Switch to: References

Citations of:

What Do We Want Law to Be? Philosophical Analysis and the Concept of Law

In Wilfrid J. Waluchow & Stefan Sciaraffa (eds.), Philosophical foundations of the nature of law. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 230 (2013)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Robust Normativity, Morality, and Legal Positivism.David Plunkett - 2019 - In Toh Kevin, Plunkett David & Shapiro Scott (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 105-136.
    This chapter discusses two different issues about the relationship between legal positivism and robust normativity (understood as the most authoritative kind of normativity to which we appeal). First, the chapter argues that, in many contexts when discussing “legal positivism” and “legal antipositivism”, the discussion should be shifted from whether legal facts are ultimately partly grounded in moral facts to whether they are ultimately partly grounded in robustly normative facts. Second, the chapter explores an important difference within the kinds of arguments (...)
    $140.97 new   $145.00 from Amazon    $145.95 used   (collection)    View on Amazon.com
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • The Architecture of Rights: Models and Theories.David Frydrych - 2021 - Palgrave Macmillan.
    What is a right? What, if anything, makes rights different from other features of the normative world, such as duties, standards, rules, or principles? Do all rights serve some ultimate purpose? In addition to raising these questions, philosophers and jurists have long been aware that different senses of ‘a right’ abound. To help make sense of this diversity, and to address the above questions, they developed two types of accounts of rights: models and theories. This book explicates rights modelling and (...)
    $85.49 new    View on Amazon.com
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Legal Interpretation, Conceptual Ethics, and Alternative Legal Concepts.David Plunkett - 2023 - Ratio Juris 36 (4):286-313.
    When legal theorists ask questions about legal interpretation—such as what it fundamentally is, what it aims at, or how it should work—they often do so in ways closely tethered to existing legal practice. For example: they try to understand how an activity legal actors (purportedly) already engage in should be done better, such as how judges can better learn about the content of the law. In this paper, I discuss a certain kind of “conceptual ethics” approach to thinking about legal (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•
  • Negotiating the Meaning of “Law”: The Metalinguistic Dimension of the Dispute Over Legal Positivism.David Plunkett - 2016 - Legal Theory 22 (3-4):205-275.
    One of the central debates in legal philosophy is the debate over legal positivism. Roughly, positivists say that law is ultimately grounded in social facts alone, whereas antipositivists say it is ultimately grounded in both social facts and moral facts. In this paper, I argue that philosophers involved in the dispute over legal positivism sometimes employ distinct concepts when they use the term “law” and pick out different things in the world using these concepts. Because of this, what positivists say (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Harms and Wrongs in Epistemic Practice.Simon Barker, Charlie Crerar & Trystan S. Goetze - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:1-21.
    This volume has its roots in two recent developments within mainstream analytic epistemology: a growing recognition over the past two or three decades of the active and social nature of our epistemic lives; and, more recently still, the increasing appreciation of the various ways in which the epistemic practices of individuals and societies can, and often do, go wrong. The theoretical analysis of these breakdowns in epistemic practice, along with the various harms and wrongs that follow as a consequence, constitutes (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Down the Methodological Rabbit Hole.David Frydrych - 2017 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 49 (147):41-73.
    This article surveys methodological matters that shape, drive, and plague analytic legal philosophy. Section 2 briefly explicates conceptual analysis, analytic definitions, and family resemblance concepts. It also argues that central cases are used in more than one way. Section 3 presents criticisms of those concepts and methods, and suggests that some of these difficulties are due to the lack of a shared paradigm regarding a counterexample’s impact. Section 4 explains “meta- theoretical” desiderata. It contends that, to date, legal philosophical appeals (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
    		•