This paper presents a validation study of a new questionnaire of self-control as an individual trait. The questionnaire has two parallel versions, one based on self-reports and another one based on informant reports. Each version consists of three subscales, called Inhibition, Switching, and Goal Monitoring. Eight samples of participants took part in the validation study. Both versions obtained satisfactory indices of internal consistency, assessed with Cronbach’s alpha and split-half coefficients. Selfcontrol assessed with this scale proved to be entirely independent of (...) general intelligence. However, AS-36 and AS-36-3 scores tended to correlate with other self-report measures of trait self control, such as Tangney, Baumeister, and Boone’s self-control scale. We conclude that AS-36 is a valid and reliable tool, suitable for assessment of self-control in both research and diagnostic settings. (shrink)

The mere exposure phenomenon (repeated exposure to a stimulus is sufficient to improve attitudes toward that stimulus) is one of the most inspiring phenomena associated with Robert Zajonc’s long and productive career in social psychology. In the first part of this article, Richard Moreland (who was trained by Zajonc in graduate school) describes his own work on exposure and learning, and on the relationships among familiarity, similarity, and attraction in person perception. In the second part, Sascha Topolinski (a recent graduate (...) who never met Zajonc, but found his ideas inspirational) describes his own work concerning embodiment and fluency in the mere exposure effect. Also, several avenues for future research on the mere exposure phenomenon are identified, further demonstrating its continuing relevance to the field. (shrink)

What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, (...) serving the 'somatic nervous system[. For this system, consciousness serves as a frame that constrains and directs skeletal muscle output, thereby yielding adaptive behavior. The mechanism by which consciousness achieves this is more counterintuitive, passive, and “low level” than the kinds of functions that theorists have previously attributed to consciousness. Passive frame theory begins to illuminate (a) what consciousness contributes to nervous function, (b) how consciousness achieves this function, and (c) the neuroanatomical substrates of conscious processes. Our untraditional, action-based perspective focuses on olfaction instead of on vision and is 'descriptive' (describing the products of nature as they evolved to be) rather than 'normative' (construing processes in terms of how they should function). Passive frame theory begins to isolate the neuroanatomical, cognitive-mechanistic, and representational (e.g., conscious contents) processes associated with consciousness. (shrink)

Priming effects have been used widely as a tool to study attentional processes. However, inferences regarding attention depend on how priming effects are interpreted. In the case of negative priming, an activation-based framework for interpreting priming suggests that attention inhibits the representation of prime distractors and that this inhibition is measured in performance to subsequent probes. Data summarized in this article point out that negative priming does not depend on selection of one of two primes and that attentional influences during (...) retrieval play an important role in determining negative priming. Also, two experiments are described that demonstrate a correlation between priming effects and knowledge of the relation between primes and probes. We suggest that negative priming is not determined directly by a process of ignoring, but instead occurs because a repeated probe is less temporally distinct when ignored as a prime than when attended. (shrink)

Do studies of perception without awareness and studies of perception without attention address a similar underlying concept of awareness? To answer this question, we compared qualitative differences in performance across variations in stimulus quality with qualitative differences in performance across variations in the direction of attention . The qualitative differences were based on three different phenomena: Stroop priming, false recognition, and exclusion failure. In all cases, variations in stimulus quality and variations in the direction of attention led to parallel findings. (...) These results suggest that perception with and without awareness and perception with and without attention are equivalent ways of describing the same underlying process distinction. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 8, August 2022.

The processes mediating dynamic and flexible responding to rapidly changing task-environments are not well understood. In the present research we employ a Stroop procedure to clarify the contribution of context-sensitive control processes to online performance. In prior work Stroop interference varied as a function of probe location context, with larger Stroop interference occurring for contexts associated with a high proportion of congruent items [Crump, M. J., Gong, Z., & Milliken, B. . The context-specific proportion congruent stroop effect: location as a (...) contextual cue. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 13, 316–321.] Here, we demonstrate that this effect does not depend on awareness of the context manipulation, but that it can depend on attention to the predictive context dimension, and on the relative salience of the target and predictive context dimensions. We discuss the implications of our results for current theories of cognitive control. (shrink)

I draw on neurobiological evidence to defend the rationalist thesis that moral judgments are essentially dependent on reasoning, not emotions (conceived as distinct from inference). The neuroscience reveals that moral cognition arises from domain-general capacities in the brain for inferring, in particular, the consequences of an agent’s action, the agent’s intent, and the rules or norms relevant to the context. Although these capacities entangle inference and affect, blurring the reason/emotion dichotomy doesn’t preferentially support sentimentalism. The argument requires careful consideration of (...) the empirical evidence (from neuroimaging to psychopathology) and philosophical analysis of the commitments of rationalism versus sentimentalism in ethics. (shrink)

The hypothesis that everyday cognitive failures are associated over individuals with levels of focused-attention performance was examined in a series of experiments. Everyday cognitive failure was assessed by the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire, and focused-attention performance was assessed using the Stroop, reverse Stroop, and dichotic-listening paradigms, together with the Embedded Figures Test. No reliable association between the two types of measure was observed. In addition, questionnaire results indicated a significant relation between reported cognitive failure and memory performance (using the Short Inventory (...) of Memory Experiences and the Everyday Memory Questionnaire) but not attentional performance (using the Everyday Attention Questionnaire). (shrink)

Research suggests that moral evaluations change during adulthood. Older adults (75+) tend to judge accidentally harmful acts more severely than younger adults do, and this age‐related difference is in part due to the greater negligence older adults attribute to the accidental harmdoers. Across two studies (N = 254), we find support for this claim and report the novel discovery that older adults’ increased attribution of negligence, in turn, is associated with a higher perceived likelihood that the accident would occur. We (...) propose that, because older adults perceive accidents as more likely than younger adults do, they condemn the agents and their actions more and even infer that the agents’ omission to exercise due care is intentional. These findings refine our understanding of the cognitive processes underpinning moral judgment in older adulthood and highlight the role of subjective probability judgments in negligence attribution. (shrink)