Perception is, at least sometimes, something we do. This paper is concerned with how to account for perceptual agency (i.e., the active aspect of perception). Eilan divides accounts of perceptual agency up into two camps: enactivist theories hold that perceptual agency is accounted for by the involvement of bodily action, while mental theories hold that perceptual agency is accounted for by the involvement of mental action in perception. In Structuring Mind (2017), Sebastian Watzl aligns his ‘activity view’ with the mental (...) action route and develops the view that the mental activity of attending infuses perceptual experience with agency. Moreover, Watzl claims that his view can accommodate enactivist intuitions, while rejecting their claims about embodiment.In this paper, we scrutinize the relevant notion of mental action involved in the mental action route. We analyze the involvement of the body in overt acts of attention (like sniffing and smelling) and argue that a constitutively embodied account of mental action provides a better analysis of overt attention than a conjunctive account in which overt attention involves a bodily and a (separate) mental action. Furthermore, we argue that the standard cases of covert attention (such as the Posner paradigm) involve the body in multiple ways.In closing, we discuss the relevance of our analysis for the debate on perceptual agency and the embodied mind thesis. We conclude that the embodied mental action route to theorizing perceptual agency provides the best analysis of perceptual agency but comes with significant commitments about the embodiment of attention. (shrink)

From the conception of Baddeley’s visuospatial sketchpad, visual working memory and visual attention have been closely linked concepts. An attractive model has advocated unity of the two cognitive functions, with attention serving the active maintenance of sensory representations. However, empirical evidence from various paradigms and dependent measures has now firmly established an at least partial dissociation between visual attention and visual working memory maintenance e thus leaving unclear what the relationship between the two concepts is. Moreover, a focus on sensory (...) storage has treated visual working memory as a reflection of the past, with attention as a limiting resource. This view ignores what storage is for: immediate or future action. We argue that rather than serving sensory storage, attention emerges from coupling relevant sensory and action representations within working memory. Importantly, this coupling is bidirectional: First, through recurrent feedback mechanisms, action coupling results in the enhancement of the appropriate sensory memory representation. Under this view, unattended memories are currently not coupled to an action plan, but are not necessarily lost and remain available for future tasks when necessary. Second, through the very same feedback projections, attention serves as the credit assignment mechanism for the action’s outcome. When the action is successful, the associated representations are being reinforced, leading to more robust consolidation and more rapid retrieval in the future e thus explaining performance benefits for attended memories without assuming that attention serves as the maintenance mechanism. By firmly grounding VWM in the action system, the new framework integrates a range of behavioural and neurophysiological findings and avoids circularity in explaining the role of attention in working memory. (shrink)