In my response, I initially defend my preference for classical Critical Theory, emphasizing its continued relevance in capitalist modernity, stressing that the epistemological approach does not imply dogmatism with regards to scientific theory or Historical Materialism, just as it does not imply closure with regards to political democracy. When it comes to the dialectics of the classics, I also defend an epistemological approach, arguing that the dialectics aiming for truth implies critique and negativity. However, confronted with the duality of transcendental (...) ideas and historical relativity, I express my confidence in human intuition. Following Hegel, determinate negation must sublate the intuitively conceived universality to a new conception that contains the result of the negation. Finally, I do not see how the conceptual aporias of general economy can be solved by the current political degrowth project. Still, politics is what we need more of, namely social democracy. (shrink)

The distinction between teleology and deontology is today almost universally accepted within practical philosophy, but deontology is and has from the beginning been subordinate to utili-tarianism. ‘Deontology’ was constructed by Bentham to signify the art and science of private morality within a utilitarian worldview. The classical distinction was constructed by Broad as a refinement of Sidgwick’s utilitarianism, and then adopted by Frankena. To Broad it signified two opposite tendencies in ethics, in Frankena’s textbooks, however, it becomes an exclusive distinction, where (...) de-ontology signifies disregard for consequences, and it is therefore almost impossible to think of deontology as a framework for a com-prehensive ethical theory. This conception, however, is adopted by Rawls, and in his contractarian interpretation of deontology it is in fact no more within the sphere of ethics. (shrink)

The argument is that Bildung has occupied Habermas from the earliest writings. In these writings he criticizes the idea of being educated as an expression of innate abilities and emphasizes instead the significance of the social conditions of the upbringing. This is the subject of the first section. The second section provides a presentation of the ideology-critical analysis of Bildung found in Habermas’s doctoral thesis on The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. The basic critique is that the ideal of (...) individual Bildung is too tightly connected to economic and political dominance, but still the ideal contains some truth. The third section maps his relatively sparse comments regarding Bildung in the subsequent decades. Significant here is Knowledge and Human Interest, where he works himself out of the philosophy of consciousness framework towards the Theory of communicative action. This becomes the communicative approach, which becomes the framework of Habermas’ discussion of Bildung, both in relation to philosophical ethics – discourse ethics – and in more specific discussions, such as what is the role of the university in modern society. Finally just a few words on the political philosophy and the philosophy of law, which Habermas presents in Between Facts and Norms, where he once again allows Bildung have a positive normative significance, but now in a collective communicative perspective. (shrink)