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  1. Kant on the place of cognition in the progression of our representations.Clinton Tolley - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3215-3244.
    I argue for a new delimitation of what Kant means by ‘cognition [Erkenntnis]’, on the basis of the intermediate, transitional place that Kant gives to cognition in the ‘progression [Stufenleiter]’ of our representations and our consciousness of them. I show how cognition differs from mental acts lying earlier on this progression—such as sensing, intuiting, and perceiving—and also how cognition differs from acts lying later on this progression—such as explaining, having insight, and comprehending. I also argue that cognition should not be (...)
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  • Kant's Conception of Number.Daniel Sutherland - 2017 - Philosophical Review Current Issue 126 (2):147-190.
    Despite the importance of Kant's claims about mathematical cognition for his philosophy as a whole and for subsequent philosophy of mathematics, there is still no consensus on his philosophy of arithmetic, and in particular the role he assigns intuition in it. This inquiry sets aside the role of intuition for the nonce to investigate Kant's conception of natural number. Although Kant himself doesn't distinguish between a cardinal and an ordinal conception of number, some of the properties Kant attributes to number (...)
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  • The Kantian (Non)‐conceptualism Debate.Colin McLear - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (11):769-790.
    One of the central debates in contemporary Kant scholarship concerns whether Kant endorses a “conceptualist” account of the nature of sensory experience. Understanding the debate is crucial for getting a full grasp of Kant's theory of mind, cognition, perception, and epistemology. This paper situates the debate in the context of Kant's broader theory of cognition and surveys some of the major arguments for conceptualist and non-conceptualist interpretations of his critical philosophy.
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  • When series go in indefinitum, ad infinitum and in infinitum concepts of infinity in Kant’s antinomy of pure reason.Silvia De Bianchi - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2395-2412.
    In the section of the Antinomy of pure Reason Kant presents three notions of infinity. By investigating these concepts of infinity, this paper highlights important ‘building blocks’ of the structure of the mathematical antinomies, such as the ability of reason of producing ascending and descending series, as well as the notions of given and givable series. These structural features are discussed in order to clarify Ernst Zermelo’s reading of Kant’s antinomy, according to which the latter is deeply rooted in the (...)
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  • On the Onto-Epistemological Status of the Empty Set and the Pure Singleton.Osman Gazi Birgül - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (6):1111-1128.
    This article discusses the quiddity of the empty set from its epistemological and linguistic aspects. It consists of four parts. The first part compares the concept of _nihil privativum_ and the empty set in terms of representability, arguing the empty set can be treated as a negative and formal concept. It is argued that, unlike Frege’s definition of zero, the quantitative negation with a full scope is what enables us to represent the empty set conceptually without committing to an antinomy. (...)
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  • Kant on the place of cognition in the progression of our representations.Clinton Tolley - 2017 - Synthese:1-30.
    I argue for a new delimitation of what Kant means by ‘cognition [Erkenntnis]’, on the basis of the intermediate, transitional place that Kant gives to cognition in the ‘progression [Stufenleiter]’ of our representations and our consciousness of them. I show how cognition differs from mental acts lying earlier on this progression—such as sensing, intuiting, and perceiving—and also how cognition differs from acts lying later on this progression—such as explaining, having insight, and comprehending. I also argue that cognition should not be (...)
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