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Hume’s Scepticism

Philosophical Topics 19 (1):271-291 (1991)

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  1. Psychology, epistemology, and skepticism in Hume’s argument about induction.Louis E. Loeb - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):321-338.
    Since the mid-1970s, scholars have recognized that the skeptical interpretation of Hume's central argument about induction is problematic. The science of human nature presupposes that inductive inference is justified and there are endorsements of induction throughout "Treatise" Book I. The recent suggestion that I.iii.6 is confined to the psychology of inductive inference cannot account for the epistemic flavor of its claims that neither a genuine demonstration nor a non-question-begging inductive argument can establish the uniformity principle. For Hume, that inductive inference (...)
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  • La unidad del escepticismo humeano.Plínio Junqueira Smith - 2023 - Ideas Y Valores 72.
    Los intérpretes han dividido la filosofía de Hume, su “lógica”, en dos partes: la destructiva, compuesta por sus análisis filosóficos, su crítica del racionalismo y sus momentos escépticos; la constructiva, que contiene su asociacionismo psicológico, su ciencia empírica de la naturaleza humana y sus momentos naturalistas o realistas. Mi intención es cuestionar cualquier interpretación que suponga esa dicotomía, y mostrar que Hume realiza ambas tareas al mismo tiempo, en etapas sucesivas. Muestro la unidad de su filosofía en tres tópicos: un (...)
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  • Uma teoria naturalista da justificação das crenças na epistemologia de David Hume.Claudiney José de Souza - 2014 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 18 (2):227.
    One of the first difficulties in interpreting Hume’s epistemological writings concerns precisely the meaning of the words ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief’. In this article it is shown, initially, how, from a humean point of view, the traditional epistemic criterion to define ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief’ appears very restrictive. Hume’s theory of causal belief is then briefly reviewed in the light of epistemological naturalism of the Michael J. Costa and Louis E. Loeb. Finally, it is submitted that the examination of all these topics (...)
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  • Hume's Changing Views on the 'Durability' of Scepticism.Brian Ribeiro - 2009 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 7 (2):215-236.
    While Hume is famous for his development and defence of various arguments for radical scepticism, Hume was bothered by the tension between his ‘abstruse’ philosophical reflections and ordinary life: If he often felt intensely sceptical in his study, he nonetheless felt genuinely unable to take these sceptical views seriously when he returned to the concerns and activities of everyday life. Hume's published work shows a deep and ongoing preoccupation with this tension, and I believe it also shows that Hume's view (...)
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  • Psychology, epistemology, and skepticism in Hume’s argument about induction.Louis E. Loeb - 2006 - Synthese 152 (3):321 - 338.
    Since the mid-1970s, scholars have recognized that the skeptical interpretation of Hume’s central argument about induction is problematic. The science of human nature presupposes that inductive inference is justified and there are endorsements of induction throughout Treatise Book I. The recent suggestion that I.iii.6 is confined to the psychology of inductive inference cannot account for the epistemic flavor of its claims that neither a genuine demonstration nor a non-question-begging inductive argument can establish the uniformity principle. For Hume, that inductive inference (...)
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  • Instability and uneasiness in Hume's theories of belief and justification.Louirs E. Loeb - 1995 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 3 (2):301 – 327.
    (1995). Instability and uneasiness in Hume's theories of belief and justification. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 301-327.
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  • The World of the Vulgar and the Ignorant: Hume and Nāgārjuna on the Substantiality and Independence of Objects.Yumiko Inukai - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (3):621-651.
    There are remarkable parallels between Hume and Nagarjuna in their denial of substantiality and independence in objects and their subsequent attitude toward our ordinary world. Acknowledging a deep-rooted human tendency to take objects as independent entities, they both argue that there is nothing intrinsic in those objects that make them unitary and independent, and that those characters are, strictly speaking, merely fictitious, mental constructs. They nonetheless affirm the existence of our ordinary world as real. Although their main purposes of the (...)
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  • Hume’s Extreme Skepticism in Treatise I IV 7.Ira Singer - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):595-622.
    This paper explores two aspects of Hume's skeptical crisis in the conclusion to _Treatise<D> Book I: his involved personal experience of the crisis, and his detached naturalistic reflection on it. I discuss several distinct states of mind reported in the text, ranging from extreme skepticism that rejects all belief, to natural dogmatism that rejects all reflection, to mitigated skepticism that tries to reconcile reflection and belief. I argue against interpretations according to which Hume's skepticism supports his naturalism, and I suggest (...)
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  • Hume on External Existence: A Sceptical Predicament.Dominic K. Dimech - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Sydney
    This thesis investigates Hume’s philosophy of external existence in relation to, and within the context of, his philosophy of scepticism. In his two main works on metaphysics – A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40) and the first Enquiry (first ed. 1748) – Hume encounters a predicament pertaining to the unreflective, ‘vulgar’ attribution of external existence to mental perceptions and the ‘philosophical’ distinction between perceptions and objects. I argue that we should understand this predicament as follows: the vulgar opinion is our (...)
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  • Le sceptique humien est-il modéré ? Le rôle du pyrrhonisme dans la genèse causale du scepticisme mitigé.Laurent Jaffro - 2011 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 52:53-69.
    Cet article montre qu'il est faux de considérer le scepticisme mitigé que présente Hume dans la section 12 de l' Enquête sur l'entendement humain comme un scepticisme modéré. Afin d'établir ce point, l'argument principal est qu'il existe un rapport de causalité par lequel l'affect que laissent derrière eux les doutes pyrrhoniens est en grande partie responsable de la production du scepticisme mitigé. Cet affect n'est pas la mélancolie paralysante dont parle le Traité de la nature humaine , mais ce qui (...)
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