The article seeks to analyse Kierkegaard’s indirecte Meddelelse, which the author proposes to translate as ‘indirect message’. It attempts to consider and illuminate this concept and its general characteristics, types and cases in Kierkegaard's work. They are to serve as a baseline for investigations of indirect messages in Buddhism, especially the famous ‘public cases’ of the Chán Buddhists. The author tries to specify indirect messages on both sides of the cultural divide in terms of some Western philosophers. Kierkegaard’s theoretical rationale (...) for his indirect message is profound, sophisticated and appropriate to the theoretical investigation of the Chán public cases. Chán representatives do not possess such pertinent tools for the formal analysis of their own or other indirect messages. However, their indirect messages are impressive in their formal diversity; their variety is, unlike Kierkegaard’s counterparts, not limited by orthodox theological residues. (shrink)

We analyse in this article, from the point of view of an aesthetics of the effect, the sources of the so called "aesthetics of Goethe's time", according to the works of Lessing, Winckelmann and Herder. Our aim is to show that there are in those authors both an influence of the parameter of the effect, elicited by the work of art on the spectactor, and the pointing to a dimension, so to speak critical, idealistic and speculative of appreciation of the (...) artistic phenomenon.Este artigo investiga, sob a perspectiva de uma estética do efeito, as origens da assim chamada "estética da época de Goethe", segundo a obra de Lessing, Winckelmann e Herder. Pretende-se mostrar que há nestes autores tanto uma influência do parâmetro do efeito, suscitado pela obra de arte no espectador, quanto o apontamento para uma instância, por assim dizer crítica, idealista e especulativa de apreciação do fenômeno artístico. (shrink)

Estudo introdutório de apresentação, seguido de tradução, da palestra “Fenomenologia e antropologia”, ministradas por Edmund Husserl nas sedes da Kantgesellschaft de Frankfurt, Berlim e Halle em 1931, na qual avalia criticamente, a partir dos pressupostos transcendentais da fenomenologia, a tendência da filosofia alemã dos anos 20 do século passado para uma antropologia filosófica.

In his work on aesthetics, John Dewey provocatively (and enigmatically) called art the "most universal and freest form of communication," and tied his reading of aesthetic experience to such an employment. I will explore how art, a seemingly obscure and indirect means of communication, can be used as the most effective and moving means of communication in certain circumstances. Dewey's theory of art will be shown to hold that art can be purposively employed to communicatively evoke a certain experience through (...) an auditor's experience of an art object. Such a use is shown to be an extension of Dewey's conceptions of scientific method and the role of experience in criticism and communication, and is discussed in light of examples drawn from contemporary film, sculpture, and classical Japanese poetry. (shrink)

This paper examines the question of how so-called indeterminate phrases in Japanese (Kuroda 1965) associate with relevant particles higher in the structure. In the universal construction in Japanese, the restrictor (provided by an indeterminate phrase) sometimes appears to be separate from the universal particle mo. It is proposed that quantification at a distance is only apparent, and that the restriction is in fact provided locally by the sister constituent of mo as a whole. The proposal leads us to a straightforward (...) uniform picture of the syntax-semantics mapping of the universal construction and wh-questions, building upon Hamblin’s (1973) semantics for wh-phrases as sets of alternatives. It allows for a switch of perspective on a long-standing puzzle regarding locality effects in the indeterminate–particle association by deriving the locality pattern from the way indeterminate phrases are interpreted and associated with particles, without any stipulations. (shrink)

Drawing on 2 years of field research conducted between 2008 and 2010 in London’s Kurdish community, I discuss the practical and ethical challenges that confront researchers dealing with violence against women committed in the name of ‘honour’. In examining how feminist methodologies and principles inform my research, I address issues of researcher positioning and the importance of speaking with, rather than for, marginalised groups. I then explore the difficulties of operationalising this position when dealing with honour-based violence. Using the interview (...) data from the 2008–2010 study and a case study of the trial of Mehmet Goren (who was convicted in 2009 of murdering his daughter Tulay for supposedly dishonouring their family), I discuss the socio-cultural norms and values underlying honour codes, examining both the position of men and women in relation to the maintenance of family honour and the regulation of women’s sexuality and conduct. In particular, I explore the difficulties inherent in obtaining and understanding victims’ own personal narratives, especially in legal settings, while simultaneously showing how it is only through empowering women to speak for themselves that we will be able to bring about the deep societal changes needed to eradicate honour-based violence. (shrink)

