Previous research showed that fear-inducing graphic warning labels can lead to cognitive dissonance and defensive responses. Less threatening, social-related warning labels do not elicit these defensive responses, making them more effective in preventing smoking in adults. Given that smoking numbers are still too high among youngsters, it is crucial to investigate how warning labels should be designed to prevent teenagers from starting smoking in the first place. In two studies, we investigated whether comparable effects of social-related warning labels could be (...) observed in a group of teenagers (14-17 years) who are not yet legally allowed to smoke. In addition, we tried to replicate earlier findings with smoking and non-smoking adults. Participants were presented with either health warning labels, social warning labels, or no warning labels. Subsequently, their explicit cognitions (i.e., risk perception, attitude towards smoking) and their implicit associations of smoking with healthiness/unhealthiness (Study 1a and Study 1b) and with positivity/negativity (Study 2a and Study 2b) were assessed. Results showed that in both studies, adult smokers had a higher risk perception and a more positive attitude towards smoking than adult non-smokers. Additionally, social warning labels lead to stronger implicit associations between smoking and negativity in Study 2 in the adult groups. In the teenage group, social warning labels lead to more positive attitudes than health warning labels in Study 2. No further effects on risk perception or implicit associations were found in the teenage group. Possible explanations are discussed. (shrink)

The moral self-concept has been proposed as a central predictor of prosocial behaviour. In two experiments (one preregistered), we explored the nature of the relation between the moral self-concept (explicit and implicit) and prosocial behaviour. Specifically, we investigated the role of emotions associated with prosocial behaviour (consequential or anticipated) and preference for consistency. The results revealed a relation between the explicit moral self-concept and sharing behaviour. The explicit moral self-concept was linked to anticipated and consequential emotions regarding not-sharing. Importantly, anticipated (...) and consequential emotions about not-sharing mediated the relation between self-concept and behaviour. Yet, the relation was independent of preference for consistency. The implicit moral self-concept was neither related to prosocial behaviour nor to emotions associated with behaviour. Overall, our study demonstrates the interplay between cognitive and emotional processes in explaining prosocial behaviour. More specific, it underlines the link between the moral self-concept and prosocial behaviour and highlights the role of emotions about the omission of prosocial behaviour. (shrink)

The received view of implicit bias holds that it is associative and unreflective. Recently, the received view has been challenged. Some argue that implicit bias is not predicated on “any” associative process, but it is unreflective. These arguments rely, in part, on debiasing experiments. They proceed as follows. If implicit bias is associative and unreflective, then certain experimental manipulations cannot change implicitly biased behavior. However, these manipulations can change such behavior. So, implicit bias is not associative and unreflective. This paper (...) finds philosophical and empirical problems with that argument. When the problems are solved, the conclusion is not quite right: implicit bias is not necessarily unreflective, but it seems to be associative. Further, the paper shows that even if legitimate non-associative interventions on implicit bias exist, then both the received view and its recent contender would be false. In their stead would be interactionism or minimalism about implicit bias. (shrink)