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  1. Knowledge, Time, and Paradox: Introducing Sequential Epistemic Logic.Wesley Holliday - 2018 - In Hans van Ditmarsch & Gabriel Sandu (eds.), Outstanding Contributions to Logic: Jaakko Hintikka. Springer.
    Epistemic logic in the tradition of Hintikka provides, as one of its many applications, a toolkit for the precise analysis of certain epistemological problems. In recent years, dynamic epistemic logic has expanded this toolkit. Dynamic epistemic logic has been used in analyses of well-known epistemic “paradoxes”, such as the Paradox of the Surprise Examination and Fitch’s Paradox of Knowability, and related epistemic phenomena, such as what Hintikka called the “anti-performatory effect” of Moorean announcements. In this paper, we explore a variation (...)
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  • Conflict and co-ordination in the aftermath of oracular statements.Mariam Thalos - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):212-226.
    Can victims of the oracle paradox, which is known primarily through its unexpected hanging and surprise examination versions, extricate themselves from their difficulties of reasoning? No. For they do not, contrary to recent opinion, commit errors of fallacious elimination. As I shall argue, the difficulties of reasoning faced by these victims do not originate in the domain of concepts, propositions and their entailment relations; nor do they result from misapprehensions about limitations on what can be known. The difficulties of reasoning (...)
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  • The bottle imp and the prediction paradox.Roy A. Sorensen - 1986 - Philosophia 15 (4):421-424.
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  • A procedural solution to the unexpected hanging and sorites paradoxes.SC Shapiro - 1998 - Mind 107 (428):751-762.
    The paradox of the Unexpected Hanging, related prediction paradoxes, and the Sorites paradoxes all involve reasoning about ordered collections of entities: days ordered by date in the case of the Unexpected Hanging; men ordered by the number of hairs on their heads the case of the bald man version of the Sorites. The reasoning then assigns each entity a value that depends on the previously assigned value of one of the neighboring entities. The final result is paradoxical because it conflicts (...)
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  • Practical solutions to the surprise-examination paradox.Ruth Weintraub - 1995 - Ratio 8 (2):161-169.
    In this paper I consider the surprise examination paradox from a practical perspective, paying special attention to the communicative role of the teacher’s promise to the students. This perspective, which places the promise within a practice, rather than viewing it in the abstract, imposes constraints on adequate solutions to the paradox. In the light of these constraints, I examine various solutions which have been offered, and suggest two of my own.
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  • Knowledge-to-Fact Arguments (Bootstrapping, Closure, Paradox and KK).Murali Ramachandran - 2016 - Analysis 76 (2):142-149.
    The leading idea of this article is that one cannot acquire knowledge of any non-epistemic fact by virtue of knowing that one that knows something. The lines of reasoning involved in the surprise exam paradox and in Williamson’s _reductio_ of the KK-principle, which demand that one can, are thereby undermined, and new type of counter-example to epistemic closure emerges.
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  • If you don't know that you know, you could be surprised.Eli Pitcovski & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Noûs 55 (4):917-934.
    Before the semester begins, a teacher tells his students: “There will be exactly one exam this semester. It will not take place on a day that is an immediate-successor of a day that you are currently in a position to know is not the exam-day”. Both the students and the teacher know – it is common knowledge – that no exam can be given on the first day of the semester. Since the teacher is truthful and reliable, it seems that (...)
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  • The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox.Ken Levy - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):131-158.
    The Surprise Exam Paradox continues to perplex and torment despite the many solutions that have been offered. This paper proposes to end the intrigue once and for all by refuting one of the central pillars of the Surprise Exam Paradox, the 'No Friday Argument,' which concludes that an exam given on the last day of the testing period cannot be a surprise. This refutation consists of three arguments, all of which are borrowed from the literature: the 'Unprojectible Announcement Argument,' the (...)
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  • On paradoxes and a surprise exam.Richard L. Kirkham - 1991 - Philosophia 21 (1-2):31-51.
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  • Blindspots, self-reference and the prediction paradox.Tjeerd B. Jongeling & Teun Koetsier - 2002 - Philosophia 29 (1-4):377-391.
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  • On Being in an Undiscoverable Position.Wesley H. Holliday - 2016 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 5 (1):33-40.
    The Paradox of the Surprise Examination has been a testing ground for a variety of frameworks in formal epistemology, from epistemic logic to probability theory to game theory and more. In this paper, I treat a related paradox, the Paradox of the Undiscoverable Position, as a test case for the possible-worlds style representation of epistemic states. I argue that the paradox can be solved in this framework, further illustrating the power of possible-worlds style modeling. The solution also illustrates an important (...)
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  • Circular queue paradoxes - the missing link.L. Goldstein - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):284-290.
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  • Une analyse dichotomique du paradoxe de l’examen-surprise.Paul Franceschi - 2005 - Philosophiques 32 (2):399-421.
    This paper proposes a new framework to solve the surprise examination paradox. I survey preliminary the main contributions to the literature related to the paradox. I introduce then a distinction between a monist and a dichotomic analysis of the paradox. With the help of a matrix notation, I also present a dichotomy that leads to distinguish two basically and structurally different notions of surprise, which are respectively based on a conjoint and a disjoint structure. I describe then how Quine’s solution (...)
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  • On Two Versions of 'the Surprise Examination Paradox'.Leo K. C. Cheung - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):159-170.
    In this paper, I consider a popular version of the clever student’s reasoning in the surprise examination case, and demonstrate that a valid argument can be constructed. The valid argument is a reductio ad absurdum with the proposition that the student knows on the morning of the first day that the teacher’s announcement is fulfilled as its reductio. But it would not give rise to any paradox. In the process, I criticize Saul Kripke’s solution and Timothy Williamson’s attack on a (...)
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  • On the Designated Student and Related Induction Paradoxes.Dale Jacquette - 1994 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (4):583-592.
    Roy A. Sorensen has advanced an ingenious variation of the prediction or surprise event paradox, which he calls the designated student paradox. Sorensen reduces the temporal dimension of the problem by eliminating reference to future occasions on which an announced surprise event might occur, and substituting a surprise location to which epistemic agents have progressively limited spatial-perceptual access, in order to sidestep what he regards as inessential solutions to the standard formulation.
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  • The Barber, Russell's Paradox, Catch-22, God, Contradiction, and More.Laurence Goldstein - 2004 - In Graham Priest, J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), The Law of Non-Contradiction. Clarendon Press. pp. 295--313.
    outrageous remarks about contradictions. Perhaps the most striking remark he makes is that they are not false. This claim first appears in his early notebooks (Wittgenstein 1960, p.108). In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein argued that contradictions (like tautologies) are not statements (Sätze) and hence are not false (or true). This is a consequence of his theory that genuine statements are pictures.
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  • A dichotomic analysis of the surprise examination paradox.Paul Franceschi - 2002
    This paper presents a dichotomic analysis of the surprise examination paradox. In section 1, I analyse the surprise notion in detail. I introduce then in section 2, the distinction between a monist and dichotomic analysis of the paradox. I also present there a dichotomy leading to distinguish two basically and structurally different versions of the paradox, respectively based on a conjoint and a disjoint definition of the surprise. In section 3, I describe the solution to SEP corresponding to the conjoint (...)
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