Franciscan biocentrism is the view that Francis of Assisi is a biocentrist who holds that all living things have intrinsic value. Recently, biocentric theorists Sterba and Taylor have modified biocentrism to accommodate holistic entities. I consider thinkers from the broader Franciscan intellectual tradition (Bonaventure and Scotus) to see whether Franciscan biocentrism can be similarly modified. I discuss notions from these medieval philosophers such as the Cosmic Christ and the concept of haecceitas. I also explore whether Franciscan biocentrism can provide a (...) satisfactory response to the problem of evil, since Franciscan biocentrism faces an issue that secular biocentrism does not: making sense of extinction. (shrink)

An increasing number of parents are electing to use daycare to assist them with their parenting from infancy onward. Strikingly, there is scant discussion of whether or not such a practice is morally permissible. In this paper, I shall discuss three different arguments that I believe are implicitly thought to support the use of daycare. I shall argue that the current widespread use of daycare, particularly with respect to infant children, often involves arbitrarily subjugating the needs of children in favor (...) of the desires of parents, and thus is often morally wrong. Finally, I consider a possible fourth argument; one that I believe stands a better chance of justifying the use of daycare, though in the final analysis I argue that it also fails to justify the current widespread use of daycare. (shrink)

This article advances what it calls the ‘Impossibility Result’: it is impossible to claim that the reduction of exploitation leads to the improvement of efficiency. The Impossibility Result is the inevitable result of the proposed conceptual difference between ‘injustice’ and ‘exploitation’. Injustice occurs when one member of a society deviates from the norms and the legal rules concerning how one should treat other members of that society. Exploitation occurs when one member of a society takes advantage of entities such wild (...) animals, cattle, a field of vegetables, or other people that lie outside the boundary of that society. In many cases of exploitation, the exploited may derive some benefit, as in the case when enslavement is better than death. In other cases of exploitation, the exploited may derive zero benefit, called here ‘harm’, as in the case when a deer is hunted. (shrink)

This paper explores the nature and impact of local and global environmental injustice in Africa. It shows that some people have been and still become toxic victims, carrying the brunt of inequitable environmental costs because of the transfer of risks and environmental hazards to some African countries through the export of toxic waste and hazardous industries. This paper suggests that besides local and national efforts global governance should be in place to address the current global environmental injustice. Distributive, participatory, and (...) recognition justice along with measures that promote human capabilities is required to promote ecological democracy in the world. (shrink)

Susan Moller Okin's critique of libertarianism in Justice, Gender, and the Family has received only slight attention in the libertarian literature. I find this neglect of Okin's argument surprising: The argument is straightforward and, if sound, it establishes a devastating conflict between the core libertarian notions of self-ownership and the acquisition of property through labour. In this paper, I first present a reconstruction of Okin's argument. In brief, she points out that mothers make children through their labour; thus it would (...) seem that mothers own their children; but this implies that the children are not self-owners. I then examine the two most common objections to this argument in the literature: mothers do not make children, and acquisition by labour includes an exception for persons. I give several replies to each objection, including an extension of Okin's argument that I call Okin's dilemma. This dilemma argues that the libertarian can avoid Okin's conclusion only by requiring an.. (shrink)

The first half of this paper replies to three postmodernist challenges to belief in objective intrinsic value. One lies in the claim that the language of objective value presupposes a flawed, dualistic distinction between subjects and objects. The second lies in the claim that there are no objective values which do not arise within and/or depend upon particular cultures or valuational frameworks. The third comprises the suggestion that belief in objective values embodies the representational theory of perception. In the second (...) half, a defence is offered of belief in objective intrinsic value. Objectivists hold that axiological properties supply interpersonal reasons for action for any relevant moral agent. The intrinsically valuable is understood as what there is reason to desire, cherish or foster in virtue of the nature of the state or object concerned. The concept of intrinsic value is shown to be instantiated, and defended against a range of criticisms. (shrink)