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Physicalism as an empirical hypothesis

Synthese 194 (9):3347-3360 (2017)

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  1. Tricky Truths: How Should Alethic Pluralism Accommodate Racial Truths?Ragnar van der Merwe & Phila Msimang - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-23.
    Some alethic pluralists maintain that there are two kinds of truths operant in our alethic discourse: a realist kind and an anti-realist kind. In this paper, we argue that such a binary conception cannot accommodate certain social truths, specifically truths about race. Most alethic pluralists surprisingly overlook the status of racial truths. Douglas Edwards is, however, an exception. In his version of alethic pluralism—Determination Pluralism—racial truths are superassertible (anti-realist) true rather than correspondence (realist) true. We argue that racial truths exhibit (...)
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  • On the continuity of metaphysics with science: Some scepticism and some suggestions.Jack Ritchie - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (2-3):202-220.
    Metaphilosophy, Volume 53, Issue 2-3, Page 202-220, April 2022.
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  • The Materialism of Roy Wood Sellars.Balázs Gimes - 2021 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 11 (1):166-182.
    Physicalism is often characterized as an empirical hypothesis. But according to an alternative conceptualization, it is instead a stance or an attitude. I analyze Roy Wood Sellars’s materialist philosophy in order to show that it is a counterexample to a specific physicalist empirical hypothesis: the minimal completeness of the physical. However, it is arguably not reducible to a stance: it is a meaningful metaphysical thesis with substantive cognitive content.
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  • Reflections on new thinking about scientific realism.Anjan Chakravartty - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3379-3392.
    In August 2014 the Universities of Pretoria and Johannesburg hosted a major international conference in Cape Town, ‘New Thinking about Scientific Realism’, to assess extant discussions of the view in hopes of opening up new avenues of research, and to sow the seeds of further development and consideration of these prospective lines of inquiry. In this, the concluding essay of the Special Issue collecting some of the descendants of these earlier presentations, I extract some of the more striking themes to (...)
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  • Physicalism, Closure, and the Structure of Causal Arguments for Physicalism: A Naturalistic Formulation of the Physical.Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (4):1081-1096.
    Physicalism is the idea that everything either is physical or is nothing over and above the physical. For this formulation of physicalism to have determinate content, it should be identified what the “physical” refers to; i.e. the body problem. Some other closely related theses, especially the ones employed in the causal arguments for different versions of physicalism, and more especially the causal closure thesis, are also subject to the body problem. In this paper, I do two things. First, I explore (...)
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  • Naturalism or Ontological Significance? Physicalism and Fundamental Mentality: A Historical Approach.Hamed Bikaraan-Behesht - 2022 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations at University of Tabriz 16 (38):154-185.
    Most physicalists believe that physicalism is a thesis that denies the existence of fundamental mentality either as a substance or as a property. Therefore, since most physicalists also endorse a posteriori physicalism, according to them, if the future physical theory posits fundamental mentality as a fundamental physical concept, then physicalism will be falsified. In contrast, there are those who believe that the core idea of physicalism is an ontological deference to science (especially physics); the idea that is usually called scientism (...)
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  • Fisicalismo e o problema mente-cérebro: uma questão de definição.Julio César Martins Mazzoni - 2019 - Sofia 8 (1):146-170.
    O Fisicalismo tem sido a posição filosófica monista mais aceita no mainstream do debate contemporâneo sobre a natureza do mental. Mas o que significa dizer que tudo o que existe é “físico”? O presente trabalho busca responder à pergunta: Como as teses fisicalistas contemporâneas têm definido o termo ‘físico’ em suas proposições? Para respondê-la foi realizada uma investigação teórico-filosófica baseada em revisão bibliográfica e análise lógica e conceitual. Quatro categorias gerais de definição do termo ‘físico’ foram identificadas numa revisão da (...)
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