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The Power of Public Positions: Official Roles in Kantian Legitimacy

In David Sobel, Steven Wall & Peter Vallentyne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, volume 4. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2018)

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  1. Kant and the Problem of Unequal Enforcement of Law.Daniel Koltonski - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 20 (2):188-210.
    Kant infamously opposes not only revolution but also any resistance or disobedience by citizens that aims to compel states to reform themselves. This paper argues that, in fact, the Kantian account of the legitimate state has the resources for a distinctive justification of principled disobedience, including even violent or destructive resistance, that applies to citizens of contemporary Western democracies. When a state fails to enforce the law equally, this lack of equal enforcement can deprive some citizens of the equal assurance (...)
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  • Disagreement, Unilateral Judgment, and Kant’s Argument for Rule by Law.Daniel Koltonski - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 20 (3):285-309.
    Kant argues that it is only as citizens of a properly constituted state that persons are able to respect one another’s innate right to freedom, for joint subjection to the authority of a state enables them to avoid what Kantians call “the problem of unilateralism”: when I interact with you in a state of nature according to my judgment of right in circumstances of disagreement between us, I implicitly claim that my judgment, and not yours, has authority over us simply (...)
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  • Answering the Conventionalist Challenge to Natural Rights Theory.Billy Christmas - 2020 - Res Publica 27 (3):329-345.
    Ben Bryan argues that the strongest challenge to natural rights theory is to explain how it overcomes the Problem of Authority. Given that our natural rights are multiply realisable by a range of equally reasonable social conventions, how or why ought one particular realisation have authority? I argue that Thomistic and Kantian solutions to this problem do not count as solutions from natural rights theory, and therefore offer my own solution. When theories of natural rights describe the rights we have (...)
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