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  1. Metaphysical Separatism and Epistemological Autonomy in Frege’s Philosophy and Beyond.Jim Hutchinson - forthcoming - British Journal for the History of Philosophy:1-25.
    Commentators regularly attribute to Frege realist, idealist, and quietist responses to metaphysical questions concerning the abstract objects he calls ‘thoughts’. But despite decades of effort, the evidence offered on behalf of these attributions remains unconvincing. I argue that Frege deliberately avoids commitment to any of these positions, as part of a metaphysical separatist policy motivated by the fact that logic is epistemologically autonomous from metaphysics. Frege’s views and arguments prove relevant to current attempts to argue for epistemological autonomy, particularly that (...)
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  • The Collapse of Logical Pluralism has Been Greatly Exaggerated.Colin R. Caret - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (4):739-760.
    According to the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall, there are several distinct relations of logical consequence. Some critics argue that logical pluralism suffers from what I call the collapse problem: that despite its intention to articulate a radically pluralistic doctrine about logic, the view unintentionally collapses into logical monism. In this paper, I propose a contextualist resolution of the collapse problem. This clarifies the mechanism responsible for a plurality of logics and handles the motivating data better than the original (...)
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  • Gottlob Frege.Edward N. Zalta - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    This entry introduces the reader to the main ideas in Frege's philosophy of logic, mathematics, and language.
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  • 19th Brazilian Logic Conference: Book of Abstracts.Cezar A. Mortari & Ricardo Silvestre (eds.) - 2019 - João Pessoa, PB, Brasil: EDUFCG.
    This is the book of abstracts of the 19th Brazilian Logic Conferences. The Brazilian Logic Conferences (EBL) is one of the most traditional logic conferences in South America. Organized by the Brazilian Logic Society (SBL), its main goal is to promote the dissemination of research in logic in a broad sense. It has been occurring since 1979, congregating logicians of different fields — mostly philosophy, mathematics and computer science — and with different backgrounds — from undergraduate students to senior researchers. (...)
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  • Aplicación y adopción de reglas lógicas.Camila Gallovich - 2022 - Análisis Filosófico 42 (1):105-125.
    El excepcionalismo de la lógica asume que la lógica tiene un estatus epistemológico privilegiado, es normativa y no es revisable. El antiexcepcionalismo, en cambio, rechaza ese carácter excepcional. Recientemente, se ha sugerido que el problema de la adopción de reglas lógicas es transversal a la discusión que se da entre excepcionalistas y antiexcepcionalistas. En este trabajo defiendo la tesis contraria. En particular, sostengo que, si el problema de la adopción de reglas es un problema central para la lógica como disciplina, (...)
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  • Logic as a Methodological Discipline.Gil Sagi - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9725-9749.
    This essay offers a conception of logic by which logic may be considered to be exceptional among the sciences on the backdrop of a naturalistic outlook. The conception of logic focused on emphasises the traditional role of logic as a methodology for the sciences, which distinguishes it from other sciences that are not methodological. On the proposed conception, the methodological aims of logic drive its definitions and principles, rather than the description of scientific phenomena. The notion of a methodological discipline (...)
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  • Frege's Critical Arguments for Axioms.Jim Hutchinson - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):516-541.
  • Intuitions, Theory Choice and the Ameliorative Character of Logical Theories.César Frederico dos Santos - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12199-12223.
    Anti-exceptionalists about logic claim that logical methodology is not different from scientific methodology when it comes to theory choice. Two anti-exceptionalist accounts of theory choice in logic are abductivism and predictivism. These accounts have in common reliance on pre-theoretical logical intuitions for the assessment of candidate logical theories. In this paper, I investigate whether intuitions can provide what abductivism and predictivism want from them and conclude that they do not. As an alternative to these approaches, I propose a Carnapian view (...)
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  • The Normativity of Kant's Logical Laws.Jessica Leech - 2017 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 34 (4).
    According to received wisdom, Kant takes the laws of logic to be normative laws of thought. This has been challenged by Tolley (2006). In this paper, I defend the received wisdom, but with an important modification: Kant's logical laws are constitutive norms for thought. The laws of logic do tell us what thinking is, not because all thoughts are in conformity with logical laws, but because all thoughts are, by nature, subject to the standard of logic.
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  • Logic Oughtn't Be Normative.Christopher Searle - 2021 - Disputatio 1 (22):3-10.
