Friedrich Engels’s “History of the Rifle” was among the longest and most detailed studies of technological development that either he or Marx produced. Yet the piece has been almost entirely forgotten. I recover Engels’s essay as a model for the historiography of technology and for the study of the politics of the technical object today, demonstrating its continuity with the larger critical project he was engaged in with Marx in these years. In a famous footnote to Capital, Marx suggested that (...) the method appropriate to a “critical history of technology” in society should be developed by analogy to Darwin’s revolutionary history of organic life. I show that Engels’s study of the rifle works out such a method in practice, recasting technological development as a nondeterministic interplay between the successive mutations of the artifact and the pressures of its social environment. Moreover, Engels’s technological materialism has a socially engaged and emancipatory end, for it is here directed against a particularly pernicious form of the commodity fetish: the fetishism of weapons. (shrink)

Starting from the seminal experience of James Prescott Joule, this paper aims to debate the possibility of “making” science outside universities and academies. Joule himself studied as an autodidact and did not make his own discoveries while following an academic path; on the contrary, at first, the associations and academic societies of the time tended not to recognize his works officially. All of this happened throughout the nineteenth century during the period of the first relevant tendency to science popularization. For (...) example, looking at the second half of the England of the 1800s, we can refer to Michael Faraday’s open lessons for children like The Chemical History of a Candle. Following this perspective from a historical view, this paper explores the Italian attempts to communicate science—from the ‘50s to the ‘70s—to a larger public via television and other media, also considering the political and social backgrounds behind this choice. In particular, this paper also deals with Lucio Lombardo Radice’s work on TV programs and writings in social-political journals and daily newspapers, as a mathematician and pedagogist engaged on the importance of what he specifically called “Scientific mediation”, as a “method” to teach and popularize science to a larger public. (shrink)

Philosophy of science is showing an increasing interest in the social aspects and the social organisation of science—the ways social values and social interactions and structures play a role in the creation of knowledge and the ways this role should be taken into account in the organisation of science and science policy. My thesis explores a number of issues related to this theme. I argue that a prominent approach to the social organisation of science—Philip Kitcher’s well-ordered science—runs into a number (...) of problems. They undermine its philosophical plausibility and practical usefulness. I agree with Kitcher that arguments about the social organisation of science should recognise profound societal consequences of science. Kitcher argues that the appropriate organisation of science should therefore take into account laypersons’ values and needs when making decisions concerning research planning, evaluation and application. My criticisms show that this is not enough. Drawing on Helen Longino ideas, I argue that laypersons’ perspectives and knowledge may also be relevant when doing research. In order to show how more inclusive research practices may be possible, I discuss connections between philosophy of science and some developments in science policy, which has also recently shown considerable interest in democratic participation. I demonstrate how public participation experiments in science policy may sometimes be close enough to what the philosopher would recommend. Their analysis can thus be helpful for understanding how societal developments may provide opportunities for the involvement of laypersons in science and what factors may endanger its success. I conclude that a way to pursue a more socially relevant philosophy of science is to focus on the points of contact and possibilities of cooperation between philosophical proposals and these public participation initiatives. (shrink)