The dissertation concerns on the theory of perception of David Hume. The problem of perception is the problem about the object of perception. According to Jerome Valberg, the problem of perception is an antinomy. For Hume the problem is a dilemma between two theories, direct realism and representative realism. For direct realism, the object of perception is a mind-indipendent object; for representative realism, the object of perception is a mind-dependent object or an internal one. In the chapter I, I have (...) focused on the positions of Descartes and John Locke. In the chapter II, I have presented the conception of Hume through three different arguments: the argument from illusion, the argument from secondary qualities and the argument from hallucination. Then, I have exposed the Humean objections to the proofs of external world and the theory about belief in an unperceived existence. Hume’s position is the following: the object of perception is an internal object and the representative realism is unverifiable, but not false. It follows, then, that for Hume direct realism is false. In the chapter III, I have compared the theory of Hume with contemporary direct realism, namely, with intentionalism of John Searle and Micheal Huemer, with externalism of Tyler Burge and disjunctivism by Michael Martin. I have argued that Hume’s theory is more consistent than intentionalism of Searle and Huemer and it can’t be objected by externalism and disjunctivism. (shrink)