C. Fred Alford contends that the manner in which I objected to Feyerabend's democratic relativism is vulnerable to Feyerabend's rhetorical strategy, and that a better strategy would be to show that Feyerabend fails to demonstrate that democratic relativism is desirable. I reply in defense of the ?plausibility? issue on the grounds that Feyerabend's theory lends itself to uses (and abuses) beyond Utopian critique (in Alford's sense). I argue that it is the fact that critics ? myself included ? have assumed (...) the burden of demonstrating the impossibility of Feyerabend's political theory that has led to the stalemate Alford describes, and that we may retain the ?plausibility? question while avoiding the stalemate by placing the burden of argument on Feyerabend to show that his theory is plausible. (shrink)

Stephen Yates's objections to Feyerabend's political theory (Inquiry 27 [1984], 137?42) are presented in a way that makes them unnecessarily vulnerable to a rhetorical strategy often employed by Feyerabend. Like many other critics, Yates seems to assume that it is the implausibility of Feyerabend's claims that opens them to refutation, whereas it is really this that makes them such slippery targets of criticism. Rather than claim that Feyerabend's ideal would be virtually impossible to realize, I argue that Feyerabend does not (...) demonstrate why ?democratic relativism? is at all desirable. (shrink)