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  1. On Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Some Comments on Brian Leiter’s View of What Jurisprudence Should Become.Julie Dickson - 2011 - Law and Philosophy 30 (4):477-497.
    In a series of powerful and challenging articles emerging since the mid-1990s, Brian Leiter has argued that certain theoretical strains in contemporary legal philosophy are ‘epistemologically bankrupt’, in virtue of their reliance on misguided argumentative devices: analysing concepts, such as the concepts of law and of authority; and doing so by appealing to intuitions regarding the correct way to understand the concepts in question. In response to this state of affairs, Leiter advocates that jurisprudence ought to attempt to catch-up with (...)
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  • Normativism, Anti-Normativism and Humanist Pragmatism: Stephen P. Turner: Explaining the Normative. Polity Press, Cambridge, 2010, pbk. $24.95, hbk. $69.95, 228 pp + index.Maksymilian Del Mar - 2010 - Human Studies 33 (2-3):305-323.
    Review Essay of Stephen P. Turner, Explaining the Normative, 2010.
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  • Le Raisonnement Juridique: Une Pratique Spécifique? [REVIEW]Pierre Brunet - 2013 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 26 (4):767-782.
    Selon une thèse largement partagée, le droit et une pratique sociale et les contributions des participants sont complémentaires les unes des autres. Dans ces conditions, le raisonnement juridique consiste d’abord en une interprétation de ces pratiques et présuppose un point de vue interne de la part de celui qui souhaite en rendre compte. Le raisonnement juridique est ainsi conçu comme une argumentation pratique, subordonnée aux exigences de la rationalité car ceux qui participent à la pratique juridique sont contraints de donner (...)
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  • The structure of social practices and the connection between law and morality.Giorgio Bongiovanni, Antonino Rotolo, Corrado Roversi & Chiara Valentini - 2009 - Ratio Juris 22 (1):1-23.
    In his work, Jules Coleman has held that the rule of recognition, if conceived of as a shared cooperative activity, should be the gateway through which to incorporate moral constraints on the content of law. This analysis, however, leaves unanswered two important questions. For one thing, we do not know when or even why morality becomes a criterion of legality. And, for another thing, we still do not know what conception of morality it is that we are dealing with. In (...)
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  • Shared intention and the doxastic single end condition.Olle Blomberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (2):351-372.
    What is required for several agents to intentionally φ together? I argue that each of them must believe or assume that their φ-ing is a single end that each intends to contribute to. Various analogies between intentional singular action and intentional joint action show that this doxastic single end condition captures a feature at the very heart of the phenomenon of intentional joint action. For instance, just as several simple actions are only unified into a complex intentional singular activity if (...)
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  • Law, Shared Activities, and Obligation.Stefano Bertea - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 27 (2):357-381.
    This paper offers a critical assessment of the way the influential “conception of law as a shared activity” explains the normative component of law in general and legal obligation in particular. I argue that the conception provides a bipartite account of legal obligation: we have full-blooded legal obligation, carrying genuine practical force, and legal obligation in a perspectival sense, the purpose of which is not to engage with us in practical reasoning, but simply to state what we ought to do (...)
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