The contrast between third- and first-personal accounts of the experiences of autistic persons has much to teach us about epistemic injustice and epistemic agency. This paper argues that bringing about greater epistemic justice for autistic people requires developing a relational account of epistemic agency. We begin by systematically identifying the many types of epistemic injustice autistic people face, specifically with regard to general assumptions regarding autistic people’s sociability or lack thereof, and by locating the source of these epistemic injustices in (...) neuronormativity and neurotypical ignorance. We then argue that this systematic identification pushes us to construe epistemic agency as resulting from a fundamentally relational and dynamic process between an individual, others around them, and their social, cultural, or institutional environment, rather than as a fixed and inherent property of individuals. Finally, we show how our relational account of epistemic agency allows us to introduce the novel concepts of epistemic disablement and epistemic enablement. We argue that these two concepts allow us to more accurately track the mechanisms that undermine or facilitate epistemic agency, and thereby to better understand how epistemic injustice arises and to design more effective interventions to foster greater epistemic justice for autistic people. (shrink)

The last two decades have witnessed growing interest in the study of social cognition and its multiple facets, including trust. Interpersonal trust is generally understood as the belief that others are not likely to harm you. When meeting strangers, judgments of trustworthiness are mostly based on fast evaluation of facial appearance, unless information about past behavior is available. In the past decade studies have tried to understand the complex relationship between trust and joint visual attention (i.e. attentional orienting following another (...) person’s gaze). This review will focus on the studies that used a gaze-cueing paradigm to explore this relationship. One study found enhanced gaze-following behavior with trustworthy faces; another one found stronger effects of gaze-following with faces associated with undesirable behavior. Notably, the majority of studies failed to observe significant interactions between trust and gaze-following. Overall, the evidence is mixed, and studies have highlighted the complexity of this relationship. Multiple factors seem to play a role, including the type of manipulation to induce trust, the level of trait-anxiety, and gender. We conclude that further investigation is needed to clarify whether an interaction exists between trust and joint visual attention, possibly focusing on the potential role of perceived threat. (shrink)