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  1. Husserl on Perception: A Nonrepresentationalism That Nearly Was.Matt Bower - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (4):1768-1790.
    There is a longstanding debate among Husserl scholars about whether Husserl thinks perception involves mental representation. The debate, I believe, has not been settled. I deny that the existentialist-inspired charge of representationalism about perception in Husserl is precise enough to stick. Given a clearer understanding of just what mental representation amounts to, I contend that those who defend Husserl against the accusation of representationalism fare little better than Husserl's existentialist-leaning critics. I argue that he is in fact a representationalist about (...)
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  • The Quilombola Movement: Sensing Futures in Afroindigenous Amazonia.Aníbal G. Arregui - 2020 - Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology 48 (3):336-356.
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  • Prinzipien und Grundlagen der Wahrnehmungsauffassung bei Husserl.Chang Liu - 2019 - Husserl Studies 35 (2):149-176.
    “Apprehension” is a key term in Husserl’s phenomenology of perceptual consciousness. However, its modes of operation have not yet been closely analyzed. Apprehension has its own principles and foundations. According to Husserl, the principles of apprehension are 1) contiguity, 2) equality and 3) similarity, and each of them expresses a specific kind of qualitative connection between the apprehension-content and the apprehension-sense. When a content presents a sense through equality or similarity, this sense can be regarded as a “projection” from the (...)
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  • Husserl's Notion of Sensation and Merleau-Ponty's Critique.Ka-Wing Leung - 2018 - Comparative and Continental Philosophy 10 (1):35-49.
    ABSTRACTMerleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception begins with a critique of the philosophical notion of sensation. Even though it is often generally said to be aimed at traditional psychology or empiricism, Merleau-Ponty’s critique is without question also applicable to Husserl’s notion of sensation. The first half of this paper will offer an interpretation of Husserl’s conception of sensation as the stuff of perception and the pregivennesses for all of the Ego’s operations. And then it will attempt to show how Merleau-Ponty’s critique in (...)
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  • Extending Gurwitsch’s Field Theory of Consciousness.Jeff Yoshimi & David W. Vinson - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 34:104-123.
    Aron Gurwitsch’s theory of the structure and dynamics of consciousness has much to offer contemporary theorizing about consciousness and its basis in the embodied brain. On Gurwitsch’s account, as we develop it, the field of consciousness has a variable sized focus or "theme" of attention surrounded by a structured periphery of inattentional contents. As the field evolves, its contents change their status, sometimes smoothly, sometimes abruptly. Inner thoughts, a sense of one’s body, and the physical environment are dominant field contents. (...)
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  • Affectively Driven Perception: Toward a Non-Representational Phenomenology.Matt Bower - 2014 - Husserl Studies 30 (3):225-245.
    While classical phenomenology, as represented by Edmund Husserl’s work, resists certain forms of representationalism about perception, I argue that in its theory of horizons, it posits representations in the sense of content-bearing vehicles. As part of a phenomenological theory, this means that on the Husserlian view such representations are part of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. I believe that, although the intuitions supporting this idea are correct, it is a mistake to maintain that there are such representations defining the (...)
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  • Husserl’s Hyletic Data and Phenomenal Consciousness.Kenneth Williford - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):501-519.
    In the Logical Investigations, Ideas I and many other texts, Husserl maintains that perceptual consciousness involves the intentional “animation” or interpretation of sensory data or hyle, e.g., “color-data,” “tone-data,” and algedonic data. These data are not intrinsically representational nor are they normally themselves objects of representation, though we can attend to them in reflection. These data are “immanent” in consciousness; they survive the phenomenological reduction. They partly ground the intuitive or “in-the-flesh” aspect of perception, and they have a determinacy of (...)
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