A contribution to the sixth installment of the Common Knowledge symposium “Apology for Quietism,” this article addresses a) the extent to which the familiar term “Buddhist quietism” is legitimate, b) the use of the term by Jesuit missionaries in Asia at the time that Catholic quietism was briefly flourishing in Europe, and c) the use of the term in the European philosophical controversy over Spinozism. Faure argues that, in most cases, the European critique of Buddhism was aimed at European enemies. (...) Chan Buddhism in China and Zen in Japan came to be associated with nihilism as well as quietism, and the association proved resilient down into the twentieth century, but the Jesuit critique has a peculiar provenance. The Jesuits in China borrowed arguments against Buddhism from neo-Confucianist allies, yet the Confucian critique of Buddhism was itself indebted to arguments that had been directed by Buddhist schools against one another. Certain Chan schools had accused other Chan schools of quietism and nihilism, and Western scholars even in the later twentieth century have taken sides in these disputes as well. However, Faure argues, the “no-thought” of Chan is not the “blank slate” of Christian quietism, on which God engraves his will and blessings. Nor does Buddhist quietism lead to the extasis of mystical union. Moreover, Buddhism was perceived by East Asian rulers mainly as an ideological weapon and only secondarily as a soteriological doctrine. Indeed “warrior monks” in Japan formed bands that attacked all who threatened their interests, and the country could not be unified under Tokugawa rule until this activist Buddhism was quelled. The article concludes with an expression of admiration for quietism and a wish that there might be more of it in Buddhism now. (shrink)

Neste artigo, busca-se articular a noção de juventude romântica como ideal de formação no pensamento do estudante Benjamin. Nos primeiros ensaios dedicados a temas pedagógicos, o filósofo propôs um novo modelo de educação apoiado no romantismo, partindo de uma crítica às instituições de sua época que cindiram a totalidade e a unidade da vida do jovem. Em seus escritos enquanto era estudante, Benjamin recupera, com sua crítica, a necessidade de olhar a arte, a literatura, a educação, em suma, toda a (...) cultura humana, como um conjunto reunido de vivências históricas. O romantismo, no pensamento de Benjamin, será, portanto, basilar às discussões pedagógicas. A juventude, vista como comunidade, tem o dever de ser criadora, de se transformar em uma convenção de gênios do tempo presente, em seus espaços de atuação, ou seja, nas instituições de formação. De modo geral, só é possível perceber e adquirir o saber específico de uma profissão se as instituições acadêmicas perceberem que devem visar à formação universal, pelo modelo de criação do gênio, pois a juventude é entendida como aquela que garante a produção de valores novos, opostos aos da experiência - sinônimo de rigidez dos conhecimentos - que não estabelecem vínculo com a vida. Para encontrar essa verdade da vida, é necessário um ato de coragem e de sentido para se estar, assim, diante de espíritos livres. A juventude, dessa forma, traduz-se como um conceito ou categoria humana dependente de um despertar da consciência de si mesma. Diante disso, conseguirá promover mudanças dentro do âmbito institucional-escolar e acadêmico, mas, ao mesmo tempo, esse despertar da consciência histórica do jovem definirá um modo específico de se lidar com a cultura humana. Portanto, neste artigo, sob à luz dos aspectos românticos, procurou-se mostrar a juventude como categoria humana, com faixa etária determinada, cercada de preocupações acerca da realidade escolar e acadêmica e, também, do ponto de vista universal, isto é, filosófico-pedagógico, como uma categoria do pensamento que significa a vanguarda, tudo aquilo que não está determinado e fixado, criando novos preceitos e formas de vida. Palavras-chave: Juventude. Gênio. Romanticismo. Formação. Walter Benjamin. (shrink)

Western philosophy has mainly developed in accordance with the three laws of identity, noncontradiction and excluded middle, also known as “laws of thought”. Since Zen Buddhism often violates these apparently indisputable logical principles, a superficial reading may induce the idea that Zen Buddhism is a completely irrational, illogical doctrine. In this essay, I argue that Zen Buddhism is not absurd or illogical. Conversely, it relies on a different logic, which is perfectly consonant with the Buddhist view of the world.

