Kantian virtue can be construed as a condition of an agent which secures adherence to the requirements of morality in the face of the ever-present possibility of inner conflict with counter-ethical considerations. This paper claims that this conception of virtue does not fit in well with one essential characteristic of the virtuous agent; that he or she is attentive to the well-being of others. After some preliminary remarks about virtue-related evaluations, the paper criticises the Kantian conception of virtue in the (...) light of certain characteristics of ethical attentiveness. The paper concludes by developing a notion of ethical habituation which includes the training of attention. (shrink)

In business ethics journals, Kant’s ethics is often portrayed as overly formalistic, devoid of substantial content, and without regard for the consequences of actions or questions of character. Hence, virtue ethicists ride happily to the rescue, offering to replace or complement Kant’s theory with their own. Before such efforts are undertaken, however, one should recognize that Kant himself wrote a “virtue theory” (Tugendlehre), wherein he discussed the questions of character as well as the teleological nature of human action. Numerous Kant (...) scholars argue that Kant already erected precisely the kind of integrative moral architecture that some of his modern interpreters (while aiming to supersede him) wish to construct. For business ethics, this divergence of scholarly opinion is of crucial importance. It shows first that the standard portrayals of Kant’s ethics in business ethics textbooks—as rigidly deontological, narrowly individualistic, and hence unsuitable for the specific demands of corporate agency—might have to be revised. Second, discussions in the business ethics literature on stakeholder-engagement and managerial decision-making likewise stand to gain from a more nuanced picture of Kant’s moral philosophy. Third, a reassessment of Kant’s ethics with regard to questions of personal character and moral sentiments might also lead to a more favorable view of the relevance of his ethics for managerial practice. Last, but not least, the many current attempts to reconcile Kant’s freedom-oriented philosophy with virtue theories stand to benefit considerably from a better understanding of how Kant himself conceived of one such synthesis between the formal and substantial aspects of morality. This, ultimately, could lead to an important overlapping consensus in the academic literature as to the role and relevance of virtuous conduct in business. (shrink)

This work represents a research on the nature of the causal efficiency of law, i.e. on how the political command is communicated by authority and received by those who must obey it. In the words of political philosophy of aristotelic tradition, it is the classical problem of the “government over free and equal men”, i.e., the problem of compatibility between political government and the freedom of human act and political rights. In the words of kantian practical philosophy, the problem consists (...) in the compatibility between individual’s moral autonomy and juridical system’s heteronomy, i.e. it consists in justifying the dominion of one man over another one, so that the citizen obeys the laws without any kind of submission to a will other than his own. The question requires particular attention to the problem of the nature of political bonds, as communication of political command is necessarily founded on what is common to the members of political society. The work is divided in two parts. The first one proposes a model of practical philosophy whose fundamental structure is common to all major political thinkers of modern times. This model consists in a “moral of obligation” founded on the opposition between law (must) and freedom (will), originated on nominalistic scholastic voluntarism. Within this structure, the problem assumes the form of a dilemma: if law comes from our own will (autonomy), then it becomes necessary to explain how it is possible to command over oneself; if law comes from a will other than our own, then it becomes necessary to explain the difference between law and mere force. In this context, the theories of Hobbes and Rousseau are studied as the theoretical matrix of modern political philosophy and as the two dialectical poles of this opposition. The conclusions derived from the study of these two thinkers are then applied to Kelsen and Kant respectively. The second part proposes a reconstruction of classical philosophy’s position about this problem, meaning by “classical” the tradition that begins with Plato, continues with Aristotle and reaches a new summit with Saint Thomas Aquinas. In this part of the work, a “classical” model of practical philosophy, common to these three authors, is presented. This model consists in an “order of loves”. Two fundamental theses are proposed. The first one is that law is a rational communicable order, whose efficacy is founded on participation of the act of “imperium” of authority in individual’s subjective “imperium” over his own acts. The second one is that the principle of this communication consists in “political concord”, i. e. a “useful friendship” about the ends of society, and that the concrete realization of this order in the citizen’s soul is political virtue, which is analogue to man’s virtue with the same platonic analogy that exists between man’s soul and the city or the State. (shrink)

In recent decades we have been given one of the most interesting concepts in Islamic intellectual history, `the scientific miracle of Qur’ān whereby the proponents have almost established the scientific theories in the Qur’ān. However, such ardent claims must not come to be without any inspiration and methodology. This article, firstly, tries to trace the inspiration of such concept and then describe the methodology. However, as exciting as this concept seems, the methodology brings forth a very negative approach to prove (...) the miracle of the Qur’ān, which is value free. That negative value free mentality which is related to the status of prophet of Islam will be exposed and it will detail how the status of prophet of Islam was abated so badly to prove the science from the Qur’ān. To counter this negative narrative and to reveal the true status of prophet of Islam, arguments will be presented from the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth which are incontrovertible. Let it be known than, this analysis is not general but particular. However, it will be a novel critique to re-visit this concept. (shrink)