Populism is on the rise throughout the world and it poses a challenge to democratic theory. Conventional political thought has not dealt seriously with this challenge throughout most of its history. The article takes the challenge seriously, underscoring the rise of Donald Trump as an example of populism. I argue that dominant paradigms in the study of the history of political thought and in normative, Rawlsian approaches do not elucidate populism. I argue that we need to look beyond the mainstream (...) and to comparative political thought in particular. The Latin American political theory tradition, which has been in conversation with European ideas since the dawn of the modern age, provides a model of ‘princely performative populism’ that is more useful. Drawing on a Machiavellian conception of the prince’s aesthetic relationship to the people and the centrality of populist experiences in Latin America, my model provides a novel definition of pop... (shrink)

Deliberative democracy is a noble project: an attempt to make citizens philosophize. Critics of deliberative democracy usually claim either that the proposed deliberation threatens an existing moral consensus or, instead, that deliberation is impossible amid power imbalances that oppress the weak. But another problem is that combining democracy and deliberation is inherently an attempt to engage publicly in a private activity—where sensitivity to each interlocutor may require a special form of address. Can this be done? Yes, in some contexts. The (...) tradition of esoteric writing has demonstrated that it is possible to layer one's discourse in such a way that all citizens can partake at a level that suits them. But writing for a public is not really deliberation among equals; it is leadership by the writer of the readers. Genuine dialogue among equals that takes account of their differences is, in contrast, inherently a private affair. (shrink)

In recent years, we have witnessed renewed interest in metaphors in political theory. In this context, Hobbes’s theory of metaphor is of great importance as it helps us understand aesthetic qualities in theory and politics. This article argues that in the work of Hobbes – often portrayed as hostile to the use of metaphor, especially so by himself – there is a remarkable discrepancy between his professed enmity to metaphor and his own use of the very word ‘metaphor’. In a (...) philosopher who censures conceptual imprecision, we find a fundamentally inconsistent and ever-changing use of this key term. This inconsistency can be accounted for if we relate it to Hobbes’s own often neglected poetics and his theory of the need for conceptual innovation. This will help solve riddles that have haunted Hobbes studies. Moreover, we must discover Hobbes’s theory of metaphor as a source of potential insights into the way in which political and theoretical languages operate with regard to aesthetic pleasure through linguistic change. Hobbes’s theory can thus make us understand the importance of something being new, that is, how theoretical languages need novelty in order to be pleasant and persuasive. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper looks at the state of the literature surrounding Heidegger and Nazism today. Part 1 focusses on Hassan Givsan’s remarkable work, Une histoire consternante: pourquoi les philosophes se laissent corrompre par le “cas Heidegger”, which looks at the different, mutually inconsistent forms of “apologetics” denying that Heidegger had been a Nazi, or that this commitment could have been shaped by his philosophy. Part 2 looks at five themes that emerge from the 2014 French-language collection Heidegger, le sol, la communauté, (...) la race, edited by Emmanuel Faye: Heidegger’s anti-semitism, before and in the Black Notebooks; Sein und Zeit and “the political”; Heidegger and his estate’s post-war “rewriting” of his Nazi-era texts; Heidegger’s esotericism; and his intellectual proximities to other Nazi thinkers. Closing reflections touch on the state of the debate, calling for increased scholarly awareness of the evidence, and debate of its significance. (shrink)

