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  1. Two Forms of Inconsistency in Quantum Foundations.Jer Steeger & Nicholas Teh - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (4):1083-1110.
    Recently, there has been some discussion of how Dutch Book arguments might be used to demonstrate the rational incoherence of certain hidden variable models of quantum theory. In this paper, we argue that the 'form of inconsistency' underlying this alleged irrationality is deeply and comprehensively related to the more familiar 'inconsistency' phenomenon of contextuality. Our main result is that the hierarchy of contextuality due to Abramsky and Brandenburger corresponds to a hierarchy of additivity/convexity-violations which yields formal Dutch Books of different (...)
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  • States of ignorance and ignorance of states: Examining the Quantum Principal Principle.Alexander Meehan - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 90 (C):160-167.
    Earman (2018) has recently argued that the Principal Principle, a principle of rationality connecting objective chance and credence, is a theorem of quantum probability theory. This paper critiques Earman's argument, while also offering a positive proposal for how to understand the status of the Principal Principle in quantum probability theory.
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  • An accuracy-based approach to quantum conditionalization.Alexander Meehan & Jer Alex Steeger - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
  • On Accuracy and Coherence with Infinite Opinion Sets.Mikayla Kelley - 2023 - Philosophy of Science 90 (1):92-128.
    There is a well-known equivalence between avoiding accuracy dominance and having probabilistically coherent credences (see, e.g., de Finetti 1974, Joyce 2009, Predd et al. 2009, Pettigrew 2016). However, this equivalence has been established only when the set of propositions on which credence functions are defined is finite. In this paper, I establish connections between accuracy dominance and coherence when credence functions are defined on an infinite set of propositions. In particular, I establish the necessary results to extend the classic accuracy (...)
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