- Intentionality, mind and folk psychology.Winand H. Dittrich & Stephen E. G. Lea - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):39-41.details
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Rhesus monkeys are radical behaviorists.Gordon G. Gallup - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129-129.details
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Human reasoning and cognitive science.Keith Stenning & Michiel van Lambalgen - 2008 - Boston, USA: MIT Press.details
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The psychologist's fallacy.Philip David Zelazo & Douglas Frye - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):89-90.details
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Development of social emotions and constructive agents.Aaron Ben Ze'ev & Keith Oatley - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):124-125.details
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Intentionality, theoreticity and innateness.Deborah Zaitchik & Jerry Samet - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):87-89.details
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Competence and performance in belief-desire reasoning across two cultures: The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about false belief?Amir Amin Yazdi, Tim P. German, Margaret Anne Defeyter & Michael Siegal - 2006 - Cognition 100 (2):343-368.details
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Three questions for Goldman.Andrew Woodfield - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):86-87.details
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Mind reading, pretence and imitation in monkeys and apes.A. Whiten - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):170-171.details
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Pragmatic Development and the False Belief Task.Evan Westra - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):235-257.details
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Pragmatic development explains the Theory-of-Mind Scale.Evan Westra & Peter Carruthers - 2017 - Cognition 158 (C):165-176.details
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Is lack of understanding of cause-effect relationships a suitable basis for interpreting monkeys' failures in attribution?Elisabetta Visalberghi - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):169-170.details
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Common sense, functional theories and knowledge of the mind.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):85-86.details
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Where's the person?Michael Tomasello - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):84-85.details
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Cognitive ethology comes of age.Michael Tomasello - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):168-169.details
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Why Alison Gopnik should be a behaviorist.Nicholas S. Thompson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):83-84.details
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A componential view of theory of mind: evidence from Williams syndrome.H. Tager-Flusberg - 2000 - Cognition 76 (1):59-90.details
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Logic in the study of psychiatric disorders: Executive function and rule-following.Keith Stenning & Michiel van Lambalgen - 2007 - Topoi 26 (1):97-114.details
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Categories, categorisation and development: Introspective knowledge is no threat to functionalism.Kim Sterelny - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):81-83.details
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The developmental history of an illusion.Keith E. Stanovich - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):80-81.details
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The sounds of silence.Charles T. Snowdon - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):167-168.details
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Are blind babies delayed in achieving social understanding?Carol Slater - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):141-142.details
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Knowing children's minds.Michael Siegal - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):79-80.details
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Special access lies down with theory-theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):78-79.details
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Why Do Children Who Solve False Belief Tasks Begin to Find True Belief Control Tasks Difficult? A Test of Pragmatic Performance Factors in Theory of Mind Tasks.Lydia P. Schidelko, Michael Huemer, Lara M. Schröder, Anna S. Lueb, Josef Perner & Hannes Rakoczy - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 12.details
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Knowing thyself, knowing the other: They're not the same.Jonathan Schull & J. David Smith - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):166-167.details
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Disenshrining the Cartesian self.Barbara A. C. Saunders - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):77-78.details
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Realism and children's early grasp of mental representation: belief-based judgements in the state change task.Rebecca Saltmarsh, Peter Mitchell & Elizabeth Robinson - 1995 - Cognition 57 (3):297-325.details
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On leaving your children wrapped in thought.James Russell - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):76-77.details
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Don’t Mention the Marble! The Role of Attentional Processes in False-Belief Tasks.Paula Rubio-Fernández & Bart Geurts - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):835-850.details
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Belief is prior to knowledge.David Rose - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):385-399.details
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The relationship between parental mental-state language and 2.5-year-olds’ performance on a nontraditional false-belief task. [REVIEW]Erin Roby & Rose M. Scott - 2018 - Cognition 180 (C):10-23.details
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Meaning, belief, and language acquisition.Mark Risjord - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (4):465-475.details
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Qualities and relations in folk theories of mind.Lance J. Rips - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):75-76.details
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How do monkeys remember the world?R. M. Ridley - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):166-166.details
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Why presume analyses are on-line?Georges Rey - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):74-75.details
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Omitting the second person in social understanding.Vasudevi Reddy - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):140-141.details
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Theories of mind: Some methodological/conceptual problems and an alternative approach.Sam S. Rakover - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):73-74.details
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Theory-theory theory.Howard Rachlin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):72-73.details
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Intentional schema will not do the work of a theory of mind.David Premack & Ann James Premack - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):138-140.details
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Matching and mental-state ascription.Ian Pratt - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):71-72.details
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Ontogeny, evolution, and folk psychology.Daniel J. Povinelli, Mia C. Zebouni & Christopher G. Prince - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):137-138.details
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On attributing mental states to monkeys: First, know thyself.Daniel J. Povinelli & Sandra deBlois - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):164-166.details
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Representational development and theory-of-mind computations.David C. Plaut & Annette Karmiloff-Smith - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):70-71.details
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Limitations on first-person experience: Implications of the “extent”.Bradford H. Pillow - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):69-69.details
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First-person authority and beliefs as representations.Paul M. Pietroski - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):67-69.details
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The many faces of belief: reflections on Fodor's and the child's theory of mind.Josef Perner - 1995 - Cognition 57 (3):241-269.details
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Exploring the “boundary” between the minds of monkeys and humans.Sidney I. Perloe - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):163-164.details
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A plea for the second functionalist model and the insufficiency of simulation.Josef Perner - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):66-67.details
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Calls as labels: An intriguing theme, but one with limitations.Donald H. Owings - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):162-163.details
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