The problem of the person may be described as the crux of Descartes' philosophy in the fairly obvious literal sense that it is the point of intersection of the two chief axes of the system, the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Mind. The actual, if not professed aim of the former is the ousting of the occult powers and faculties of Scholastic-Aristotelian physics by the mechanical concept of force or action-by-contact. The chief tenet of the latter is that (...) mind, whose essence is thinking, is clearly and distinctly conceivable apart from matter, the essence of which is extension. From this, by an illicit inference which need not concern us further, Descartes concludes that the mind is “really distinct” from matter, that is, a substance capable of existing apart from body in its own right. Where these two lines of thought meet, the problem of the person constitutes itself in the following manner. (shrink)

There are several differences between the theories of matter published by René Descartes in 1637 and 1644 which deserve attention. The differences follow from Descartes's well-known identification of substance with spatial extension, and his consequent rejection of the void. Since there was no void space, Descartes argued, a very finely divided subtle matter must extend throughout the universe in order to fill all space not otherwise occupied by the less finely divided ordinary matter. In the 1637 treatises La dioptrique and (...) Les météores Descartes described only one kind of subtle matter, the primary function of which was to transmit the action of light. Yet when he came to write Principia philosophiae , he believed that the subtle matter was divided into two separate elements. One of these remained an aether for light transmission, but the other had lost this property and was believed instead to be active in magnetic effects and in the electrification of glass, and to form part of the substance of flame. (shrink)

To be able to believe that a dog with a broken paw is not really in pain when it whimpers is a quite extraordinary achievement even for a philosopher. Yet according to the standard interpretaion, this is just what Descartes did believe. He held, we are informed, the ‘monstrous’ thesis that ‘animals are without feeling or awareness of any kind’. The Standard view has been reiterated in a recent collection on animal rights, which casts Descartes as the villain of the (...) piece for his alleged view that animals merely behave ‘ as if they feel pain when they are, say, kicked or stabbed’. The basis for this widely accepted interpretation is Descartes' famous doctrine of ‘animal machine’ ; a doctrine that one critic condemns as ‘a grim fortaste of a mechanically minded age’ which ‘brutally violates the old kindly fellowship of living things’. (shrink)

Many people are attracted to the idea that plants experience phenomenal conscious states like pain, sensory awareness, or emotions like fear. If true, this would have wide-ranging moral implications for human behavior, including land development, farming, vegetarianism, and more. Determining whether plants have minds relies on the work of both empirical disciplines and philosophy. Epistemology should settle the standards for evidence of other minds, and science should inform our judgment about whether any plants meet those standards. We argue that evidence (...) for other minds comes either from testimony, behavior, anatomy/physiology, or phylogeny. However, none of these provide evidence that plants have conscious mental states. Therefore, we conclude that there is no evidence that plants have minds in the sense relevant for morality. (shrink)

The Scottish philosopher Norman Kemp Smith (1872–1958) is best known for his 1929 English translation of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, and for his incisive commentaries on Descartes, Hume, and Kant. These achievements have overshadowed his original philosophical work in several areas, including the experience of time. A realist with idealist sympathies, Kemp Smith developed a non-transcendental version of Kant’s conception of time as a ‘pure intuition’ (though he insisted that temporal perception involved ‘categories’). He employed this conception to solve (...) a problem that was widely discussed in early twentieth-century European and American philosophy, which William James dubbed the ‘specious present’: how can we perceive an extended duration, like a full golf swing, or the cadence of a brief tune, if we only perceive the present? A closely related problem: if we only ever perceive the present, how can we distinguish among the future, present, and past? In this paper, I explain Kemp Smith’s proposed solution, and compare it with two of his contemporary influences: Samuel Alexander and George F. Stout. Finally, I suggest that these problems are still with us, and are likely to be for some time, especially if we ignore the insights offered by earlier discussions. (shrink)

Descartes’s most extensive discussion of the law of refraction and the shape of the anaclastic lens is contained in Rule 8 of "Rules for the Direction of the Mind". Few reconstructions of Descartes’s discovery of the law of refraction take Rule 8 as their basis. In Rule 8, Descartes denies that the law of refraction can be discovered by purely mathematical means, and he requires that the law of refraction be deduced from physical principles about natural power or force, the (...) nature of the action of light, and the behavior of light rays in a variety of transparent media. For over a century, however, there has been broad agreement that Descartes discovered the law of refraction by purely mathematical means, and that he only later provided the relevant physical rationale (via comparisons or analogies) in Dioptrics II. I execute each step in Descartes’s proposed deduction of the law of refraction and the shape of the anaclastic lens in Rule 8 and concretely show how Descartes could have discovered the law of refraction and the shape of the anaclastic by its means. Rule 8, I argue, reflects Descartes’s actual path to the discovery of the law of refraction and the shape of the anaclastic lens. (shrink)

By an ancient and honourable tradition, which began last year when I spared you this exercise, the President gives a Presidential Address only once during his term of office, on retirement. A presidential address in the summer season is a privileged occasion. Coming at the end of an active day, it is not the moment for a massive account of research. Rather it is an occasion when one may indulge with privilege in some directed impressionism, and that is what I (...) propose to do. (shrink)

Originally published in 1996, this book presents and analyses children’s reasonings about fundamental metaphysical problems. The first part describes dialogues with children that were constructed on the basis of Descartes’ _Mediations on First Philosophy_ and which look at children’s ideas about the relationships between true and false knowledge, mental images and physical objects, mind and body, personal existence and the external world, dreams and reality, and the existence of the Supreme Being, among others. The second part of the book draws (...) on concepts that children of various ages have about psychological and metapsychological aspects of human reality such as: cognitive and moral development; personal freedom and responsibility; the relationships between conscious and unconscious; living and non-living; and about the fundamental drives of an individual for development and expansion of his or her needs and passions, for eternal life, and for the dreamlike world of fulfilled wishes. The book presents a systematic empirical and theoretical study of the problems, some of which were touched on in Piaget’s early writing but which he later abandoned and which were only sporadically illuminated by other authors, whereas others were completely new to research in developmental psychology at the time. It will still be a helpful guide for developmental psychologists, teachers, educationalists, social workers, lawyers, and other professionals interested in the knowledge that 4- to 14-year-old children have about the most fundamental aspects of reality and human beings. (shrink)

This work is devoted to clear how the foundation of modern thought takes place as a reinforced reiteration of metaphysics which is provoked by a defensive fold of reason against the assault of transrational. We begin showing the way this asault is experimented by Descartes in a decisive moment of his life and how reagently replies to him. The article continues showing how physics and metaphysics are being moved in Descartes on the wake of a try to build seawalls against (...) the incessant return of what has been repressed. (shrink)