Switch to: References

Citations of:

The Ideal of Orthonomous Action, or the How and Why of Buck-Passing

In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking About Reasons: Themes From the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press. pp. 50 (2013)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Two Thesis About the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In C. McHugh, J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 221-240.
    In tradition linked to Aristotle and Kant, many contemporary philosophers treat practical and theoretical normativity as two genuinely distinct domains of normativity. In this paper I consider the question of what it is for normative domains to be distinct. I suggest that there are two different ways that the distinctness thesis might be understood and consider the different implications of the two different distinctness theses.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • On The Intellectual Conditions for Responsibility: Acting for the Right Reasons, Conceptualization, and Credit.Errol Lord - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2):436-464.
    In this paper I'm interested in the prospects for the Right Reasons theory of creditworthiness. The Right Reasons theory says that what it is for an agent to be creditworthy for X-ing is for that agent to X for the right reasons. The paper has a negative goal and a positive goal. The negative goal is to show that a class of Right Reasons theories are doomed. These theories all have a Conceptualization Condition on acting for the right reasons. Conceptualization (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • What’s the Matter with Huck Finn?Hrishikesh Joshi - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):70-87.
    This paper explores some key commitments of the idea that it can be rational to do what you believe you ought not to do. I suggest that there is a prima facie tension between this idea and certain plausible coherence constraints on rational agency. I propose a way to resolve this tension. While akratic agents are always irrational, they are not always practically irrational, as many authors assume. Rather, “inverse” akratics like Huck Finn fail in a distinctively theoretical way. What (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • All Reasons Are Fundamentally For Attitudes.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    As rational agents, we are governed by reasons. The fact that there’s beer at the pub might be a reason to go there and a reason to believe you’ll enjoy it. As this example illustrates, there are reasons for both action and for belief. There are also many other responses for which there seem to be reasons – for example, desire, regret, admiration, and blame. This diversity raises questions about how reasons for different responses relate to each other. Might certain (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation