Scholars loosely affiliated with the “Cambridge School” accentuate rule of law, common good, class equilibrium, and non-domination in Machiavelli's political thought and republicanism generally but underestimate the Florentine's preference for class conflict and ignore his insistence on elite accountability. The author argues that they obscure the extent to which Machiavelli is an anti-elitist critic of the republican tradition, which they fail to disclose was predominantly oligarchic. The prescriptive lessons these scholars draw from republicanism for contemporary politics reinforce rather than reform (...) the “senatorial,” electorally based, and socioeconomically agnostic republican model that permits common citizens to acclaim but not determine government policies. Cambridge School textual interpretations and practical proposals have little connection with Machiavelli's “tribunate,” class-specific model of popular government elaborated in The Discourses, one that relies on extra-electoral accountability techniques and embraces deliberative popular assemblies. (shrink)

Robert Dahl's democratic theory has been remarkably consistent over the course of his long career. While Dahl has maintained a markedly un‐romantic view of modern democracy, and can best be read as an immanent critic of its liberal variant, he has steadily clung to certain radical aspirations, even as their prospects have waned. Dahl's often‐unnoticed radicalism lies in his desire to see democracy break out of the institutional bonds of the liberal state. Reviewing his career forces one to consider the (...) ultimately Utopian character of his quiet radicalism and the significance of its apparent failure. Paradoxically, Dahl's call for the extension of democracy into the economic sphere would be less Utopian if it were more radical at its foundation—that is, if his basic premises would lead him to seriously question citizens’ existing preferences. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Historically, many philosophers and social scientists have sharply distinguished between “normative” and “empirical” forms of inquiry. In response, some have called for a re-engagement of these forms of inquiry. Here I offer a novel way of justifying such re-engagement in democratic theory. Drawing on classical pragmatism, I argue that normative democratic theory is a form of practical reasoning, hence inevitably involves empirical inquiry. Thus, in reasoning about what democratic processes ought to look like, we should avoid sharply distinguishing normative (...) from empirical forms of reasoning, just as we should avoid sharply distinguishing theoretical from practical forms of reasoning. (shrink)