Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.

This paper discusses a wide range of anti-naturalistic argument from reason due to Balfour, Haldane, Joad, Lewis, Taylor, Moreland, Plantinga, Reppert, and Hasker. I argue that none of these arguments poses a serious challenge to naturalists who are identity theorists. Further, I argue that some of these arguments do not even pose prima facie plausible challenges to naturalism. In the concluding part of my discussion, I draw attention to some distinctive differences between Hasker’s anti-naturalistic arguments and the other anti-naturalistic arguments (...) mentioned above. (shrink)

We have no reason to believe that reasons do not exist. Contra Bart Streumer’s recent proposal, this has nothing to do with our incapacity to believe this error theory. Rather, it is because if we know that if a proposition is true, we have no reason to believe it, then we have no reason to believe this proposition. From a different angle: if we know that we have at best misleading reasons to believe a proposition, then we have no reason (...) to believe it. This has two consequences. Firstly, coming close to believing the error theory is idle or pointless. Secondly, philosophers who argue that believing sweeping theories like determinism or physicalism is self-defeating because they are either false or believed for no reason pursue a worthwhile argumentative strategy. (shrink)

Free will sceptics deny the existence of free will, that is the command or control necessary for moral responsibility. Epicureans allege that this denial is somehow self-defeating. To interpret the Epicurean allegation charitably, we must first realise that it is propositional attitudes like beliefs and not propositions themselves which can be self-defeating. So, believing in free will scepticism might be self- defeating. The charge becomes more plausible because, as Epicurus insightfully recognised,there is a strong connection between conduct and belief—and so (...) between thecontent of free will scepticism (since it is about conduct) and the attitude of believing it. Second, we must realise that an attitude can be self- defeating relative to certain grounds. This means that it might be self-defeating to be a free will sceptic on certain grounds, such as the putative fact that we lack leeway or sourcehood. This charge is much more interesting because of the epistemic importance of leeway and sourcehood. Ultimately, the Epicurean charge of self-defeat fails. Yet, it delivers important lessons to the sceptic. The most important of them is that free will sceptics should either accept the existence of leeway or reject the principle that ‘“ought” implies “can”’. (shrink)

Free will sceptics claim that we lack free will, i.e. the command or control of our conduct that is required for moral responsibility. There are different conceptions of free will: it is sometimes understood as having the ability to choose between real options or alternatives; and sometimes as being the original or true source of our own conduct. Whether conceived in the first or in the second way, free will is subject to strong sceptical arguments. However, free will sceptics face (...) a difficulty: doubting the existence of free will might itself be problematic, whether free will exists or not. Three main considerations are offered in support of this claim. Firstly, it is said that free will sceptics confuse contexts: even if they are right to doubt the existence of free will in the philosophy classroom, they are wrong to do so in other contexts, such as day-to-day interactions or a court of law. Secondly, it is said that free will scepticism is incompatible with inescapable and indispensable human practices such as practical deliberation or moral criticism and evaluation. For, to deliberate about what to do, we must presume that we have true options or alternatives. And to judge that some human practices are wrong, we need to assume the existence of moral responsibility. Thirdly, free will scepticism is sometimes said to be self-defeating, on the grounds that it cannot be rational to believe free will scepticism, because free will is required for rationality. This thesis critically assesses these arguments. None takes free will scepticism down, but all are instructive about how not to be a sceptic. They trace the ‘contours’ of free will scepticism by discrediting some conceptions of free will and some arguments for free will scepticism. (shrink)