Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Cohen’s Community: Beyond the Liberal State?Louis-Philippe Hodgson - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (1):23-50.
    Does the kind of socialist ideal articulated by G. A. Cohen in Why Not Socialism? add anything substantial to the Rawlsian conception of justice? Is it an ideal that Rawlsians should want to take on board, or is it ultimately foreign to their outlook? I defend a mixed answer to these questions. On the one hand, we shouldn’t underestimate the extent to which Rawls's theory already addresses the concerns that motivate Cohen’s appeal to the socialist ideal. Within the bounds of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Rawls and Racial Justice.D. C. Matthew - 2017 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 16 (3):235-258.
    This article discusses the adequacy of Rawls’ theory of justice as a tool for racial justice. It is argued that critics like Charles W Mills fail to appreciate both the insights and limits of the Rawlsian framework. The article has two main parts spread out over several different sections. The first is concerned with whether the Rawlsian framework suffices to prevent racial injustice. It is argued that there are reasons to doubt whether it does. The second part is concerned with (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Incentives, Offers, and Community.Harrison P. Frye - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (3):367-390.
    :A common justification offered for unequal pay is that it encourages socially beneficial productivity. G. A. Cohen famously criticizes this argument for not questioning the behaviour and attitudes that make those incentives necessary. I defend the communal status of incentives against Cohen's challenge. I argue that Cohen's criticism fails to appreciate two different contexts in which we might grant incentives. We might grant unequal payment to someone because they demand it. However, unequal payment might be an offer instead. I claim (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Mill, Rawls and Cohen on Incentives and Occupational Freedom.Paula Casal - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (4):375-397.
    G. A. Cohen's critique of Rawls's defence of economic incentives echoes some of J. S. Mill's insights on the subject. Some of Cohen's arguments, however, clash not only with those of Rawls but also with each other as well as with Mill's. A similar charge, however, may be made against Rawls. This article has conciliatory ambitions. It suggests reconciling each author with himself, as well as with each other, by focusing onthe worthof liberty. It stresses the importance of non-pecuniary occupational (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Egalitarianism.Richard Arneson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
  • Relational Egalitarianism and Emergent Social Inequalities.Dan Threet - 2021 - Res Publica 28 (1):49-67.
    This paper identifies a challenge for liberal relational egalitarians—namely, how to respond to the prospect of emergent inequalities of power, status, and influence arising unintentionally through the free exercise of fundamental individual liberties over time. I argue that these emergent social inequalities can be produced through patterns of nonmalicious choices, that they can in fact impede the full realization of relational equality, and that it is possible they cannot be eliminated entirely without abandoning fundamental liberal commitments to leave individuals substantial (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Incentive Inequalities and Talents: A Reply to Shiffrin.Douglas MacKay - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (2):521-526.
    In a recent article, Seana Valentine Shiffrin offers a distinctive egalitarian critique of the types of incentive inequalities that are permitted by John Rawls's difference principle. She argues that citizens of a well-ordered society, who publicly accept Rawls's two principles of justice and their justifications, may not demand incentives to employ their talents in productive ways since such demands are inconsistent with a major justification for the difference principle: the moral arbitrariness of talent. I argue that there is no such (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Incentives, Inequality and Self-Respect.Richard Penny - 2013 - Res Publica 19 (4):335-351.
    Rawls argues that ‘Parties in the original position would wish to avoid at almost any cost the social conditions that undermine self-respect’. But what are these social conditions that we should so urgently avoid? One evident candidate might be conditions of material inequality. Yet Rawls seems confident that his account of justice can endorse such inequalities without jeopardising citizens’ self-respect. In this article I argue that this confidence is misplaced. Unequalising incentives, I claim, jeopardise the self-respect of those least advantaged—at (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Public Ecology of Freedom of Association.Andres Moles - 2014 - Res Publica 20 (1):85-103.
    This paper defends the claim that private associations might be legitimately constrained by a requirement of reasonableness. I present a list of goods that freedom of association protect, and argue that the limits to associational freedom have to be sensitive to the nature of these goods. In defending this claim, I cast doubt on two popular liberal arguments: One is that attitudes cultivated in the private sphere are not likely to spill over into the public arena. The other is that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Making Sense of Discrimination.Re'em Segev - 2014 - Ratio Juris 27 (1):47-78.