Plato wrote dialogues. While there has been attention to the dramatic elements of Plato's dialogues by a number of scholars, there has been much less attention to the narrative style of the dialogues. I argue that we should consider whether the dialogues are recited or presented like dramatic works with each character speaking his own words—or as a mixture of these narrative forms. By employing this interpretive tool to read the Republic, I illustrate how paying attention to the narrative style (...) enables us to see a democratic Socrates who undermines readings of the Republic famously offered by Karl Popper and Leo Strauss. Plato appears then as neither a defender of the "closed society" nor an advocate of the elite rule of the wise over the many. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to analyze the opinion of a Jewish Averroist Rabbi Josef Ibn Caspi on the relation between prophetical and philosophical truth. In the beginning of the article, we will see that in some of his writings, R. Caspi claims the prophet’s knowledge to be superior to that of the philosopher. However, in the second part of the article, we will analyze his commentary on Maimonides Guide of the Perplexed. In this commentary R. Caspi also mentions (...) the opposite opinion: that the knowledge of the prophet is only his knowledge as a philosopher and that even true prophets’ can have a few false prophecies just as good philosophers may have a few wrong opinions. He thus equates the knowledge of a prophet to that of a philosopher. In the conclusion of the article we try to determine how one can distinguish between the texts that explain the true opinion of R. Caspi and the text that our author wrote only for political and pedagogical reasons. (shrink)

In much theory there is a tendency to place thought above action, or the opposite, action over thought. The consequence of the first option is that philosophy or scientific evidence gains the upper hand in educational thinking. The consequence of the second view is that pragmatism and relativism become the dominant features. This article discusses how different branches of the Aristotelian tradition can mediate between these two views. I argue, contrary to some other Aristotelian approaches, that thinking and action are (...) both separated and yet prerequisites for each other and point to some educational consequences of this way of thinking. To build this argument I draw on selected aspects of the philosophy of Hanna Arendt, Leo Strauss and John Dewey. (shrink)

The ArgumentAgainst the idea that modern historiography developed in the eighteenth century as a completely new way of looking at the past, this paper argues that modern historical science borrowed its sense of experience from seventeenth-century memoirs. However, seventeenth-century rnemorialists made very different as sumptions than modern historians about the relations between time, memory, and history. One consequence of their introduction of lived subjectivity into the depiction of the past was a debate in early eighteenth-century France about the relations between (...) history and fiction, some arguing that fiction is a better way of grasping the subjective truth of the past. These debates about the relations between history and memory and between history and fiction have resurfaced recently. The historical moods that are one context for paradigm shifts share common motifs, such as a sense of defeat, of distance between the present and the immediate past, and a need for consolation through the elaboration of a new mode of experiencing the past. (shrink)

This essay examines the relationship between Eric Voegelin and Leo Strauss in order to show the central themes necessary to elucidate their philosophical positions. The essay reveals the centrality of the figure of Plato as a point of departure to understand the agreement and the disagreement concerning fundamental questions (such as the way of reading ancient texts, the importance of the historical perspective or the importance of the study of the past in order to orient the modern science) which revolves (...) around the issue of the relation between revelation and philosophy. The work concludes with an identification of the common core of both thinkers that allows us to understand their differences (homogeneity or heterogeneity of reality and the human) and, moreover, identifies both perspectives with a «foundational» (Voegelin) or «negative» (Strauss) interpretation of Plato’s thought. (shrink)

Drawing together an assemblage of historical and textual reference, this article examines the curious connections between Paul de Man and Leo Strauss. It does not suggest an intellectual affinity between the two men (on the contrary). However, it notes the proximity of both around the question of dialogism in relation to de Man's reading of Rousseau.

ABSTRACTLeo Strauss argues that the “theologico-political” problem arose from the competing claims of rationalist philosophy and theology. Although he urges others to take sides in this debate, most theorists see it as insoluble, since it is rooted in competing traditions and different, non-demonstrable, epistemic principles. Strauss, however, argues that there is a common ground capable of sustaining a contest between the two: their appeal to the pre-philosophic understanding of justice as moral virtue. The contest between the Bible and Socratic-Platonic philosophy (...) centers on which of the two better understands what justice is, what completes it, and in what respect it is good. Strauss enables us to see why Plato’s Socratic dialogues became indispensable models for classical and medieval philosophers who sought to meet the challenge of theology on the vital common ground of philosophy and theology. (shrink)

