In this paper, there were presented ethical arguments concerning the application of modern techniques of genetic intervention in human procreation. In particular, the rationalistic arguments in favour of genetic interventions were critically presented, namely the argument on ethical neutrality of technology, liberal argument on procreative freedom and argument on genetic enhancement. There were also analysed the negative emotional reaction to genetic engineering. The main aim of the paper was to express the cognitive element from these emotions enabling a wider understanding (...) of human procreation and the values of parent-child relations. (shrink)

The most benign rationale for sex selection is deemed to be “family balancing.” On this view, provided the sex distribution of an existing offspring group is “unbalanced,” one may legitimately use reproductive technologies to select the sex of the next child. I present four novel concerns with granting “family balancing” as a justification for sex selection: families or family subsets should not be subject to medicalization; sex selection for “family balancing” entrenches heteronormativity, inflicting harm in at least three specific ways; (...) the logic of affirmative action is appropriated; the moral mandate of reproductive autonomy is misused. I conclude that the harms caused by family balancing are sufficiently substantive to override any claim arising from a supposed right to sex selection as an instantiation of procreative autonomy. (shrink)

In the UK, regulation of clinical services is being restructured. We consider two clinical procedures, abortion and IVF treatment, which have similar ethical and political sensitivities. We consider factors including the law, licensing, inspection, amount of paperwork and reporting requirements, the reception by practitioners and costs, to establish which field has the greater ‘regulatory burden’. We test them based on scientific, ethical, social, political factors that might explain differences. We find that regulatory burden borne by IVF services is greater than (...) in abortion, but none of the explanatory theses can provide a justification of this phenomenon. We offer an alternative explanation based on regulatory ‘overspill’ from research regulation and policy making, conceptualisation of risk regulation and a high public profile that locks a regulator into self-preservation. (shrink)

This paper forms part of the feminist critique of the regulatory consequences of biomedicine’s systematic exclusion of the role of women’s bodies in the development of reprogenetic technologies. I suggest that strategic use of notions of the sacred to decontextualise and delimit disagreement fosters this marginalisation. Here conceptions of the sacred and sacralisation afford a means by which pragmatic consensus over regulation may be achieved, through the deployment of a bricolage of dense images associated with cultural loyalties to solidify support (...) or exclude contradictory elements. Hence an explicit renegotiation of the symbolic order structuring salient debates is necessary to disrupt and enrich the entrenched and exclusionary dominant discourse over reprogenetic regulation. I draw upon previous analyses of strategic rhetoric associated with the regulation of infertility treatment and embryo research in the United Kingdom, the cultural anthropology of biomedicine and feminist ethnographies of reprogenetics to illustrate these claims. (shrink)

This response to Edgar Dahl’s paper in this issue of Health Care Analysis clarifies my argument concerning sex selection and shows that our disagreement is less than he believes it is.

This paper examines dominant arguments advocating for the procreative right to undergo sex selection for social reasons, based on gender preference. I present four of the most recognized and common justifications for sex selection: the argument from natural sex selection, the argument from procreative autonomy, the argument from family balancing, and the argument from children’s well-being. Together these represent the various means by which scholars aim to defend access to sex selection for social reasons as a legitimate procreative choice. In (...) response, I contend that these justifications are flawed and often inconsistent and therefore fail to vindicate the practice. (shrink)

In a recent comment on the HFEA’s public consultation on sex selection, Soren Holm claimed that proponents of family balancing are committed to embrace a laissez faire approach. Given that arguments in support of sex selection for family balancing also support sex selection for other social reasons, advocates of family balancing, he asserts, are simply inconsistent when calling for a limit on access to sex selection. In this paper, I argue that proponents of family balancing are in no way inconsistent. (...) Provided their advocacy of family balancing is aimed at preventing a severe distortion of the natural sex ratio, they are entirely justified in insisting on restrictions to sex selection. The real question is whether a concern for the sex ratio does indeed call for a limit on sex selection. Based on a recent survey on gender preferences and data from several Gender Clinics, I argue that a restriction on sex selection to family balancing is unwarranted. In the absence of any evidence for a pending sex ratio distortion, we are actually required to adopt a laissez faire approach to sex selection. (shrink)

This article briefly reviews the various papers contained in this volume. They were originally presented at a research workshop held at Keele University in the UK in February 2003. It is suggested that the different papers raise a series of related legal, social and ethical issues and can be collectively seen to demonstrate the fact that policy formation in relation to reproductive matters is highly contested. It is concluded that ethical policy formation in this area needs to be based on (...) actual evidence of harm rather than assumed harm and that this therefore entails more empirical research into reproductive matters. (shrink)