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The motivation question

Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3413-3430 (2016)

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  1. A puzzle about enkratic reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3177-3196.
    Enkratic reasoning—reasoning from believing that you ought to do something to an intention to do that thing—seems good. But there is a puzzle about how it could be. Good reasoning preserves correctness, other things equal. But enkratic reasoning does not preserve correctness. This is because what you ought to do depends on your epistemic position, but what it is correct to intend does not. In this paper, I motivate these claims and thus show that there is a puzzle. I then (...)
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  • Maximalism versus Omnism about Permissibility.Douglas Portmore - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):427-452.
    Roughly speaking, maximalism is the view that only certain options are to be assessed in terms of whether they have some right‐making property (such as that of producing optimal consequences), whereas omnism is the view that all options are to be assessed in terms of whether they have this property. I argue that maximalism is preferable to omnism because it provides a more plausible solution to what's known as the problem of act versions and is not subject to any significant (...)
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  • Responses.John Broome - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3431-3448.
    This is a response to the comments of Boghossian, Cullity, Pettit and Southwood on my book Rationality Through Reasoning.
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