Recent radical changes to university education in England have been discussed largely in terms of the arrangements for transferring funding from the state to the student as consumer, with little discussion of what universities are for. It is important, while challenging the economic rationale for the new system, to resist talking about higher education only in the language of economics. There is a strong principled case for rejecting the extension of neoliberalism to education and university education especially. ‘The market’ claims (...) to be the language of perfect rationality: thus it narrows the range of what can be said and thought, driving out the other forms of rationality to which it is the function of education and culture to introduce successive generations. One distinctive role of the university, in our time as always, is to speak richer and more complex languages, invoking other values and goods than those which currently underpin what passes for policy. (shrink)

I argue here, that, ultimately and in large part, the stakes of educational action research are conditioned by the various ways of conceiving theory, research and practice, and I attempt to explore and put forward one such way that I view as potentially more helpful than others. I begin with a comparative overview of the implicit philosophical assumptions that have informed or grounded educational action research in the broadly conceived Germanic and Anglo-American contexts. I then examine the tensions around theory (...) and practice and the role such tensions play in educational action research. In my interpretation, the polemics surrounding this topic have significantly shaped the course educational action research has taken. Examining such polemics, then, might be useful in the effort to approach risks, prospects and visions and to develop the perspective of a recuperated, enhanced but modest philosophical intervention in educational action research. (shrink)

I argue here, that, ultimately and in large part, the stakes of educational action research are conditioned by the various ways of conceiving theory, research and practice, and I attempt to explore and put forward one such way that I view as potentially more helpful than others. I begin with a comparative overview of the implicit philosophical assumptions that have informed or grounded educational action research in the broadly conceived Germanic and Anglo-American contexts. I then examine the tensions around theory (...) and practice and the role such tensions play in educational action research. In my interpretation, the polemics surrounding this topic have significantly shaped the course educational action research has taken. Examining such polemics, then, might be useful in the effort to approach risks, prospects and visions and to develop the perspective of a recuperated, enhanced but modest philosophical intervention in educational action research. (shrink)

This paper reviews a publication entitled ‘Ethics Matters. Managing Ethical Issues in Higher Education’, which was distributed to all UK universities and equivalent in October 2005. The publication proposed that HEIs should put in place an institution‐wide ethical policy framework, well beyond the customary focus on research ethics, together with the mechanisms necessary to ensure its implementation. Having summarised the processes that led to the publication and the publication itself, the paper then considers whether following the now commonplace corporate practice (...) of implementing a code of ethics is appropriate for such institutions. Drawing on both the empirical evidence in relation to codes in the business ethics literature and a consideration of the nature of the university as an institution, the paper offers an alternative suggestion for how ethical issues in higher education might be managed. (shrink)

This paper reviews a publication entitled ‘Ethics Matters. Managing Ethical Issues in Higher Education’, which was distributed to all UK universities and equivalent (HEIs) in October 2005. The publication proposed that HEIs should put in place an institution‐wide ethical policy framework, well beyond the customary focus on research ethics, together with the mechanisms necessary to ensure its implementation. Having summarised the processes that led to the publication and the publication itself, the paper then considers whether following the now commonplace corporate (...) practice of implementing a code of ethics is appropriate for such institutions. Drawing on both the empirical evidence in relation to codes in the business ethics literature and a consideration of the nature of the university as an institution, the paper offers an alternative suggestion for how ethical issues in higher education might be managed. (shrink)

While the notion of risk remains under-theorised in moral philosophy, risk aversion and moralist self-protection appear as dominant cultural tendencies saturating educational orientation and practice. Philosophy of education has responded to the educational emphasis on risk management by exposing the unavoidable and positive presence of risk in any endeavour to learn and teach. Taking such responses into account, I discuss how the theoretical connection of risk and education could be radicalised through an ethical approach combined with epistemological and existential concerns. (...) My aim is to propose an ethics that is sensitive to the difference between risks taken and risks imposed and to the cultural variations of what counts as danger. Finally, I explain how the educational relevance of such an ethics requires a prior questioning of the western understanding of self and world that has functioned as a subtext of the dominant view of risk. (shrink)

It is well documented that the application of business models to the higher education sector has precipitated a managerialistic approach to organisational structures ( Preston, 2001 ). Less well documented is the impact of this business ideal on the student-teacher encounter. It is argued that this age-old relation is now being configured (conceptually and organisationally) in terms peculiar to the business sector: as a customer-product relation. It is the applicability and suitability of such a configuration that specifically concerns this contribution. (...) The paper maintains that the move to describe the student-teacher relation in these terms is indeed inappropriately reductive, but not straightforwardly so. The problem arises in that we remain unsure of the contemporary purpose of education. We lack any firm educational ideals that, in themselves, cannot be encompassed by the business paradigm. Indeed, the pedagogical critique of education (broadly, that education is only of use in as much as it is of use to society) extends further than has yet been intimated and prevents one securing any educational ideal that does not immediately succumb to critique. This pedagogical logic is unassailable in any linear way but, when pressed, precipitates an aporetic moment that prevents it from assuming any totalising hold over education. We draw on the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida to consider whether one might yet imagine an educational 'quasi-ideal' that will enable practitioners and institutions to counter the effects of customerisation. (shrink)