Este artigo oferece alguns argumentos a favor da tese de que o método de reconstrução do contexto intelectual é mais adequado ao entendimento da obra de Nietzsche do que o método de leitura imanente. Independentemente dos méritos e limitações das respectivas metodologias, duas características gerais da obra de Nietzsche tornam a abordagem contextual mais promissora: a concepção nietzscheana da tarefa filosófica, na medida em que esta o leva a tratar de forma instrumental entidades abstratas ; e sua preferência pela forma (...) de exposição aforismática, na medida em que esta o obriga a ocultar parte importante de suas premissas. O limite para a instrumentalização de argumentos filosóficos será examinado na última seção do artigo. (shrink)

The starting point of this article is that there is a kind of ‘hidden dialogue’ that Claude Lefort is trying to conduct with Leo Strauss on the theologico-political problem. If Strauss claims this problem to be ‘irresolvable’, Lefort seeks to show that the ‘permanence of the theologico-political’ in modernity is only an appearance, as democracy has, in the last instance, succeeded in ‘cutting’ the knot tied between the theological and the political in pre-modern societies. Moreover, while Strauss associates recognition of (...) the irresolvable character of the theologico-political problem with moderation, Lefort takes the exact opposite view, insisting on the lack of moderation, even excess, that weighs particularly on modern politics consequent to any attempt to amalgamate the theological with the political. (shrink)

The article focuses on examining the distinct nature of persecution. In the article I argue that on the grounds of common historical cases of persecution an account of the core components of the concept may be established. The core comprises three central elements: asymmetrical and systemic threat, severe and sustained harm, and unjust discriminatory targeting. I will conclude the paper by suggesting that none of the components alone make persecution anything distinct. However, the simultaneous occurrence of the components may be (...) argued to amount to a separable class of harms that are among the worst-case scenarios for those having to endure them. (shrink)

In this article I discuss two questions with relation to Spinoza’s Christology. The first question is: how can we bring Spinoza’s thesis of the separation of theology and philosophy in agreement with his understanding of Christ as a philosophical figure in a book of revelation, the Bible? The second question is: how must we interpret Spinoza’s faith in Christ as a person, who has adequately understood the central message of prophetic revelation, a message of salvation through good works? The first (...) question is discussed by means of a comparison between Maimonides’ prophetology in The Guide of the Perplexed on the one hand and Spinoza’s prophetology and christology in the Theological Political Treatise on the other hand. I show that Spinoza’s figure of Christ has the same kinds of knowledge as Maimonides’ prophet. A difference between Spinoza’s Christ and Maimonides’ prophet is that the first has no political ambitions while the last is – especially in the person of Mozes – evidently a political figure. The second question is discussed by an investigation of Spinoza’s conception of the subject of incarnation in his correspondence with Henry Oldenburg. It is argued that Spinoza understands incarnation as an expression of God’s wisdom in all things. Incarnation is not an exclusive but an all including principle of divine production of and manifestation in different modes of being. Nevertheless, we can distinguish hierarchies of modes of being. In this respect God’s wisdom is more incarnated in human beings than in non-human modes of being, and among human beings it is most incarnated in Christ. However, the question how Christ as a human being can understand adequately the message of revelation, which cannot be cleared up by philosophical reason, remains unanswered. In the concluding remarks it is argued that Spinoza with his christology tried to build a bridge to the enlightened parts of the christian communities of his time. Moreover, this christology functions for himself as a guarantee that the sphere of revelation and faith is ultimately included in the intuitive knowlegde sub specie aeternitatis. So the thesis of separation of faith and reason can only be understood as provisional. (shrink)