    Discrimination is a central moral and legal concept. However, it is also a contested one. Particularly, accounts of the wrongness of discrimination often rely on controversial and particular assumptions. In this paper, I argue that a theory of discrimination that relies on premises that are very general and widely accepted provides a plausible account of the concept of wrongful discrimination. According to the combined theory, wrongful discrimination consists of allocating a benefit that is not supported by a morally significant fact, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Publicity, Reciprocity, and Incentives.Andrew Lister - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):67-82.
    This paper mounts a partial defense of the basic structure objection to the egalitarian criticism of productive incentives. The defense is based on the claim that some duties of justice are subject to a reciprocity condition. The paper develops this position via an examination of the debate between Andrew Williams and G. A. Cohen on publicity and incentives. Reciprocity is an intrinsic feature of a relational conception of social justice, not simply a requirement of stability. Not all duties are conditional (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Marx, Rawls, Cohen, and Feminism.Paula Casal - 2015 - Hypatia 30 (4):811-828.
    Although G. A. Cohen's work on Marx was flawed by a lack of gender-awareness, his work on Rawls owes much of its success to feminist inspiration. Cohen appeals effectively to feminism to rebut the basic structure objection to his egalitarian ethos, and could now appeal to feminism in response to Andrew Williams's publicity objection to this ethos. The article argues that Williams's objection is insufficient to rebut Cohen's ethos, inapplicable to variants of this ethos, and in conflict with plausible gender-egalitarian (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • The Inegalitarian Ethos: Incentives, Respect, and Self-Respect.Emily McTernan - 2013 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 12 (1):93-111.
    In Cohen’s vision of the just society, there would be no need for unequalizing incentives so as to benefit the least well-off; instead, people would be motivated by an egalitarian ethos to work hard and in the most socially productive jobs. As such, Cohen appears to offer a way to mitigate the trade-off of equality for efficiency that often characterizes theorizing about distributive justice. This article presents an egalitarian challenge to Cohen’s vision of the just society. I argue that a (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Geographic Location and Moral Arbitrariness in the Allocation of Donated Livers.Douglas MacKay & Samuel Fitz - 2019 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 47 (2):308-319.
    The federal system for allocating donated livers in the United States is often criticized for allowing geographic disparities in access to livers. Critics argue that such disparities are unfair on the grounds that where one lives is morally arbitrary and so should not influence one's access to donated livers. They argue instead that livers should be allocated in accordance with the equal opportunity principle, according to which US residents who are equally sick should have the same opportunity to receive a (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Cohen's Equivocal Attack on Rawls's Basic Structure Restriction.Kyle Johannsen - 2016 - Ethical Perspectives 23 (3):499-525.
    G.A. Cohen is famous for his critique of John Rawls’s view that principles of justice are restricted in scope to institutional structures. In recent work, however, Cohen has suggested that Rawlsians get more than just the scope of justice wrong: they get the concept wrong too. He claims that justice is a fundamental value, i.e. a moral input in our deliberations about the content of action-guiding regulatory principles, rather than the output. I argue here that Cohen’s arguments for extending the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • On the Conceptual Status of Justice.Kyle Johannsen - 2015 - Dissertation, Queen's University
    In contemporary debates about justice, political philosophers take themselves to be engaged with a subject that’s narrower than the whole of morality. Many contemporary liberals, notably John Rawls, understand this narrowness in terms of context specificity. On their view, justice is the part of morality that applies to the context of a society’s institutions, but only has indirect application to the context of citizens’ personal lives. In contrast, many value pluralists, notably G.A. Cohen, understand justice’s narrowness in terms of singularity (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Species of Pluralism in Political Philosophy.Kyle Johannsen - 2021 - Journal of Value Inquiry 55 (3):491-506.
    The name ‘pluralism’ frequently rears its head in political philosophy, but theorists often have different things in mind when using the term. Whereas ‘reasonable pluralism’ refers to the fact of moral diversity among citizens of a liberal democracy, ‘value pluralism’ is a metaethical view about the structure of moral practical reasoning. In this paper, I argue that value pluralism is part of the best explanation for reasonable pluralism. However, I also argue that embracing this explanation is compatible with political liberalism’s (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Rescuing Rawls’s Institutionalism and Incentives Inequality.Edward Greetis - 2019 - Res Publica 25 (4):571-590.
