- The Normativity of Belief.Conor McHugh & Daniel Whiting - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):698-713.details
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Fitting belief.Conor McHugh - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (2pt2):167-187.details
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What is Good Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:153-174.details
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Engel on doxastic correctness.Conor McHugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1451-1462.details
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Justification as 'Would-Be' Knowledge.Aidan McGlynn - 2012 - Episteme 9 (4):361-376.details
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Practical Certainty.Dustin Locke - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):72-95.details
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What is Rational Belief?Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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A note concerning justification and access.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Episteme 10 (4):369-386.details
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Moral Deference, Moral Assertion, and Pragmatics.Max Lewis - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):5-22.details
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The norm of assertion: Empirical data.Markus Kneer - 2018 - Cognition 177 (C):165-171.details
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Pragmatic encroachment in epistemology.Brian Kim - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (5):e12415.details
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Knowledge, reasoning, and deliberation.Brian Kim - 2020 - Ratio 33 (1):14-26.details
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Lotteries and justification.Christoph Kelp - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1233-1244.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
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Is knowledge the ability to ϕ for the reason that p?Nick Hughes - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):457-462.details
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Consistency and evidence.Nick Hughes - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):333-338.details
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Knowledge and acceptance.Roman Heil - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-17.details
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Against overconfidence: arguing for the accessibility of memorial justification.Jonathan Egeland - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):1-21.details
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The Importance of Knowledge Ascriptions.Michael J. Hannon - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):856-866.details
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The myth of full belief.Jeremy Goodman - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):164-171.details
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The Roles of Knowledge Ascriptions in Epistemic Assessment.Mikkel Gerken - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):141-161.details
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How to infer what persistent things are up to – a Fregean puzzle for traditional Fregeans.Johan Gersel - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (1):92-121.details
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Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment.James Fritz - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):643-661.details
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Moral encroachment and reasons of the wrong kind.James Fritz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3051-3070.details
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Moral Grandstanding and Norms of Moral Discourse.A. K. Flowerree & Mark Satta - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-28.details
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Evidentialism in action.A. K. Flowerree - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3409-3426.details
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On the generality argument for the knowledge norm.Davide Fassio - 2018 - Synthese:1-22.details
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On the generality argument for the knowledge norm.Davide Fassio - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3459-3480.details
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Is there an epistemic norm of practical reasoning?Davide Fassio - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2137-2166.details
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Are epistemic reasons perspective-dependent?Davide Fassio - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3253-3283.details
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Belief, Correctness and Constitutivity.Davide Fassio - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1084-1106.details
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Sosa on the normativity of belief.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):617-624.details
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I—Doxastic Correctness.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.details
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Doxastic Correctness.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.details
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Lottery judgments: A philosophical and experimental study.Philip A. Ebert, Martin Smith & Ian Durbach - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):110-138.details
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Against philosophical proofs against common sense.Louis Doulas & Evan Welchance - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):207–215.details
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Beliefs don’t simplify our reasoning, credences do.Alexander Dinges - 2021 - Analysis 81 (2):199-207.details
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Theorizing about the epistemic.Stewart Cohen - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8):839-857.details
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Cognitive diversity and epistemic norms.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):326-342.details
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Contextualism and the Knowledge Norms.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):89-100.details
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Knowledge-First Theories of Justification.Paul Silva - 2020 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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John Cook Wilson.Mathieu Marion - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Assertion.Peter Pagin & Neri Marsili - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Hedging and the Norm of Belief.Peter van Elswyk & Christopher Willard-Kyle - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Can There Be a Knowledge-First Ethics of Belief?Dennis Whitcomb - 2014 - In Jonathan Matheson & Rico Vits (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. Oxford University Press.details
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Reference, Truth, and Biological Kinds.Marcel Weber - 2014 - In: J. Dutant, D. Fassio and A. Meylan (Eds.) Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.details
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Review of Justification as Ignorance by Sven Rosenkranz. [REVIEW]Martin Smith - forthcoming - Mind.details
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Knowledge, Practice, and Merit.Arturs Logins - 2012 - Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2):133-152.details
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