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  1. Being Self-Deceived About One’s Own Mental State.Kevin Lynch - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):652-672.
    A familiar puzzle about self-deception concerns how self-deception is possible in light of the paradoxes generated by a plausible way of defining it. A less familiar puzzle concerns how a certain type of self-deception—being self-deceived about one's own intentional mental state—is possible in light of a plausible way of understanding the nature of self-knowledge. According to this understanding, we ordinarily do not infer our mental states from evidence, but then it's puzzling how this sort of self-deception could occur given that (...)
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  • The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning.Michael Waldmann (ed.) - 2017 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    Causal reasoning is one of our most central cognitive competencies, enabling us to adapt to our world. Causal knowledge allows us to predict future events, or diagnose the causes of observed facts. We plan actions and solve problems using knowledge about cause-effect relations. Without our ability to discover and empirically test causal theories, we would not have made progress in various empirical sciences. In the past decades, the important role of causal knowledge has been discovered in many areas of cognitive (...)
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  • How Do We Believe?Steven A. Sloman - 2022 - Wiley: Topics in Cognitive Science 14 (1):31-44.
    Topics in Cognitive Science, Volume 14, Issue 1, Page 31-44, January 2022.
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  • The Influence of Self-Control and Social Status on Self-Deception.Mengmeng Ren, Bowei Zhong, Wei Fan, Hongmei Dai, Bo Yang, Wenjie Zhang, Zongxiang Yin, Juan Liu, Jin Li & Youlong Zhan - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
  • Self-Deception as Affective Coping. An Empirical Perspective on Philosophical Issues.Federico Lauria, Delphine Preissmann & Fabrice Clément - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 41:119-134.
    In the philosophical literature, self-deception is mainly approached through the analysis of paradoxes. Yet, it is agreed that self-deception is motivated by protection from distress. In this paper, we argue, with the help of findings from cognitive neuroscience and psychology, that self-deception is a type of affective coping. First, we criticize the main solutions to the paradoxes of self-deception. We then present a new approach to self-deception. Self-deception, we argue, involves three appraisals of the distressing evidence: (a) appraisal of the (...)
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  • The Slow Decay and Quick Revival of Self-Deception.Zoë Chance, Francesca Gino, Michael I. Norton & Dan Ariely - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
  • Cognitive Shortcuts in Causal Inference.Philip M. Fernbach & Bob Rehder - 2013 - Argument and Computation 4 (1):64 - 88.
    (2013). Cognitive shortcuts in causal inference. Argument & Computation: Vol. 4, Formal Models of Reasoning in Cognitive Psychology, pp. 64-88. doi: 10.1080/19462166.2012.682655.
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  • The Effect of Negative Feedback on Positive Beliefs in Self-Deception.Juan Liu, Wenjie Zhang, Youlong Zhan, Lixin Song, Peipei Guan, Dan Kang, Jie Jian, Ronghua Cai & Mei Li - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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  • What is the Link Between Regret and Weakness of Will?Mathieu Doucet - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (3):448-461.
    This paper argues that most contemporary accounts of weakness of will either implicitly or explicitly assume that regret is a typical or even necessary element of standard cases of weakness of will and that this assumption is mistaken. I draw on empirical and philosophical work on self-assessment to show that regret need not accompany typical weak-willed behavior, and that we should therefore revise the dominant account of the difference between weakness of will and changes of mind.
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