One of the aims of Spinoza's Tractatus Theologico-Politicus is to vindicate the view that philosophy and theology are separate forms of enquiry, neither of which has any authority over the other. However, many commentators have objected that this aspect of his project fails. Despite his protestations to the contrary, Spinoza implicitly gives epistemological precedence to philosophy. I argue that this objection misunderstands the nature of Spinoza's position and wrongly charges him with inconsistency. To show how he can coherently allow both (...) that theology and philosophy employ independent epistemological standards, and that philosophy is epistemologically superior to theology, we need to step back from the immediate disputes to which the Tractatus is a response and examine a Ciceronian distinction on which Spinoza indirectly draws. As well as enabling us to vindicate Spinoza's position, it places his alleged naturalism in a new light and portrays philosophizing as a form of piety. (shrink)

This article seeks to explore the conceptual structure and moral standing of an idea that has received almost no attention from analytical philosophers: self-censorship. It is argued that at the heart of the concept is a tension between the thoughts of the self-censor as, on the one hand, the author, and on the other, the instrument, of the censorship. Which of these aspects is emphasised also importantly helps shape how self-censorship is viewed normatively. Focusing on authorship tends to lead to (...) seeing self-censorship as more akin to a freely chosen act of self-restraint, while focusing on the self-censor as instrument presents it as one specific form of ordinary censorship. It is the tension between these two aspects that accounts for the moral ambivalence that is often felt towards the practice of self-censorship. (shrink)

The political philosopher Leo Strauss is famous for contending that any synthesis of reason and revelation is impossible, since they are irreconcilable antagonists. Yet he is also famous for praising the secular regime of liberal democracy as the best regime for all human beings, even though he is well aware that modern philosophers such as Spinoza thought this regime must make use of biblical morality to promote good citizenship. Is democracy, then, both religious and secular? Strauss thought that Spinoza was (...) contradictory in teaching that reason and revelation should be separated from each other while also insisting that a secular democratic politics still requires the biblical morality of charity. The paradox that liberal democracy is both religious and secular, which is central to Spinoza, was dismissed by Strauss as a Machiavellian subterfuge or the cynical attempt to use religion for political purposes. In order to adhere to his dualistic separation of reason and revelation, Strauss turned to ancient Greek political philosophy, particularly the ideas of Plato and Aristotle, as the true ground of liberal democracy since this classical tradition was never exposed to biblical revelation. Yet, the illiberal and hierarchical implications of Greek political thought, which clash with Strauss’s modern views on human individuality and dignity, ultimately take him back to the biblically based philosophies of Spinoza and Kierkegaard, who teach the paradox that the Bible is the true foundation of human freedom. (shrink)

Though currently marginalised in Western philosophy, tenth-century Arabic philosopher Abu Nasr Alfarabi is one of the most important thinkers of the medieval era. In fact, he was known as the ‘second teacher’ (after Aristotle) to philosophers such as Avicenna and Averroes. As this epithet suggests, Alfarabi and his successors engaged in a critical and creative dialogue with thinkers from other historical traditions, including that of the Ancient Greeks, although the creativity of his part is often marginalised as well. In this (...) article, I offer a new interpretation of Alfarabi’s sweeping volume, The Principles of the Opinions of the Virtuous Community. My focus is the materialism that overflows Alfarabi’s account of soul in general and the imaginative power in particular. The political conclusion of this account is that Virtuous Community does not directly present Alfarabi’s ideal ruler or community. Instead, it offers a materialist critique that prefigures critical theory and post-structuralism and thereby provides guidelines for how to more effectively engage monotheistic communities in the pursuit of social justice – including along the axes of race, gender and sexual orientation. (shrink)

When Peter Strawson subtitled the most celebrated book in ordinary language philosophy, Individuals, ‘An essay in descriptive metaphysics’, he shocked mainly for having reintroduced ‘metaphysics’ into intellectually respectable English a quarter-century after A.J. Ayer had consigned it to the logical positivists' index of forbidden philosophical words . Few at the time appreciated the import of the modifiers ‘descriptive’ and its opposite, ‘revisionary’. Now, another half century on, philosophers have come around to Bertrand Russell's original view that both the ordinary language (...) philosophy Strawson championed and the ideal scientific language philosophy Ayer championed offer alternative metaphysical visions. The remaining question of philosophical interest is what hangs in the balance between a descriptive and revisionary approach to metaphysics – or, for that matter, any branch of philosophy. This paper critically examines the currently dominant descriptive approach from a revisionary standpoint, initially relying on the terms Strawson uses to frame the distinction, and then moving outward to consider its implications for our understanding of the history of modern philosophy, especially the ‘naturalist’ sensibility that has been especially influential in analytic social epistemology. (shrink)

