Affective polarization is characterized by deep antagonism between political opponents and is an issue of growing concern. Some philosophers have recently suggested empathy as a possible remedy. In particular, it has been suggested that empathy might mitigate the harm resulting from affective polarization by helping us find common ground across our differences. While these discussions provide a helpful starting point, important questions regarding the conditions under which empathizing and finding common ground are morally appropriate and likely to be useful, given (...) the many risks associated with taking this approach, remain unaddressed. In this paper, I therefore give an account of the risks that we must reckon with if empathy and common ground are to help remedy affective polarization and repair damaged relations between political opponents. Far from suggesting that empathy is morally unimportant or intrinsically harmful, my goal is thus to extend and amplify previous discussion to promote a more nuanced understanding of empathy's role in this important aspect of the moral life and to ensure that our efforts to empathize are appropriate and fruitful. (shrink)

It is not unusual in the philosophy of perception to use empirical research to build arguments against or in favour of a certain philosophical view (see Phillips 2016 for a scrutinizing discussion). This methodology is what Barwich uses in her book entitled Smellosophy (2020) when criticizing an approach to olfaction according to which ‘truthful perception is an accurate mental representation of physical properties’ (Barwich 2020: 310). Furthermore, Barwich would like neuroscience to set the agenda for philosophical questions about olfaction, so (...) that empirical evidence is not just used to adjudicate between existing philosophical theories but instead inspires new ones, such as Barwich’s own. Thus, while her main focus is first-order theories of olfaction, she also aims to exemplify a methodology for developing and assessing such theories that ‘break[s] down the silos of institutionalized disciplinarity that are neatly dividing philosophical from neuroscientific inquiry’ (Barwich 2020: 311). The ways in which Barwich arrives at and justifies claims about olfaction give rise to various questions about the relationship between philosophical discussion of perception and neuroscientific results concerning how the brain works. In part 1 of this critical notice, I look at the approach to olfaction that Barwich criticizes and raise a few of these questions. This leads to a query about exactly how the approach differs from Barwich’s own view of olfaction. Part 2 discusses selected aspects of her view. I examine how her claim that olfaction is both exteroceptive and interoceptive and the associated idea that the brain creates odours relate to the empirical research she presents. This leads to a query concerning her methodology, which uses empirical research about brain processing to arrive at conclusions concerning a subject’s experience. (shrink)