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  1. Partly Free Semantics for Some Anderson-Like Ontological Proofs.Mirosław Szatkowski - 2011 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 20 (4):475-512.
    Anderson-like ontological proofs, studied in this paper, employ contingent identity, free principles of quantification of the 1st order variables and classical principles of quantification of the 2nd order variables. All these theories are strongly complete wrt. classes of modal structures containing families of world-varying objectual domains of the 1st order and constant conceptual domains of the 2nd order. In such structures, terms of the 1st order receive only rigid extensions, which are elements of the union of all 1st order domains. (...)
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  • Contingent modal semantics for some variants of Anderson-like ontological proofs.Miroslaw Szatkowski - 2007 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (1):91-114.
    In the paper we introduce a wide range of Anderson-like variants of Gödel's theory and prove for each of them strong completeness theorem wrt. corresponding class of modal structures.These theories — all formulated in the 2nd order modal language with a 2nd order unary predicate of positiveness — differ among themselves with respect of: properties of the necessity operator and of the predicate of positiveness, axioms characterizing identity between 1st sort terms, definitions of identity between 2nd sort terms, the treatment (...)
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  • Two Types of Ontological Frame and Gödel’s Ontological Proof.Sergio Galvan - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (2):147--168.
    The aim of this essay is twofold. First, it outlines the concept of ontological frame. Secondly, two models are distinguished on this structure. The first one is connected to Kant’s concept of possible object and the second one relates to Leibniz’s. Leibniz maintains that the source of possibility is the mere logical consistency of the notions involved, so that possibility coincides with analytical possibility. Kant, instead, argues that consistency is only a necessary component of possibility. According to Kant, something is (...)
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