Si le concept d’auteur est une notion centrale de la littérature et de la théorie littéraire, il s’agit d’abord d’une notion juridique qui a été mobilisée par les philosophes modernes, en particulier Hobbes et Spinoza, dans le but politique et scientifique de lutter contre le régime traditionnel des autorités et de défendre la liberté de pensée contre les interprétations normatives des docteurs de la loi et de la religion. L’article remonte aux origines politiques et juridiques de l’auteur-législateur moderne et retrace (...) sa marche vers la Souveraineté. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper explores similarities between the sacrilegious revaluations Nietzsche and Spinoza undertook with regards to Christianity and Judaism respectively. In both cases, these revaluations involve a devaluation of an ancestral religious tradition, followed by the infusion of alternative values posited through forms of secular salvation linked to immanent conceptions of eternity. Given the importance of the structural and phenomenological similarities the paper analyses, it is argued that if Nietzsche thought of himself as the Anti-Christ, there is a convincing case to (...) think of Spinoza as the Anti-Moses. And because both the Anti-Christ and the Anti-Moses not only devaluated their respective religious traditions, but also suggested forms of beatitude based on a valorizing notion of eternity, their efforts are profoundly religious. Accordingly, Nietzsche and Spinoza are not only arguably the greatest Christian and Jewish heretics, but also the prophets of innovative forms of secular and immanent... (shrink)

Many scholars in recent years have focused their efforts on revealing the connection of philosophy and authority. Basically, from Nietzsche onwards, philosophyhas witnessed ongoing efforts for “will to power” by some philosophers and of course this motivated many philosophers to take part in politics. Nonetheless, thismoot point engendered a serious risk and not only contrasted with the Socratic contributions, but also paved the way for the advent of a new way of making politics where philosophy and scientific prestige are being (...) manipulated following certain interests. By comparing the US and Argentinian climates, this paper explores to what extent philosophy can and must remain independent of politics. Even though one might think of Heidegger as a clear example of this relationship, there are many other philosophers who were interested in politics and committed to political parties. One of the aspects that characterizes this new way of politics is the theatrification of reality, and philosophers are part of this process. To some extent, the prestige given to scholars for their contribution to society is being conferred to some privileged groups to gain more legitimacy, precisely in a world where the classical institutions are gradually declining. (shrink)

(2002). A VERY PECULIAR ROYALIST. HOBBES IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS POLITICAL CONTEMPORARIES. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 167-208. doi: 10.1080/096087800210122455.

On the Definition of Religion in Hobbes’ Leviathan It has long been a controversial topic whether Hobbes was an atheistic philosopher or a sincere Christian. A clear understanding of the issue requires an investigation into Hobbes’ view of religion. This paper tends to provide such an examination. First, it analyses the legal point of view by which Hobbes distinguishes religion from superstition. Secondly, it examines the two elements by which Hobbes defines religion: fear and power. Thirdly, it explores what true (...) religion is for Hobbes. Fourthly, after dealing with Hobbes’ rational theology, it raises certain questions about difficulties and contradictions in Hobbes’ definition of religion and true religion. Fifthly and finally, drawing on the double teaching theory and taking the purpose of Hobbes’ political theory into account, it concludes that there is a double doctrine in Hobbes on the one hand and, on the other hand, Hobbes desires to publicize the esoteric philosophic teaching in accordance with the purpose of his political philosophy, i.e. with the pursuit of a rational and free world state. (shrink)

