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  1. I—Michael Williams: Mythology of the Given: Sosa, Sellars and the Task of Epistemology.Michael Williams - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):91-112.
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  • Neurath’s protocol statements revisited: sketch of a theory of scientific testimony.Thomas Uebel - 2009 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (1):4-13.
  • Phenomenological Claims and the Myth of the Given.Jean-Michel Roy - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1):1-32.
    Over the past twenty years, Husserlian phenomenology has increasingly drawn the attention of the cognitive community, thereby leading to the emergence of what might be called a phenomenological trend within contemporary cognitive studies. What this phenomenological trend really amounts to is however a matter of debate. The reason is that it embodies, in fact, a multifaceted reflection about the relevance of Husserlian phenomenology to the current efforts towards a scientific theory of cognition, and, to a lesser degree, about the reciprocal (...)
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  • Rationality, Justification, and the Internalism/Externalism Debate.Harold Langsam - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):79-101.
    In this paper, I argue that what underlies internalism about justification is a rationalist conception of justification, not a deontological conception of justification, and I argue for the plausibility of this rationalist conception of justification. The rationalist conception of justification is the view that a justified belief is a belief that is held in a rational way; since we exercise our rationality through conscious deliberation, the rationalist conception holds that a belief is justified iff a relevant possible instance of conscious (...)
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  • Myth, memory and misrecognition in Sellars' ``empiricism and the philosophy of mind''.Rebecca Kukla - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 101 (2-3):161-211.
  • The Problem of the Epistemic Status of Rules: Wilfrid Sellars on the Material Rules of Inference.Ivan Ivashchenko - 2016 - Sententiae 34 (1):6-24.
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  • Virtue Perspectivism, Externalism, and Epistemic Circularity.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Michela Massimi (ed.), Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Synthese Library. pp. 123-140.
    Virtue perspectivism is a bi-level epistemology according to which there are two grades of knowledge: animal and reflective. The exercise of reliable competences suffices to give us animal knowledge; but we can then use these same competences to gain a second-order assuring perspective, one through which we may appreciate those faculties as reliable and in doing so place our first-order knowledge in a competent second-order perspective. Virtue perspectivism has considerable theoretical power, especially when it comes to vindicating our external world (...)
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  • Epistemic Perceptualism, Skill, and the Regress Problem.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-26.
    A novel solution is offered for how emotional experiences can function as sources of immediate prima facie justification for evaluative beliefs, and in such a way that suffices to halt a justificatory regress. Key to this solution is the recognition of two distinct kinds of emotional skill (what I call generative emotional skill and doxastic emotional skill) and how these must be working in tandem when emotional experience plays such a justificatory role. The paper has two main parts, the first (...)
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  • Epistemic perceptualism, skill and the regress problem.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1229-1254.
    A novel solution is offered for how emotional experiences can function as sources of immediate prima facie justification for evaluative beliefs, and in such a way that suffices to halt a justificatory regress. Key to this solution is the recognition of two distinct kinds of emotional skill and how these must be working in tandem when emotional experience plays such a justificatory role. The paper has two main parts, the first negative and the second positive. The negative part criticises the (...)
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  • Sellars vs. the given.Daniel Bonevac - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):1-30.
    John McDowell, Richard Rorty, and Robert Brandom invoke Sellars’s arguments against the Myth of the Given as having shown that the Given is nothing more than a myth. But most of Sellars’s arguments attack logical atomism, not the framework of givenness as such. Moreover, they do not succeed. At crucial points the arguments confuse the perspectives of a knower and those attributing knowledge to a knower. Only one argument-the “inconsistent triad” argument-addresses the Myth of the Given as such, and there (...)
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  • Phenomenological claims and the myth of the given.Jean-Michel Roy - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (Supplement):1-32.
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  • Collective (Telic) Virtue Epistemology.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Mark Alfano, Jeroen de Ridder & Colin Klein (eds.), Social Virtue Epistemology. London: Routledge.
    A new way to transpose the virtue epistemologist’s ‘knowledge = apt belief’ template to the collective level, as a thesis about group knowledge, is developed. In particular, it is shown how specifically judgmental belief can be realised at the collective level in a way that is structurally analogous, on a telic theory of epistemic normativity (e.g., Sosa 2020), to how it is realised at the individual level—viz., through a (collective) intentional attempt to get it right aptly (whether p) by alethically (...)
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  • Wilfrid Sellars.Jay Rosenberg - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Wilfrid Sellars.Willem deVries - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Overview of Wilfrid Sellars's philosophy.
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  • Pluralism and Perspectivism in the American Pragmatist Tradition.Matthew Brown - 2020 - In Michela Massimi (ed.), Knowledge From a Human Point of View. Springer Verlag.
    This chapter explores perspectivism in the American Pragmatist tradition. On the one hand, the thematization of perspectivism in contemporary epistemology and philosophy of science can benefit from resources in the American Pragmatist philosophical tradition. On the other hand, the Pragmatists have interesting and innovative, pluralistic views that can be illuminated through the lens of perspectivism. I pursue this inquiry primarily through examining relevant sources from the Pragmatist tradition. I will illustrate productive engagements between pragmatism and perspectivism in three areas: in (...)
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  • A defense of internalist foundations: direct awareness of fit as the solution to the Sellarsian dilemma.Travis McLane Dickinson - unknown
    Many of our ordinary beliefs about the world around us are a result of inference from more fundamental beliefs. Foundationalists in epistemology have thought that, if these ordinary beliefs are to be rationally justified, the chain of inferential justification must terminate in a belief that is justified noninferentially. Foundationalists, of the internalist variety, have thought that the most plausible candidates for ending the regress of empirical justification are experiential states, the justifying features of which the believing subject is aware. The (...)
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