We examined Confucian moral philosophy, primarily the Analects, to determine how Confucian ethics could help managers regulate their own behavior (self-regulation) to maintain an ethical standard of practice. We found that some Confucian virtues relevant to self-regulation are common to Western concepts of management ethics such as benevolence, righteousness, wisdom, and trustworthiness. Some are relatively unique, such as ritual propriety and filial piety. We identify seven Confucian principles and discuss how they apply to achieving ethical self-regulation in management. In addition, (...) we examined some of the unique Confucian practices to achieve self-regulation including ritual and music. We balanced the framework by exploring the potential problems in applying Confucian principles to develop ethical self-regulation including whistle blowing. Confucian moral philosophy offers an indigenous Chinese theoretical framework for developing ethical self-regulation in managers. This is relevant for managers and those who relate to managers in Confucian-oriented societies, such as China, Korea, Japan, and Singapore. We recommend further research to examine if the application of the Confucian practices outlined here actually work in regulating the ethical behavior of managers in modern organizations. (shrink)

A recent turn in the cognitive sciences has deepened the attention on embodied and situated dynamics for explaining different cognitive processes such as perception, emotion, and social cognition. This has fostered an extensive interest in the social and ‘intersubjective’ nature of moral behavior, especially from the perspective of enactivism. In this paper, I argue that embodied and situated perspectives, enactivism in particular, nonetheless require further improvements with regards to their analysis of the social nature of human morality. In brief, enactivist (...) proposals still do not define what features of the social-relational context, or which kind of processes within social interactions, make an evaluation or action morally relevant or distinctive from other types of social normativity. As an alternative to this proclivity, and seeking to complement the enactive perspective, I present a definition of the process of moral sense-making and offer an empirically-based ethical distinction between different domains of social knowledge in moral development. For doing so, I take insights from the constructivist tradition in moral psychology. My objective is not to radically oppose embodied and enactive alternatives but to expand the horizon of their conceptual and empirical contributions to morality research. (shrink)

In recent years, increasing attention has been given to virtue ethics in business. Aristotle's thought is often seen as the basis of the virtue ethics tradition. For Aristotle, the idea of phronësis, or 'practical wisdom', lies at the foundation of ethics. Confucian ethics has notable similarities to Aristotelian virtue ethics, and may embody some similar ideas of practical wisdom. This article considers how ideas of moral judgment in these traditions are consistent with modern ideas about intuition in management decision making. (...) A hypothetical case is considered where the complexity of ethical decision making in a group context illustrates the importance of intuitive, phronësis-like judgment. It is then noted that both Aristotelian and Confucian virtue ethics include suggestions about support for moral decision making that are also consistent with modern theory. (shrink)

On one view of ethical development, someone not yet virtuous can reliably progress by engaging in what meaningfully resembles virtuous conduct. However, if the well-intended conduct is psychologically demanding, one's character, precisely because one is not yet virtuous, may worsen rather than improve. This risk of degradation casts doubt on the developmental view. I counter the doubt through one interpretation and one application of the Mengzi. In passage 2A2, invoking the image of a farmer who “helped” the crop grow by (...) pulling the sprouts, MENG Ke cautions, “do not help it grow.” I defend a novel interpretation: do not advance with a naïve negligence about your psycho-physiological constitution. I also show how to advance with realistic care by pointing out an overlooked application of a much-discussed cultivation technique illustrated in Mengzi 1A7: ethical reflection can conciliate one with one’s ongoing or past advanced action, lowering the action’s risk of degradation. (shrink)

The present study examines the four core concepts that underpin the various theories of cultivation of East Asian Confucian philosophy: self, cultivation, transformation, and nurture. The discussion is divided into six sections. The first section, the introduction, explains the significance of the issue in question. The second section examines the substantial notion of “self” as expounded in the Confucian intellectual tradition and the corresponding concept of selfhood or personhood. Confucianism stresses that personal selfhood is based on the freedom of subjectivity, (...) and society’s values and norms originate in this freedom of subjectivity. The third section discusses the functional concept of cultivation, focusing on the fact that in Confucian theories the terms “cultivation” and “body” are always combined to form the concept of “self-cultivation.” Moreover, Confucian thinkers tend to discuss the effort of self-cultivation in the context of a body-mind continuum. Indeed, they often use orientational metaphors in order to describe the efforts entailed by cultivation. The fourth section analyzes the linguistic setting and context of the functional concept of transformation within Confucian philosophy of the concrete self. The term “transformation” indicates clearly that Confucian philosophy is a transformative philosophy. The fifth section analyzes the functional concept of nurture, stressing that Confucius’ two greatest followers, Mencius and Xunzi, represent two opposed approaches to nurturing. Mencius stresses that one should undertake the effort of “nurturing qi,” that is, produce culture through natural cultivation, while Xunzi advocates artificially instilling culture in order to discipline, tame, and order nature. Mencius and Xunzi both turn to the container metaphor in their discussions of self-cultivation. The article concludes that the various cultivation activities advocated by these two disparate Confucians are based on two assumptions: the self coincides with the physical body, and the physical self is steeped in and interactive with the cultural values of society. In sum, the functional concept of self-cultivation is an important pillar of Confucian theories of self-cultivation. (shrink)

This paper consists of two parts. The first deals with the issue of whether it is possible to coherently employ the term ‘critical Confucian’ in general, i.e. whether it is a paradox or oxymoron. It will be argued that Confucianism should not be identified with any particular ideology and, therefore, can be critical. This critical potential, in turn, can be developed by bringing it into dialogue with Critical Theory. As such, the second part indicates, in an introductory way, some possible (...) overlaps between Confucianism and Critical Theory by comparing Heiner Roetz’s and Axel Honneth’s respective interpretations of these traditions. (shrink)

This paper explores a distinctive form of social interaction—interpersonal inquiry—in which two or more people attempt to understand one another by engaging in conversation. Like many modes of inquiry into human beings, interpersonal inquiry partly shapes its own objects. How we conduct it thus affects who we become. I present an ethical ideal of conversation to which, I argue, at least some of our interpersonal inquiry ought to aspire. I then consider how this ideal might influence philosophical conceptions of the (...) self. (shrink)

In this paper I will take the right to privacy as an example when discussing the question of the prospects of global value consensus or value conflicts. The question whether privacy is a contextual value will be discussed in the remaining part of my paper and I will take the views of the Japanese ICT-ethicists Yohko Orito and Kiyosho Murata as my point of departure. In “Privacy protection in Japan: cultural influence on the universal value” (2005), they argue against the (...) view that the right to privacy is a universal value. Their argument is straightforward and clear, hence their article is a valuable contribution to the discussion. However, I will object to their argument. I will defend the view that privacy is a universal value, although there are contextual differences concerning what kind of information is considered as privacy sensitive. (shrink)

This paper explores the Confucian value of authenticity. Taking as the starting point of the Confucian concept of becoming authentic persons of bo, da, jing, and shen, the paper first demonstrates that a high–far–firm zhixiang, creativity, an examined life, and sincerity are four necessary conditions for a self to be an authentic one of bo, da, jing, and shen. It then demonstrates that Confucian ethics operates with a metaphysical concept of a substantive self and Confucian self-cultivation implies authenticating such a (...) substantive self. Finally, it demonstrates that in Confucian ethics, cultivating a person’s self and cultivating the person’s humanity are not separable and entail one another. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis essay explores the Confucian theory of mind. Doing so, it first examines the early Confucian concept of the human mind as a substance that has both moral and cognitive functions and a universal nature. It then explores the neo-Confucian concept of the human mind, the original mind, and the relationships between the human mind and human nature, as well as between the human mind and the human body. Finally, it explores the Confucian concept of cultivation of the mind.

An overview of Dai's ethics, highlighting some overlooked or misunderstood theses on moral deliberation and motivation.