Online discourse has created a new media environment for contributions to public life, one that challenges the social significance of the role of public intellectuals—intellectuals who, whether by choice or by circumstance, offer commentary on issues of the day. The value of such commentary is rooted in the assumption that, by virtue of their training and experience, intellectuals possess knowledge—that they understand what constitutes knowledge with respect to a particular topic, are able to distinguish it from mere opinion, and are (...) in a position to define its relevance in different contexts. When intellectuals comment on matters of public concern, they are accordingly presumed to speak truth, whether they are writing books or op-ed columns or appearing as guests on radio and television news programs. At the same time, with increasing frequency, discourse on public life is taking place online. This new digital environment is characterized by abundance—an abundance of speakers, discussion, and access. But has this abundance of discourse—this democratization of knowledge, as some describe it—brought with it a corresponding increase in truth? Casting doubt on the assertion that online discourse, with its proliferation of voices, will somehow yield collective wisdom, Speaking Power to Truth raises concerns that this wealth of digitally enabled commentary is, in fact, too often bereft of the hallmarks of intellectual discourse: an epistemological framework and the provision of evidence to substantiate claims. Instead, the pursuit of truth finds itself in competition with the quest for public reputation, access to influence, and enhanced visibility. But as knowledge is drawn into the orbit of power, and as the line between knowledge and opinion is blurred, what role will the public intellectual play in the promotion and nurturing of democratic processes and goals? In exploring the implications of the digital transition, the contributors to Speaking Power to Truth provide both empirical evidence of, and philosophical reflection on, the current and future role of the public intellectual in a technologically mediated public sphere. Contributions by Barry Cooper, Jacob Foster, Karim-Ally Kassam, Boaz Miller, Liz Pirnie, and Eleanor Townsley. (shrink)

Are we really sure to correctly know what do we feel in front ofan artwork and to correctly verbalize it? How do we know what weappreciate and why we appreciate it? This paper deals with the problem ofintrospective opacity in aesthetics (that is, the unreliability of self-knowledge) in the light of traditional philosophical issues, but also of recentpsychological insights, according to which there are many instances ofmisleading intuition about one’s own mental processes, affective states orpreferences. Usually, it is assumed that (...) aesthetic statements are intuitivelyclear and self-evident. However, a long tradition in psychological researchhas called the idea of introspective transparency and the infallibility of self-knowledge into question (Wilson 2002). This topic has only recently beenrecognized as an interesting problem in aesthetics (Melchionne 2011, Irvin2014). In this paper I will discuss the main shortcomings in introspective self-knowledge, mostly referring to psychological findings. As a consequence, thedevelopment of a folk psychological account of aesthetic experience could beneeded, investigating how people develop intuitive and naïve theories abouttheir aesthetic reactions, taste, and feelings, distinct from a more objectiveand empirically grounded account of how judgment and preferences areactually formed in ourselves, even on a neurobiological level. However, itwill also be argued that bypassing the individual judgment and his expressedchoices in favor of allegedly more objective levels of description would notbe an innocent step to take. (shrink)

In this paper I begin by examining Fogelin’s account of deep disagreement. My contention is that this account is so deeply flawed as to cast doubt on the possibility that such deep disagreements actually happen. Nevertheless, I contend that the notion of deep disagreement itself is a useful theoretical foil for thinking about argumentation. The second part of this paper makes this case by showing how thinking about deep disagreements from the perspective of rhetoric, Walton-style argumentation theory, computation, and normative (...) pragmatics can all yield insights that are useful no matter what one’s orientation within the study of argument. Thus, I conclude that deep disagreement –even if it were to turn out that there are no real-world occurrences of it to which we can point–is useful for theorists of argumentation. In this wise, deep disagreement poses a theoretical challenge for argumentation theory not unlike that posed by radical skepticism for traditional epistemology. (shrink)