It is well documented that the application of business models to the higher education sector has precipitated a managerialistic approach to organisational structures (Preston, 2001). Less well documented is the impact of this business ideal on the student-teacher encounter. It is argued that this age-old relation is now being configured (conceptually and organisationally) in terms peculiar to the business sector: as a customer-product relation. It is the applicability and suitability of such a configuration that specifically concerns this contribution. The paper (...) maintains that the move to describe the student-teacher relation in these terms is indeed inappropriately reductive, but not straightforwardly so. The problem arises in that we remain unsure of the contemporary purpose of education. We lack any firm educational ideals that, in themselves, cannot be encompassed by the business paradigm. Indeed, the pedagogical critique of education (broadly, that education is only of use in as much as it is of use to society) extends further than has yet been intimated and prevents one securing any educational ideal that does not immediately succumb to critique. This pedagogical logic is unassailable in any linear way but, when pressed, precipitates an aporetic moment that prevents it from assuming any totalising hold over education. We draw on the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida to consider whether one might yet imagine an educational ‘quasi-ideal’ that will enable practitioners and institutions to counter the effects of customerisation. (shrink)

This article is a discussion of Ralph Johnson’s concept of practice of argumentation. Such practice is characterized by three properties: (1) It is teleological, (2) it is dialectical, and (3) it is manifestly rational. I argue that Johnson’s preferred definition of practice—which is Alasdair MacIntyre’s concept of practice as a human activity with internal goods accessible through partcipation in that same activity—does not fit these properties or features. I also suggest that this failure should not require Johnson to adjust the (...) properties to make them fit the practice concept. While MacIntyre’s concept of practice clearly has some attractive features, it does not provide what Johnson wants from a concept of practice. (shrink)

According to Alasdair MacIntyre's influential account of practices, ‘teaching itself is not a practice, but a set of skills and habits put to the service of a variety of practices’ (MacIntyre and Dunne, 2002, p. 5). Various philosophers of education have responded to and critiqued MacIntyre's position, most notably in a Special Issue of the Journal of Philosophy of Education (Vol. 37.2, 2003). However, both in that Special Issue and since, this debate remains inconclusive. Much of this earlier discussion seems (...) to accept that teaching is a unique case in being a putative practice that does not fit readily into MacIntyre's account. In fact many supposed practices, including some nominated by MacIntyre himself, do not fit his account. A constructive critique of this account leads to a refurbished, broadly MacIntyrean account of practice. This will clarify the issue of whether teaching and a range of other activities are, indeed, practices. (shrink)

Karl Jaspers argued that academics must be prepared to accept, perhaps even to welcome, the fact that most students ‘will learn next to nothing’ from a university education. In this paper I shall argue that, while Jaspers’ model is unpersuasive as an ideal and inaccurate as a description, there is an uncomfortable truth lurking behind his forthright but gloomy conclusion; viz., that university teaching pays little direct attention to the needs of the student in the wider world (i.e. to the (...) needs of the student qua employee or qua citizen or even qua rounded human being) and pays even less attention, or perhaps none at all, to the needs and expectations of third parties such as employers. In terms of the political context universities now find themselves in, this is an uncomfortable and embarrassing truth for faculty to admit, for it appears to epitomise a self-regarding and inward looking academy. Yet, despite this, perhaps it is a truth that academics should be prepared to accept, even to welcome. At least, in starting any serious discussion on the nature of a university education, it should be a truth we are prepared to admit. (shrink)

Karl Jaspers argued that academics must be prepared to accept, perhaps even to welcome, the fact that most students 'will learn next to nothing' from a university education. In this paper I shall argue that, while Jaspers' model is unpersuasive as an ideal and inaccurate as a description, there is an uncomfortable truth lurking behind his forthright but gloomy conclusion; viz., that university teaching pays little direct attention to the needs of the student in the wider world (i.e. to the (...) needs of the student qua employee or qua citizen or even qua rounded human being) and pays even less attention, or perhaps none at all, to the needs and expectations of third parties such as employers. In terms of the political context universities now find themselves in, this is an uncomfortable and embarrassing truth for faculty to admit, for it appears to epitomise a self-regarding and inward looking academy. Yet, despite this, perhaps it is a truth that academics should be prepared to accept, even to welcome. At least, in starting any serious discussion on the nature of a university education, it should be a truth we are prepared to admit. (shrink)