In this article, I will attempt to link altruism, a concern of Positive Psychology, a recent branch of psychology, and dāna, the deeply entrenched aspect of Indian thought. These aspects strive towards a connection with the self and well-being. In addition, an association between Indian psychological attributes, especially with reference to the Mahābhārata, and Positive Psychology will be shown. In the Indian context, dāna or the act of giving involves not merely the act of giving material or tangible goods or (...) objects but also involves doing an act, doing something for others in which one has no stake or claim. In other words, the giving involves giving something from the depths of oneself, for the ‘good’ of another, without expecting anything in return. The cultivation of generosity facilitates a pliancy of mind that allows for the eradication of delusion of a limited self as well as disables greed and hate. In addition to anna-dāna, jala-dāna, bhūmi-dāna, vidyā-dāna and jnana-dāna, the Mahābhārata also talks about sharing with love and affection. A desire for good is a desire for self-satisfaction, bearing a positive therapeutic value for a better, truer, more real self. (shrink)

In this dissertation I discuss the epistemology of ethical intuitionism, in particular the claim that mature moral agents possess self-evident moral knowledge. Traditional intuitionists such as W.D. Ross have claimed that by reflection, we can acquire knowledge of our basic moral duties such as the duty of veracity or benevolence. Recent defenders of intuitionism such as Robert Audi have further developed this theory and argued that adequate understanding can be sufficient for moral knowledge. I criticize this view and argue that (...) such accounts fail to make a convincing case for a foundationalist moral epistemology. Instead, I propose to separate the question of how we acquire moral knowledge from an account that justifies moral beliefs. In response to the first issue, I draw an analogy between our moral intuitions and chosmkian linguistics; in both areas, I argue, human beings possess a universal, unconscious and (partly) inaccessible system of rules that explains how we come to learn language and to make moral judgments. In regards to the justificatory issue, I address recent evolutionary debunking arguments designed to undermine the claim that our moral judgments track stance-independent truths. I try to show that this conclusion only follows under the assumption of an instrumentalist interpretation of moral reasoning which the intuitionist is not forced to accept. (shrink)