    Presumably, the exponent of logical normativity believes it to be the case that rational agents ought to reason logically. If the converse holds, and the exponent of logical normativity believes either (a) that it is false that rational agents ought to reason logically or (b) that the claim that rational agents ought to reason logi- cally is not truth–functional, then any attempt to formulate sound arguments in support of their position will be either question–begging or self–contradictory. To argue in favour (...)
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  • Logical Form and the Limits of Thought.Manish Oza - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
    What is the relation of logic to thinking? My dissertation offers a new argument for the claim that logic is constitutive of thinking in the following sense: representational activity counts as thinking only if it manifests sensitivity to logical rules. In short, thinking has to be minimally logical. An account of thinking has to allow for our freedom to question or revise our commitments – even seemingly obvious conceptual connections – without loss of understanding. This freedom, I argue, requires that (...)
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  • The Normativity of Logic in a Psychologistic Framework: Three Approaches.Simone Melis - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Turin
    Contemporary psychologism has been amended for most of the objections by its opponents over a century ago. However, some authors still raise doubts about its ability to account for some peculiar properties of logic. In particular, it is argued that the psychological universality of patterns of inferential behavior is not sufficient to account for the normativity of logic. In this paper, I deal with the issue and offer three alternative solutions that do not rely on mere empirical universality. I will (...)
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  • What the Heck is Logic? Logics-as-Formalizations, a Nihilistic Approach.Aadil Kurji - 2020 - Dissertation,
    Logic is about reasoning, or so the story goes. This thesis looks at the concept of logic, what it is, and what claims of correctness of logics amount to. The concept of logic is not a settled matter, and has not been throughout the history of it as a notion. Tools from conceptual analysis aid in this historical venture. Once the unsettledness of logic is established we see the repercussions in current debates in the philosophy of logic. Much of the (...)
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  • Why Logical Pluralism?Colin R. Caret - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4947-4968.
    This paper scrutinizes the debate over logical pluralism. I hope to make this debate more tractable by addressing the question of motivating data: what would count as strong evidence in favor of logical pluralism? Any research program should be able to answer this question, but when faced with this task, many logical pluralists fall back on brute intuitions. This sets logical pluralism on a weak foundation and makes it seem as if nothing pressing is at stake in the debate. The (...)
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  • Frege on the Generality of Logical Laws.Jim Hutchinson - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy (2):1-18.
    Frege claims that the laws of logic are characterized by their “generality,” but it is hard to see how this could identify a special feature of those laws. I argue that we must understand this talk of generality in normative terms, but that what Frege says provides a normative demarcation of the logical laws only once we connect it with his thinking about truth and science. He means to be identifying the laws of logic as those that appear in every (...)
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  • Inductive Logic as Explication: The Evolution of Carnap’s Notion of Logical Probability.Marta Sznajder - 2018 - The Monist 101 (4):417-440.
    According to a popular interpretation, Carnap’s interpretation of probability had evolved from a logical towards a subjective conception. However Carnap himself insisted that his basic philosophical view of probability was always the same. I address this apparent clash between Carnap's self-identification and the subsequent interpretations of his work. Following its original intentions, I reconstruct inductive logic as an explication. The emerging picture is of a versatile linguistic framework, whose main function is not the discovery of objective logical relations in the (...)
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  • Logical Pluralism and Normativity.Stewart Shapiro & Teresa Kouri Kissel - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):389-410.
    We are logical pluralists who hold that the right logic is dependent on the domain of investigation; different logics for different mathematical theories. The purpose of this article is to explore the ramifications for our pluralism concerning normativity. Is there any normative role for logic, once we give up its universality? We discuss Florian Steingerger’s “Frege and Carnap on the Normativity of Logic” as a source for possible types of normativity, and then turn to our own proposal, which postulates that (...)
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  • Logic Isn’T Normative.Gillian Russell - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):371-388.
    Some writers object to logical pluralism on the grounds that logic is normative. The rough idea is that the relation of logical consequence has consequences for what we ought to think and h...
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  • Logical Pluralism and Normativity.Teresa Kouri Kissel & Stewart Shapiro - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.
    We are logical pluralists who hold that the right logic is dependent on the domain of investigation; different logics for different mathematical theories. The purpose of this article is to explore the ramifications for our pluralism concerning normativity. Is there any normative role for logic, once we give up its universality? We discuss Florian Steingerger’s “Frege and Carnap on the Normativity of Logic” as a source for possible types of normativity, and then turn to our own proposal, which postulates that (...)
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