- Curiosity was Framed.Dennis Whitcomb - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):664-687.details
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Believing Things Unknown.Aidan McGlynn - 2011 - Noûs 47 (2):385-407.details
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Welfarist Pluralism: Pluralistic Reasons for Belief and the Value of Truth.Andrew Reisner - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.details
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What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.details
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Epistemic Courage.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Infrastructure for a Scientific Metaphysics.Amanda Bryant - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (1):27-49.details
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Evidentialism.Giada Fratantonio - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.details
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Evidentialist Reliabilism.Juan Comesaña - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):571-600.details
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Perceptual experience and perceptual justification.Nicholas Silins - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Standing in a Garden of Forking Paths.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag.details
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On justifications and excuses.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Synthese 195 (10):4551-4562.details
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Four arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified.Martin Smith - 2021 - In Douven, I. ed. Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).details
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Belief-that and Belief-in: Which Reductive Analysis?Uriah Kriegel - 2018 - In Alex Gzrankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. pp. 192-213.details
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Graded epistemic justification.John Hawthorne & Arturs Https://Orcidorg Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1845-1858.details
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The Problem of Massive Deception for Justification Norms of Action.Arturs Logins - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (4):457-468.details
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Knowledge and normativity.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Markos Valaris & Stephen Hetherington (eds.), Knowledge in Contemporary Philosophy. London, UK: Bloomsbury Publishing.details
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Evidence and Bias.Nick Hughes - 2019 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.details
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Knowledge-First Evidentialism about Rationality.Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant Fabian Dorsch (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.details
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The New Evil Demon Problem at 40.Peter J. Graham - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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Knowledge and the Norm of Assertion: An Essay in Philosophical Science.John Turri - 2016 - Cambridge: Open Book Publishers.details
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The transmission of knowledge and justification.Stephen Wright - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):293-311.details
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Internalism in the Epistemology of Testimony.Stephen Wright - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (1):69-86.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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Moral error theory, explanatory dispensability and the limits of guilt.Silvan Wittwer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2969-2983.details
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Mechanistic reasoning and the problem of masking.Michael Wilde - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):1-16.details
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Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey.John N. Williams - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (1):24-37.details
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Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.details
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One wage of unknowability.Dennis Whitcomb - 2013 - Synthese 190 (3):339-352.details
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Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3593-3609.details
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If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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Knowledge first, stability and value.Barnaby Walker - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3833-3854.details
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How to solve the hardest logic puzzle ever in two questions.Gabriel Uzquiano - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):39-44.details
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The test of truth: An experimental investigation of the norm of assertion.John Turri - 2013 - Cognition 129 (2):279-291.details
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The Radicalism of Truth‐insensitive Epistemology: Truth's Profound Effect on the Evaluation of Belief.John Turri - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):348-367.details
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Refutation by elimination.John Turri - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):35-39.details
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Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision.John Turri - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):4009-4030.details
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An Epistemic Non-Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2020 - The Philosophical Review 129 (1):1-51.details
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Normativity without Cartesian privilege.Amia Srinivasan - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):273-299.details
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The Hardest Paradox for Closure.Martin Smith - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):2003-2028.details
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Two accounts of assertion.Martin Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.details
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Justification as Ignorance: An Essay in Epistemology, by Sven Rosenkranz. [REVIEW]Martin Smith - forthcoming - Mind.details
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Belief and Self‐Knowledge: Lessons From Moore's Paradox.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):393-421.details
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Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1369-1386.details
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Credal accuracy and knowledge.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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Knowledge‐first functionalism.Mona Simion - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):254-267.details
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The Composite Nature of Epistemic Justification.Paul Silva - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1).details
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Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief.Paul Silva - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2639-2664.details
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Introspection and inference.Nicholas Silins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):291-315.details
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Explaining enkratic asymmetries: knowledge-first style.Paul Silva - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2907-2930.details
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