Strauss championed a philosophy of history according to which philosophers characteristically hide their actual beliefs when writing about ethics and politics. This paper begins by suggesting that an esoteric philosophy of history encourages a set of specific biases when writing histories of philosophy. Proponents of esotericism are liable to be far too ready to conclude that philosophers intended to hide their beliefs; they are likely to be insufficiently attuned to the varied contexts in which philosophers write; and they are likely (...) to be too ready to assimilate the beliefs of philosophers to a norm. Thereafter the paper considers the presence of these biases in Strauss's account of modernity. Strauss allows for waves of modernity but he defines these waves as part of a single, monolithic project that is defined in contrast to the esoteric character of ancient philosophy and that leads inexorably to nihilism. Once we correct for the biases mentioned above, however, modernity appears as a series of projects located in specific contexts and confronting particular dilemmas. Again, where Strauss presents our own era as one of crisis, this revised account of modernity suggests that we merely confront the more local issue of how to forge a community out of self-governing individuals. (shrink)

Beginning with an analysis of the problematic relation of ‘the particular’ to ‘the universal’ in canonical political texts, this paper explores a variety of frameworks for the study of classical Greek political thought. Specifically, after investigating the influence of Quentin Skinner’s contextualism, the paper examines the ideas, approaches, and methods of Bernard Williams, Leo Strauss, and Josiah Ober. I draw attention to each figure’s distinctive motivations for returning to ancient Greece and to the influence of particular political ideals on those (...) motivations. I also assess their strengths and weaknesses and offer a critical commentary on their chief ideas. Toward the end of the paper, I outline a novel dialectical framework for the study of classical Athens – one that emphasizes the remoteness of the ancient past and the contribution that our studies might make to self-knowledge. In sketching this framework, I focus on what I call ‘ethical Athens’, ‘philosophical Athens’, and ‘critical Athens’. (shrink)

Bringing continental sensibilities and skill to his project, David Janssens has abandoned the line of defense heretofore used by North American intellectuals to shield Leo Strauss from criticism: Janssens wastes no time trying to prove Strauss was a liberal democrat, frankly admits his atheism, and emphasizes the continuity and European origins of his thought. Nevertheless committed to defending Strauss even at his most vulnerable points, Janssens is compelled to anchor his new defensive position on a misreading of what he calls (...) "an inconspicuous footnote" in Philosophie und Gesetz (1935). (shrink)

El análisis de las ideas que al-Fārābī heredó de Las Leyes de Platón ha sido prácticamente desatendida a pesar de que ello contribuiría a una mejor comprensión de uno de los problemas que ha sido discutido entre los seguidores de la interpretación de Leo Strauss y sus críticos, a saber, las tensiones entre religión y política tanto en Las Leyes de Platón como en la filosofía política de al-Fārābī. En este artículo argumento que una interpretación integral de la filosofía política (...) de al-Fārābī ayuda a esclarecer aquella tensión que ha sido polémicamente interpretada por Leo Strauss, como una antinomia. (shrink)

