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  1. Why the performance of habit requires attention.Laura Bickel - 2024 - Mind and Language 39 (2):260-270.
    This article argues that every performance of habit‐driven action requires attention. I begin by revisiting the conception of habit‐driven actions as reducible to automatically performed responses to stimuli. On this conception, habitual actions are a counterexample to Wayne Wu's action‐centered theory of attention. Using the biased competition model of attention, and building on findings from affective cognitive neuroscience, I challenge this position. I claim that the performance of a habitual action requires experiential history to be exerting an influence that is (...)
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  • Thinking the Right Way (at the Right Time) about Virtues and Skills. [REVIEW]Scott Woodcock - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (2):577-586.
    I discuss three features of Matt Stichter’s new book The Skillfulness of Virtue. The thesis of the book is that virtue is best conceptualized as a type of skill, and the chapters of the book explore the implications of this thesis for our understanding of moral development, social psychology and comparisons of virtuous agents with agents who exhibit familiar types of non-moral expertise. The features of the book that I examine are (1) Stichter’s rejection of an ability to articulate reasons (...)
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  • Replies.Jason Stanley - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):497-511.
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  • Skill and Sensitivity to Reasons.Joshua Shepherd - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (3):669-681.
    In this paper I explore the relationship between skill and sensitivity to reasons for action. I want to know to what degree we can explain the fact that the skilled agent is very good at performing a cluster of actions within some domain in terms of the fact that the skilled agent has a refined sensitivity to the reasons for action common to the cluster. The picture is a little bit complex. While skill can be partially explained by sensitivity to (...)
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  • Skill acquisition without representation.Albert Piacente - 2018 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 45 (3):241-258.
    ABSTRACTA paper in two parts, the first is a critique of the commonly held view among both cognitivist and non-cognitivist sport philosophers that conscious mental representation of knowledge that is a necessary condition for skill acquisition. The second is a defense of a necessary causal condition for skill acquisition, a necessary causal condition that is mimetic, physically embodied, and socially embedded. To make my case I rely throughout on a common thought experiment in and beyond the philosophy of sport literature, (...)
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  • The Pragmatic Intelligence of Habits.Katsunori Miyahara & Ian Robertson - 2021 - Topoi 40 (3):597-608.
    Habitual actions unfold without conscious deliberation or reflection, and yet often seem to be intelligently adjusted to situational intricacies. A question arises, then, as to how it is that habitual actions can exhibit this form of intelligence, while falling outside the domain of paradigmatically intentional actions. Call this the intelligence puzzle of habits. This puzzle invites three standard replies. Some stipulate that habits lack intelligence and contend that the puzzle is ill-posed. Others hold that habitual actions can exhibit intelligence because (...)
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  • Skills – do we really know what kind of knowledge they are?Jens Erling Birch - 2016 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 10 (3):237-250.
    Philosophers of sport seem to have lived happily with the idea that the knowledge in sporting skills is knowing how. In traditional epistemology, knowing how does not qualify to be knowledge proper since knowledge is a question of whether a belief is true and justified. Unless knowing how is a special case of knowing that, it is not knowledge. The argument for such an identification arises saying that a former expert in tennis has tennis know-how, although she cannot perform skillfully. (...)
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