- Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Self-Experience.Darryl Mathieson - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.details
|
|
A Moorean paradox of desire.David Wall - 2012 - Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):63-84.details
|
|
No-‘How’ Privileged Self-Knowledge.Dorit Bar-On - forthcoming - Erkenntnis.details
|
|
Endorsement and assertion.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):363-384.details
|
|
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Wittgenstein and Qualia.Ned Block - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.details
|
|
Factive phenomenal characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.details
|
|
Une défense hétérodoxe de la conception inférentialiste de l'introspection.Pascal Ludwig - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (1):123-144.details
|
|
The Developmental Challenge to the Paradox of Pain.Kevin Reuter - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (2):265-283.details
|
|
The Transcendental Argument for Universal Mineness: A Critique.Daniel Wehinger - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (1):167-188.details
|
|
Access Internalism and the Extended Mind.Declan Smithies - 2018 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Andy Clark, Jesper Kallestrup, Orestis Palermos & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Extended Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 17-41.details
|
|
The Role of Certainty.Timm Triplett - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (2):171-190.details
|
|
Knowing what one wants.Krista Lawlor - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):47-75.details
|
|
Senses for senses.Brad Thompson - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):99 – 117.details
|
|
Self-knowledge: Rationalism vs. empiricism.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (2):325–352.details
|
|
Self-verification and the content of thought.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2006 - Synthese 149 (1):59 - 75.details
|
|
Belief and Commitment: Commentary on Annalisa Coliva, The Varieties of Self-Knowledge, London: Pallgrave Macmillan.Aaron Z. Zimmerman - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):335-342.details
|
|
Ownership, Memory, Attention: Commentary on Ganeri.Dan Zahavi - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (4):406-415.details
|
|
Is the Self a Social Construct?Dan Zahavi - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (6):551-573.details
|
|
Shoemaker on qualia, phenomenal properties and spectrum inversions.Timm Triplett - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):203-208.details
|
|
Wolfgang Huemer, the constitution of consciousness: A study in analytic phenomenology. [REVIEW]Amie L. Thomasson - 2007 - Husserl Studies 23 (2):161-167.details
|
|
Reasonable Partiality and the Agent’s Point of View.Alan Thomas - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (1-2):25-43.details
|
|
Introspection and phenomenological method.Amie L. Thomasson - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):239-254.details
|
|
Empathy and the Melodic Unity of the Other.Joona Taipale - 2015 - Human Studies 38 (4):463-479.details
|
|
Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.details
|
|
Judgment Internalism: An Argument from Self-Knowledge.Jussi Suikkanen - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):489-503.details
|
|
What Is the Relation Between an Experience, the Subject of the Experience, and the Content of the Experience?Galen Strawson - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):279-315.details
|
|
The Regress Objection to Reflexive Theories of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):293-308.details
|
|
The Consequences Of Intentionalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):247-270.details
|
|
The argument from diaphanousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement):341--90.details
|
|
Is there a persuasive argument for an inner awareness theory of consciousness?Daniel Stoljar - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1555-1575.details
|
|
Introspective knowledge of negative facts.Daniel Stoljar - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):389-410.details
|
|
Introspection and Necessity.Daniel Stoljar - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):389-410.details
|
|
Insincerity.Andreas Stokke - 2012 - Noûs 48 (3):496-520.details
|
|
Evans on transparency: a rationalist account.Daniel Stoljar - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2067-2085.details
|
|
Systematische überlegungen zu husserls einstellungslehre.Andrea Staiti - 2009 - Husserl Studies 25 (3):219-233.details
|
|
Mental action and the epistemology of mind.Matthew Soteriou - 2005 - Noûs 39 (1):83-105.details
|
|
Shoemaker’s Moderate Qualia Realism and the Transparency of Qualia.Renée J. Smith - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (22):1 - 13.details
|
|
On the Global Ambitions of Phenomenal Conservatism.Declan Smithies - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (3):206-244.details
|
|
Belief and Self‐Knowledge: Lessons From Moore's Paradox.Declan Smithies - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):393-421.details
|
|
Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action.Declan Smithies & Jeremy Weiss - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (1):27-54.details
|
|
The Evil Demon Inside.Nicholas Silins - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):325-343.details
|
|
Introspection and inference.Nicholas Silins - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):291-315.details
|
|
Is experience transparent?Charles Siewert - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):15-41.details
|
|
Why Should We Know Our Own Minds?Shuhei Shimamura - 2012 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 45 (2):29-46.details
|
|
Plural self-awareness.Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):7-24.details
|
|
On Kant's Conception of Inner Sense: Self‐Affection by the Understanding.Friederike Schmitz - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1044-1063.details
|
|
Knowing Your Own Beliefs.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):41-62.details
|
|
Collective Responsibilities of Random Collections: Plural Self‐Awareness among Strangers.Hans Bernhard Schmid - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):91-105.details
|
|
Knowledge of Our Own Beliefs.Sherrilyn Roush - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):45-69.details
|
|