My dissertation lays out some of the chief philosophical precursors to Jonathan Israel's Radical Enlightenment. It investigates the principal question of Will Durant's The Age of Voltaire: "How did it come about that a major part of the educated classes in Europe and America has lost faith in the theology that for fifteen centuries gave supernatural sanctions and supports to the precarious and uncongenial moral code upon which Western civilization has been based?" The aim of this project is both broad (...) and specific: the first is to provide a general history of the philosophical precursors to the Radical Enlightenment up until the early modern period, and the second is to highlight one of these precursors in detail, which I do in the large Spinoza part. With the assistance of a great deal of scholarship in philosophy of religion, history of philosophy, theological analysis, biblical criticism, and historiography, my dissertation contends that the major philosophical precursors against orthodox faith in revelation and for the Radical Enlightenment have been derived primarily from several forces. I present some of the general arguments of some of the pre-Socratics and Greek philosophers, especially Socrates and Plato, emphasizing their rationalist and non-theological thinking. Then I point out how some of this Greek philosophical literature led to new philosophical and theological elements in some of the teachings of the Church Fathers, some of the medievals, and some of the scholastics, up to the early modern period. The core of my argument, however, begins to pick up steam at the Renaissance. With the Renaissance, the Scientific Revolution, and the early Enlightenment New Philosophy, everything changes. Renaissance textual criticism of ancient texts leads to the beginnings of some genuine biblical criticism. The explosion of naturalist-leaning explanations of nature via Copernicus, Galileo, Descartes and many others in the Scientific Revolution leads many to wonder if God is needed. The rejection of Aristotelian and Scholastic metaphysics by the New Philosophers, most notably, Descartes, undermine what for many provided the philosophical underpinnings for the Church and theology. And then "the most unkindest cut of all," the revolutionary historical and textual criticism of the Bible which utterly undermines and refutes Judaism and Christianity. (shrink)

Despite their differences, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Leo Strauss share two key philosophical commitments. They recognize that philosophy cannot establish or discover a conceptual structure to which one might appeal to justify what one says. And they agree that the task of philosophical writing is to convey a way of thinking set apart from that which seeks to establish or discover conceptual structures. Yet each knows that his writing, in the absence of a universal ground of appeal, will (...) mostly fail to convey that way of thinking, and so will be, to that extent, esoteric. What differentiates them is their rendering of philosophy's inherent esotericism. -/- Wittgenstein's late interest in aspect-seeing and aspect-blindness grows out of his well-documented despair that his writing would fall before uncomprehending eyes. The correlation here rests on noticing, contra Stephen Mulhall, that Wittgenstein's aspect-seeing remarks are inspired by aesthetic matters, not least by the 'subjective universality' of aesthetic judgments. Indeed, Wittgenstein's appeals to grammatical criteria are rightly understood, not as appeals to rules in a game, but as cousin to the form of justification in aesthetics. But then, as in aesthetic justification, there may be no reason for a speaker's inability to convey to another the connections he or she may see. Emerson, whose approach to writing comes into view alongside parallel strategies in jazz and film, begins with the fact that he can write the way he does---relying on the transformative possibilities of words whose multiple meanings he acquired the way anyone does---and concludes that no one is precluded from finding in his writing a model for transforming thinking. Strauss begins with the fact that esoteric writing works the way it does---conveying the writer's true thoughts to some while withholding them from the majority---and concludes that such writing reveals a natural order of rank among readers. Yet nothing in the nature of writing philosophy as Strauss understands it compels one, in the end, to accept Strauss's conclusion. (shrink)

During the 20th century there have been many attempts to reconstitute political knowledge as objective, value-neutral empirical science. One of such attempts was the “behavioral revolution” in political science. However, apart from this tendency a different one can be traced: scholars strived to openly acknowledged political goals and values as a factor in their own work. In this case one can speak of “engaged knowledge”. Pierre Bourdieu, a representative of this tradition, spoke of the need to give up an image (...) of the “scholar who locks himself up in his ivory tower” and stop the “flight into purity”. He urged scientists to bring their knowledge outside academia and join social movements. In the similar vein Michael Burawoy emphasized the necessity to make sociological knowledge available to the wider public. The article reveals the ways in which engaged knowledge distances itself from the image of political and social scholarship as “pure science” as well as from the approach of political philosophy with its emphasis on philosophic contemplation. This perspective opens up the way for the analysis of Max Weber’s ideas on the value neutrality of scientific knowledge, essential features of the “behavioral revolution” in political science, as well as Leo Strauss’ views on the nature of political philosophy. The article develops the ideas of feminist standpoint epistemology, which is contrasted with the scientist’s “gaze from nowhere” and philosopher’s “gaze from above”. Finally, the article gives account of the problematic relation between engaged knowledge and the Marxist tradition. (shrink)