    G. A. Cohen argues that Rawls’s difference principle is incompatible with his endorsement of incentives inequality—higher pay for certain professions is just when that pay benefits everyone. Cohen concludes that Rawls must reject both incentives inequality and ‘institutionalism’—the view that egalitarian principles, including the difference principle, apply exclusively to social institutions. I argue that the premises of Cohen’s ‘internal criticism’ of Rawls require rejecting two important parts of his theory: a ‘subjective circumstance of justice’ and a ‘shared conception of justice’. (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Mooring for Ethical Life.Chris Melenovsky - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania
    Since G.A. Cohen’s influential criticism, John Rawls’s focus on the basic structure of society has fallen out of favor in moral and political philosophy. The most prominent defenses of this focus has argued from particular conceptions of justice or from a moral division of labor. In this dissertation, I instead argue for the Rawlsian focus from the ways in which social institutions establish new obligations, rights and powers. I argue that full evaluation of individual conduct requires that we evaluate the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Educational Adequacy and Educational Equality: A Merging Proposal.Fernando De-Los-Santos-Menéndez - 2019 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-22.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Two Conceptions of Talent.Jaime Ahlberg - forthcoming - Tandf: Educational Philosophy and Theory:1-12.
  • Immigrant Selection, Health Requirements, and Disability Discrimination.Douglas MacKay - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 14 (1).
    Australia, Canada, and New Zealand currently apply health requirements to prospective immigrants, denying residency to those with health conditions that are likely to impose an “excessive demand” on their publicly funded health and social service programs. In this paper, I investigate the charge that such policies are wrongfully discriminatory against persons with disabilities. I first provide a freedom-based account of the wrongness of discrimination according to which discrimination is wrong when and because it involves disadvantaging people in the exercise of (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Educational Adequacy and Educational Equality: A Merging Proposal.Fernando de los Santos Menéndez - forthcoming - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy:1-22.
  • What Is the Point of Justice?Andrew Mason - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (4):525-547.
    Conflicting answers to the question of what principles of justice are for may generate very different ways of theorizing about justice. Indeed divergent answers to it are at the heart of G. A. Cohen's disagreement with John Rawls. Cohen thinks that the roots of this disagreement lie in the constructivist method that Rawls employs, which mistakenly treats the principles that emerge from a procedure that involves factual assumptions as ultimate principles of justice. But I argue that even if Rawls were (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Nonworseness Claim and the Moral Permissibility of Better-Than-Permissible Acts.Adam D. Bailey - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):237-250.
    Grounded in what Alan Wertheimer terms the nonworseness claim, it is thought by some philosophers that what will be referred to herein as better-than-permissible acts —acts that, if undertaken, would make another or others better off than they would be were an alternative but morally permissible act to be undertaken—are necessarily morally permissible. What, other than a bout of irrationality, it may be thought, would lead one to hold that an act (such as outsourcing production to a sweatshop in a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Book Review: Property-Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond, Written by M. O’Neill and T. Williamson. [REVIEW]Carl Fox - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (4):543-546.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Occupational Choice and the Egalitarian Ethos.Paula Casal - 2013 - Economics and Philosophy 29 (1):3-20.
    G. A. Cohen proposes to eradicate inequality without loss of efficiency or freedom by relying on an egalitarian ethos requiring us to undertake socially useful occupations we would rather not take, and work hard at them, without requesting differential incentive payments. Since the ethos is not legally enforced, Cohen denies it threatens our occupational freedom. Drawing on the work of Joseph Raz, the paper argues that Cohen's proposal threatens our occupational autonomy even if it leaves our legal freedom intact. It (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Incentive Inequalities and Freedom of Occupational Choice.Douglas Mackay - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (1):21-49.
    In Rescuing Justice and Equality, G.A. Cohen argues that the incentive inequalities permitted by John Rawls's difference principle are unjust since people cannot justify them to their fellow citizens. I argue that citizens of a Rawlsian society can justify their acceptance of a wide range of incentive inequalities to their fellow citizens. They can do so because they possess the right to freedom of occupational choice, and are permitted – as a matter of justice – to exercise this right by (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Incentives, Conventionalism, and Constructivism.C. M. Melenovsky - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):549-574.
    Rawlsians argue for principles of justice that apply exclusively to the basic structure of society, but it can seem strange that those who accept these principles should not also regulate their choices by them. Valid moral principles should seemingly identify ideals for both institutions and individuals. What justifies this nonintuitive distinction between institutional and individual principles is not a moral division of labor but Rawls’s dual commitments to conventionalism and constructivism. Conventionalism distinguishes the relevant ideals for evaluating institutions from those (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation