink)

I prove the nonexistence of gods. The proof is based on three axioms: Ockham’s razor (OR), religiosity is endogenous in humans, and, there are no miracles. The OR is formulated operationally, to remove improper postulates, such that it yields not only a plausible argument but truth. The validity of the second and the third axiom is established empirically by inductive reasoning relying on a thorough analysis of the psychiatric literature and skeptical publications. With these axioms I prove that gods are (...) not necessary for our universe. Applying OR yields that gods do not exist. The implications of this article are enormous. Mankind’s understanding of the world is elevated to a higher level to a unified view on the world being nature and mankind being a part of it. (shrink)