The main aim of this paper is to analyse Hegel’s theory of cognitive reference to the world and, in particular, Hegel’s theory of sensation, in order to verify whether it implies metaphysical commitments. I will pursue my goal by investigating the problem of sensation in Hegel’s philosophy starting from McDowell’s conception of the relation between mind and world and from his theory of perception. In my view, this strategy offers a threefold advantage that will enable us to do the following: (...) i) persuasively interpret the Hegelian theory of sensation; ii) better understand the authenticity and the limits of McDowell’s ‘Hegelianism’; iii) place the Hegelian theory of sensation within the complex contemporary debate on the status of sensible experience. (shrink)

In his most recent work, McDowell argues that the oscillation between the Myth of the Given and coherentism can be avoided only by an ‘equipoise’ between the objective and the subjective. However, I argue that Adorno’s ‘cognitive utopia’ is a genuine 4th option distinct from equipoise and from the oscillation between the Myth of the Given and coherentism. McDowell’s inability to acknowledge the cognitive utopia is traced to his overly abstract conception of the disenchantment of nature, in contrast to Adorno’s (...) emphasis on the domination of nature. This difference is traced to their different interpretations of Hegel. (shrink)

Jürgen Habermas’s political philosophy incorporates the view that legitimacy is immanent to law, even though it makes morality a central component of democratic legitimacy. Taking this as a startin...

There are two general approaches to Hegel’s theoretical philosophy which are broadly popular in recent work. Debate between them is often characterized, by both sides, as a dispute between those favoring a more traditional “metaphysical” approach and those favoring a newer “nonmetaphysical” approach. But I argue that the most important and compelling points made by both sides are actually independent of the idea of a “nonmetaphysical” interpretation of Hegel, which is itself simply unconvincing. The most promising directions for future research, (...) for those on both sides of recent debates, will require recognizing that Hegel’s theoretical philosophy includes a metaphysics, and engaging new debates about the specific character of that metaphysics. (shrink)

Although, as many scholars have noted, Hegel appears to dismiss common sense, I argue that his claim that speculative philosophy can provide the rational ground for what is implicit in ordinary consciousness amounts to a critical vindication of common sense. Hegel’s attitude to common sense/ordinary consciousness is thus more complex and intriguing than either the longstanding consensus on his dismissal of and disdain for common sense, or the McDowellian attempt to ally Hegel’s position with later-Wittgensteinian philosophical therapy. Hegel’s critique of (...) ordinary consciousness, I conclude, should be read as a nuanced philosophical vindication of common sense. (shrink)

In this article I argue that Hegel has become analytic philosophy’s “pharmakon”—both its “poison” and its “cure.” Traditionally, Hegel’s philosophy has been attacked by Anglo-American analytical philosophers for its alleged charlatanism and irrelevance. Yet starting from the 1970s there has been a revival of interest in Hegel’s philosophical work, which, I suggest, may be explained by three developments: the revival of interest in Aristotelianism following Saul Kripke’s and Hilary Putnam’s work on natural kinds, and Elizabeth Anscombe’s, Philippa Foot’s, and Putnam’s (...) opposition to the fact-value distinction; the rehabilitation of Hegel’s theories by various philosophers, including Robert Pippin, Terry Pinkard, Fred Beiser, Robert Stern, and Stephen Houlgate; and the Sellars-inspired philosophy of mind of John McDowell and of Robert Brandom. The first and third of these reasons, I argue, have led several analytic theorists to cast Hegel in a more positive light as the “cure” for analyti... (shrink)

Hegel definiert „Vernunft” als die Einheit der Objektivität und der Subjektivität. Diese Definition bedeutet nicht, dass für Hegel nur das Subjekt existiert, welches sich das Objekt dementsprechend nur in seinem Inneren vorstellt; eine solche Definition bedeutet nämlich nicht, dass es für Hegel keine Außenwelt gibt, sondern eigentlich, dass es für ihn nichts gibt, was als solches unvernünftig ist. Als Einheit des Subjekts, das erkennt, und des Objekts, das erkannt wird, umfasst die Vernunft für Hegel alles, was es gibt und geben (...) kann. Jene Definition bedeutet eben: Es gibt nichts außerhalb dessen, was das Subjekt erkennt und erkennen kann. Mit dieser These verneint Hegel selbstverständlich nicht, dass es Sachen gibt, die das Subjekt noch nicht kennt bzw. von deren Existenz es noch nicht weiß, und auch nicht, dass es keine Sachen gibt, die das Subjekt noch nicht verstanden und begriffen hat, sondern eigentlich nur, dass es keine Sachen gibt, die prinzipiell nicht erkannt und begriffen werden können. Dass etwas existiert, impliziert für Hegel, dass es eventuell erkannt und fernerhin begriffen werden kann. Sein, Erkennbarsein und Begreifbarsein sind für Hegel ein und dasselbe. (shrink)