- Nuel Belnap on Indeterminism and Free Action.Thomas Müller (ed.) - 2014 - Wien, Austria: Springer.details
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Causing Things and Doing Things.Helen Steward - 2014 - In C. G. Pulman (ed.), Hart on Responsibility. New York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Free Will, Determinism, and Epiphenomenalism.Mark Balaguer - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
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Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
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Thing Causation.Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Free Will and Abilities to Act.Randolph Clarke - 2019 - In Klaus von Stosch Saskia Wendel (ed.), Streit um die Freiheit: Philosophische und theologische Beiträge. Schoeningh/Brill. pp. 41-62.details
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The Disappearing Agent.Filip Čeč - 2017 - In Boran Berčić (ed.), Perspectives on the Self. University of Rijeka. pp. 235-253.details
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A new puppet puzzle.Andrew M. Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (3):202-213.details
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Agent‐Switching, Plight Inescapability, and Corporate Agency.Olof Leffler - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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Freedom and the open future.Yishai Cohen - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (3):228-255.details
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Agential Settling Requires a Conscious Intention.Yishai Cohen - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (01):139-155.details
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Deliberating in the presence of manipulation.Yishai Cohen - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):85-105.details
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Agency and Causal Explanation in Economics. Virtues and Economics, vol 5.Peter Róna & László Zsolnai (eds.) - 2019 - Springer.details
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Explaining Free Will.Michael Elstob - 2018 - Chesham, UK: C. M. Elstob. Printed and distributed by Amazon.details
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Free Will and Epistemology: a Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Robert Lockie - 2018 - London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Setiya on reasons and causes.Ben Wolfson - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (3):276-289.details
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A Dispositional Theory of Health.Sander Werkhoven - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):927-952.details
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Forking Paths and Freedom: A Challenge to Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Robyn Repko Waller & Russell L. Waller - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1199-1212.details
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A Dilemma for Reductive Compatibilism.Robert H. Wallace - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (7):2763–2785.details
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Are abilities dispositions?Barbara Vetter - 2019 - Synthese 196 (196):201-220.details
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Free Will and Mental Powers.Niels van Miltenburg & Dawa Ometto - 2020 - Topoi 39 (5):1155-1165.details
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Causality, determination and free will: towards an anscombean account of free action.Niels van Miltenburg - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-20.details
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Freedom. An impossible reality.Raymond Tallis - 2022 - Human Affairs 32 (4):474-507.details
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Fresh starts.Helen Steward - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):197-217.details
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The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Moral Responsibility.Helen Steward - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):241-271.details
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Replies to Randolph Clarke, John Bishop, and Helen Beebee.Helen Steward - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):547-557.details
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Responses.Helen Steward - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (6):681-706.details
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Précis of łarger A łarger METAPHYSICS łarger FOR łarger FREEDOM.Helen Steward - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):513-518.details
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Agency as a Two-Way Power: A Defence.Helen Steward - 2020 - The Monist 103 (3):342-355.details
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The essence of agency is discovered, not defined: a minimal mindreading argument.Andrew Sims - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2011-2028.details
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On a Neglected Aspect of Agentive Experience.Andrew Sims - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (4):1313-1330.details
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Robustness Revised: Frankfurt Cases and the Right Kind of Power to Do Otherwise.Seth Shabo - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):89-106.details
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It wasn’t up to Jones: unavoidable actions and intensional contexts in Frankfurt examples.Seth Shabo - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):379-399.details
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Assimilations and Rollbacks: Two Arguments Against Libertarianism Defended.Seth Shabo - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):151-172.details
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Intention as action under development: why intention is not a mental state.Devlin Russell - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):742-761.details
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Events, agents, and settling whether and how one intervenes.Jason D. Runyan - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1629-1646.details
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Agent-causal libertarianism, statistical neural laws and wild coincidences.Jason D. Runyan - 2018 - Synthese 195 (10):4563-4580.details
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Reductionism, Agency and Free Will.Maria Joana Rigato - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (1):107-116.details
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From My Arm Rising to Me Raising It: a Taxonomy of Behaviors and Actions.Joana Rigato - 2019 - Kairos 22 (1):132-160.details
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Downward causation and supervenience: the non-reductionist’s extra argument for incompatibilism.Joana Rigato - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (3):384-399.details
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Beyond the Postmetaphysical Turn: Ethics and Metaphysics in Critical Theory.Craig Reeves - 2016 - Journal of Critical Realism 15 (3):217-244.details
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Adorno, Freedom and Criminal Law: The ‘Determinist Challenge’ Revitalised.Craig Reeves - 2016 - Law and Critique 27 (3):323-348.details
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Aristotle's Four Causes of Action.Bryan C. Reece - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):213-227.details
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Psychopathology and the Ability to Do Otherwise.Hanna Pickard - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):135-163.details
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Team Reasoning and Collective Intentionality.Björn Petersson - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):199-218.details
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From Neuroscience to Law: Bridging the Gap.Tuomas K. Pernu & Nadine Elzein - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.details
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A Defense of Free Will Skepticism: Replies to Commentaries by Victor Tadros, Saul Smilansky, Michael McKenna, and Alfred R. Mele on Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):617-636.details
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Foundational Grounding and Creaturely Freedom.Kenneth L. Pearce - 2021 - Mind 131 (524):1108-1130.details
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Substance Causation.Michele Paolini Paoletti - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (1):287-308.details
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The libertarian predicament: a plea for action theory.Niels van Miltenburg & Dawa Ometto - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):161-178.details
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