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  1. ‘I should do what?’ Addressing research misconduct through values alignment.Kate Chatfield & Emma Law - 2024 - Research Ethics 20 (2):251-271.
    Evidence suggests that the incidence of research misconduct is not in decline despite efforts to improve awareness, education and governance mechanisms. Two responses to this problem are favoured: first, the promotion of an agent-centred ethics approach to enhance researchers’ personal responsibility and accountability, and second, a change in research culture to relieve perceived pressures to engage in misconduct. This article discusses the challenges for both responses and explains how normative coherence through values alignment might assist. We argue that research integrity (...)
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  • Between Faith and Judgement: Kant’s Dual Conception of Moral Certainty.Sara Di Giulio - forthcoming - Kantian Review:1-21.
    There are two main meanings in Kant’s concept of moral certainty (moralische Gewissheit, certitudo moralis): first, it applies to the kind of certainty embodied in rational faith in the existence of God and a future life; second, it applies to the conscientiousness (Gewissenhaftigkeit) required of an agent in the practice of moral judgement. Despite the growing attention to Kant’s theory of conscience and his concept of conscientiousness, this article is the first to discuss ‘moral certainty’ as the aim of ‘conscientiousness’ (...)
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  • Moral Rationalism and Demandingness in Kant.Marcel van Ackeren & Martin Sticker - 2018 - Kantian Review 23 (3):407-428.
  • Kant on thinking for oneself and with others—the ethical a priori, openness and diversity.Martin Sticker - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 55 (6):949-965.
  • Who is Rationalising? On an Overlooked Problem for Kant’s Moral Psychology and Method of Ethics.Martin Sicker - 2022 - Kantian Journal 41 (1):7-39.
    I critically examine the plausibility of Kant’s conception of rationalising, a form of self-deception that plays a crucial role for Kant’s moral psychology and his conception of the functions of critical practical philosophy. The main problem I see with Kant’s conception is that there are no theory-independent criteria to determine whether an exercise of rational capacities constitutes rationalising. Kant believes that rationalising is wide-spread and he charges the popular philosophers and other ethical theorists with rationalising. Yet, his opponents could, in (...)
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  • Batteux, Kant and Schiller on fine art and moral education.Aviv Reiter & Ido Geiger - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 55 (6):1142-1158.
  • Vernünfteln: Kant über die Rationalität des Bösen.Jörg Noller - 2020 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 68 (1):28-50.
    Kant attempted to answer the question of whether immoral actions result from a mere lack or failing of reason, or whether they consist in a certain form of rationality, i. e. in immoral reasons. The paper addresses this question by concentrating on Kant’s conception of “rationalising” (“Vernünfteln”). This concept is the key for understanding how immoral actions can be based on reasons and are thus imputable. According to Kant, by rationalising, the moral agent constructs a formal coherence of his maxims (...)
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  • The Logic of Illusion: Kant on the Reasons of Error.Jörg Noller - 2021 - Theoria 87 (6):1468-1480.
    In this paper, I reconstruct Immanuel Kant's theory of theoretical and practical error, and I situate it within the broader context of his transcendental philosophy. I thereby refer to his conception of dialectic as the logic of illusion (CpR, B 86) and to his concept of rationalizing. By referring to Donald Davidson's conception of irrationality, I argue that Kant's theory of error allows us to keep the erring person responsible both in theoretical and practical regards.
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  • Rationalizing: Kant on Moral Self-Deception.Jörg Noller - 2022 - SATS 23 (2):175-189.
    Kant’s moral philosophy is challenged by the so-called “Socratic Paradox”: If free will and pure practical reason are to be identified, as Kant argues, then there seems to be no room for immoral actions that are to be imputed to our individual freedom. The paper argues that Kant’s conception of rationalizing helps us to avoid the Socratic Paradox, and to understand how immoral actions can be imputed to our individual freedom and responsibility. In rationalizing, we misuse our capacity of reason (...)
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  • Kantian Conscientious Objection: A Reply to Kennett.Ryan Kulesa - 2023 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 32 (3):450-453.
    In her paper, “The cost of conscience: Kant on conscience and conscientious objection,” Jeanette Kennett argues that a Kantian view of conscientious objection in medicine would bar physicians from refusing to perform certain practices based on conscience. I offer a response in the following manner: First, I reconstruct her main argument; second, I present a more accurate picture of Kant’s view of conscience. I conclude that, given a Kantian framework, a physician should be allowed to refuse to perform practices that (...)
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  • Reseña de: Vigo, Alejandro G., Conciencia, ética y derecho. Estudios sobre Kant, Fichte y Hegel, Reason and Normativity, Volume 15, Hildesheim/Zürich/New York, Olms, 2020. 491 pp. ISBN 978-3-487-15929-4. [REVIEW]Vojtěch Kolomý - 2020 - Con-Textos Kantianos 1 (12):633-640.
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  • Kant on moral self‐opacity.Anastasia N. A. Berg - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):567-585.
    It has been widely accepted that Kant holds the “Opacity Thesis,” the claim that we cannot know the ultimate grounds of our actions. Understood in this way, I shall argue, the Opacity Thesis is at odds with Kant's account of practical self-consciousness, according to which I act from the (always potentially conscious) representation of principles of action and that, in particular, in acting from duty I act in consciousness of the moral law's determination of my will. The Opacity Thesis thus (...)
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