The primary goal of Peter Ludlow's Semantics, Tense, and Time is to illustrate how one can study metaphysical issues from a linguistic/semantic perspective by addressing the debate between tenseless theorists and tensed theorists. Ludlow's book is noteworthy in part because of the novelty of its approach to this debate and in part because it addresses and endeavors to solve the metaphysical problems of temporal solipsism that other temporal solipsists have not addressed.

Each phenomenon contains variable components, which are conservative. Because of their conservation, they accumulate. Present phenomena contain constituents of phenomena, belonging to the past which form the present and the future, and their dependence on time is an exponential one - S = Sₒe^t-tᵖ. We assume that before and after tₒ = t-tᵖ = 0 the change pertains to phenomena of one type. The dependency is for each defined phenomenon of one and the same type. The concrete aspect of the (...) change S will depend on the type of the phenomenon. We show in our study how in some cosmological phenomena, the exponential dependence on time is present. The processes of radioactive disintegration of atomic nuclei, are also phenomena of this type. We present the real phenomena as a sum of exponents. Each phenomenon originates, develops and is destroyed. In reality most phenomena are formed as a composition of exponential dependencies of the change. (shrink)

An empirical science must be at once grounded in sensory evidence and rationally justified by that evidence. But, as Hume famously argued, the fruits of empirical science would seem to be generalizations that cannot be rationally grounded in sensory experience. For, as Quine puts the point, “the most modest of generalizations about observable traits will cover more cases than its utterer can have had occasion actually to observe”. Quine’s response to the difficulty is essentially Hume’s: give up the project of (...) trying to understand the rationality of natural science—its obligation to the norm of truth—and aim instead to explain the mechanisms by which the natural scientist’s beliefs are formed. Sellars has a very different response: uncover the hidden assumptions that led to the skeptical conclusion in the first place. As Sell- ars argues in his master-work, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind”, first published in 1956, the fatal flaw in the empiricist program lies not in its overarching aim of understanding the rationality of the pursuit of empirical knowledge but instead in its foundationalist conception of what it would be to achieve that aim. The fundamental and most profound lesson of EPM is that “empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once”. (shrink)