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Deliberating groups versus prediction markets (or Hayek's challenge to Habermas)

In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Episteme. Oxford University Press. pp. 192-213 (2012)

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  1. Od dyktatury ekspertów do demokracji nieliberalnej.Janusz Grygieńć - 2021 - Civitas. Studia Z Filozofii Polityki 28:15-40.
    Brak transparentności procesów decyzyjnych typowy dla demokracji liberalnych oraz związany z nim kryzys zaufania obywateli wobec instytucji politycznych to jedne z głównych przyczyn sukcesów odnoszonych przez stronników demokracji nieliberalnej. Zdaniem krytyków liberalizmu zbyt wiele decyzji współcześnie delegowanych jest do ciał nienadzorowanych demokratycznie. Zwolennicy koncepcji demokracji deliberacyjnej formułują różne remedia na tę sytuację. Nie czynią tego jednak stronnicy najpopularniejszej obecnie z wersji demokracji deliberacyjnej – podejścia systemowego do deliberacji. Autor artykułu twierdzi, że podejście to może legitymizować „niedemokratyczny liberalizm” – jedną z (...)
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  • Epistemic Democracy: Beyond Knowledge Exploitation.Julian Müller - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (5):1267-1288.
    This essay criticizes the current approach to epistemic democracy. Epistemic democrats are preoccupied with the question of how a society can best exploit a given stock of knowledge. This article argues that the problem-solving capability of a society depends on two factors rather than one. The quality of decision-making depends both on how a democracy is able to make use of its stock of knowledge and on the size of the knowledge stock. Society’s problem-solving capability over time is therefore a (...)
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  • Freedom, Recognition and Non-Domination: A Republican Theory of (Global) Justice.Fabian Schuppert (ed.) - 2014 - Springer.
    Introduction : A Republican Theory of (Global) Justice.- Chapter One: The Nature of Free Rational Agency -- Chapter Two: Analysing Freedom & Autonomy Recognition, Responsibility and Threats to Agency -- Chapter Three: Needs, Interests and Rights -- Chapter Four: Capabilities, Freedom and Sufficiency -- Chapter Five: Collective Agency, Democracy and Political Institutions -- Chapter Six: Global Justice and Non-Domination -- Conclusion: Freedom, Recognition & Non-Domination.
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  • What Is Minimally Cooperative Behavior?Kirk Ludwig - 2020 - In Anika Fiebich (ed.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency. Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 9-40.
    Cooperation admits of degrees. When factory workers stage a slowdown, they do not cease to cooperate with management in the production of goods altogether, but they are not fully cooperative either. Full cooperation implies that participants in a joint action are committed to rendering appropriate contributions as needed toward their joint end so as to bring it about, consistently with the type of action and the generally agreed upon constraints within which they work, as efficiently as they can, where their (...)
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  • 'Explicating Ways of Consensus-Making: Distinguishing the Academic, the Interface and the Meta-Consensus.Laszlo Kosolosky & Jeroen Van Bouwel - 2014 - In Carlo Martini (ed.), Experts and Consensus in Social Science. Berlin: Springer. pp. 71-92.
  • The Wisdom of Collective Grading and the Effects of Epistemic and Semantic Diversity.Aidan Lyon & Michael Morreau - 2018 - Theory and Decision 85 (1):99-116.
    A computer simulation is used to study collective judgements that an expert panel reaches on the basis of qualitative probability judgements contributed by individual members. The simulated panel displays a strong and robust crowd wisdom effect. The panel's performance is better when members contribute precise probability estimates instead of qualitative judgements, but not by much. Surprisingly, it doesn't always hurt for panel members to interpret the probability expressions differently. Indeed, coordinating their understandings can be much worse.
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  • The Social Epistemology of Consensus and Dissent.Boaz Miller - 2019 - In David Henderson, Peter Graham, Miranda Fricker & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 228-237.
    This paper reviews current debates in social epistemology about the relations ‎between ‎knowledge ‎and consensus. These relations are philosophically interesting on their ‎own, but ‎also have ‎practical consequences, as consensus takes an increasingly significant ‎role in ‎informing public ‎decision making. The paper addresses the following questions. ‎When is a ‎consensus attributable to an epistemic community? Under what conditions may ‎we ‎legitimately infer that a consensual view is knowledge-based or otherwise ‎epistemically ‎justified? Should consensus be the aim of scientific inquiry, and (...)
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  • Mandevillian Intelligence.Paul Smart - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):4169-4200.
    Mandevillian intelligence is a specific form of collective intelligence in which individual cognitive vices are seen to play a positive functional role in yielding collective forms of cognitive success. The present paper introduces the concept of mandevillian intelligence and reviews a number of strands of empirical research that help to shed light on the phenomenon. The paper also attempts to highlight the value of the concept of mandevillian intelligence from a philosophical, scientific and engineering perspective. Inasmuch as we accept the (...)
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  • Deliberating Groups Vs. Prediction Markets (or Hayek's Challenge to Habermas).Cass R. Sunstein - 2006 - Episteme 3 (3):192-213.
    For multiple reasons, deliberating groups often converge on falsehood rather than truth. Individual errors may be amplifi ed rather than cured. Group members may fall victim to a bad cascade, either informational or reputational. Deliberators may emphasize shared information at the expense of uniquely held information. Finally, group polarization may lead even rational people to unjustifi ed extremism. By contrast, prediction markets often produce accurate results, because they create strong incentives for revelation of privately held knowledge and succeed in aggregating (...)
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  • Epistemic Democracy and the Social Character of Knowledge.Michael Fuerstein - 2008 - Episteme 5 (1):pp. 74-93.
    How can democratic governments be relied upon to achieve adequate political knowledge when they turn over their authority to those of no epistemic distinction whatsoever? This deep and longstanding concern is one that any proponent of epistemic conceptions of democracy must take seriously. While Condorcetian responses have recently attracted substantial interest, they are largely undermined by a fundamental neglect of agenda-setting. I argue that the apparent intractability of the problem of epistemic adequacy in democracy stems in large part from a (...)
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  • The Normative Implications of “Knowing the Future” for Preventive War.Ariel Colonomos - 2016 - Journal of Military Ethics 15 (3):205-226.
    What if claims about the future informed us about the intentions and the capabilities of our opponents to wage war against ourselves? Would and should the existing norms that restrict the preventive use of force change in the wake of such transformation? This article highlights the potential normative consequences of this change and discriminates between several possible normative evolutions. Would and should the “knowability of the future” alter radically the traditional rule of self-defense? This rule could indeed be jeopardized but, (...)
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  • Independence and Interdependence in Collective Decision Making: An Agent-Based Model of Nest-Site Choice by Honey Bee Swarms.Christian List, Christian Elsholtz & Thomas Seeley - 2009 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 364:755-762.
    Condorcet's classic jury theorem shows that when the members of a group have noisy but independent information about what is best for the group as a whole, majority decisions tend to outperform dictatorial ones. When voting is supplemented by communication, however, the resulting interdependencies between decision-makers can strengthen or undermine this effect: they can facilitate information pooling, but also amplify errors. We consider an intriguing non-human case of independent information pooling combined with communication: the case of nest-site choice by honey (...)
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